ARA General Belgrano

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Belgrano as she was in 1941 as USS Phoenix passing Battleship row at Pearl Harbor

The ARA General Belgrano was an Armada República Argentina cruiser sunk, with significant loss of life, in a controversial incident during the Falklands War. It is the only ship ever to have been sunk by a nuclear-powered submarine as a hostile act. The name had earlier been used for a 7,069-ton armoured cruiser completed in 1899.

Contents

1 General history
2 Falklands War
3 Controversy over the sinking

3.1 Later political controversy

4 General characteristics
5 References
6 See also

General history

She was built as USS Phoenix (CL-46), the sixth of the Brooklyn-class light cruisers, in New Jersey by the New York Shipbuilding Corporation starting in 1935, and launched in March 1938. She survived the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and was decommissioned from the US Navy (USN) in July 1946. USS Phoenix was sold, with another of her class (USS Boise), to Argentina in October 1951, for $7.8 million. She was renamed 17 de Octubre after an important date for the political party of the then president Juan Perón. Perón was overthrown in 1955, and in 1956 the vessel was renamed General Belgrano (C-4) after General Manuel Belgrano, who had fought for Argentine independence in 1816.

Falklands War

The sinking of the Belgrano was celebrated with one of the most famous headlines in history from the British tabloid newspaper The Sun.

In the early phase of the 1982 Falklands War, much of the Argentine navy had avoided any conflict. The General Belgrano had left Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego on April 26, 1982, with two destroyers, the ARA Piedra Buena (D-29) and the Bouchard (D-26) (both also ex-USN vessels), as Task Group 79.3. On the 29th they were patrolling the Burdwood Bank, south of the islands. On the 30th she was detected by the British nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine HMS Conqueror. The submarine approached over the following day. Although outside the British-declared Total Exclusion Zone of 370 km (200 nautical miles) radius from the islands, the British decided that the group was a threat. After consultation at Cabinet level, the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, agreed that Commander Chris Wreford-Brown should attack the group. At 15:57 on May 2, Conqueror fired three conventional Mk 8 mod 4 torpedoes, each with an 800 lb (363 kg) Torpex warhead, two of which hit the General Belgrano. The Conqueror was also equipped with the newer Mk 24 Tigerfish homing torpedo, but there were doubts about its reliability. The Mk 8 dated back to the 1920s and was not a homing design. [link]

One of the torpedoes struck between 10 and 15 metres back from the bow, outside the area protected by either the ship's side armour or the internal anti-torpedo bulge. The effect of this was to blow the bow of the ship off, but the internal bulkheads held and the forward powder magazine for the 40 mm gun did not detonate. There was nobody in that part of the ship at the time of the explosion.

The second torpedo struck about three-quarters of the way along the ship, just outside the rear limit of the side armour plating. The torpedo punched through the side of the ship before exploding in the after machine room. The explosion tore upwards through two messes and a relaxation area called "the Soda Fountain" and finally ripped a twenty metre long hole in the main deck. Later reports put the number of deaths in the area around the explosion at 275 men. There was no fire after the explosion, but the ship rapidly filled with smoke. The explosion also damaged the Belgrano's electrical power system, preventing her putting out a radio distress call.

Though the forward bulkheads held, water was rushing in through the hole created by the torpedo and could not be pumped out because of the electrical power failure. The ship began to list to port and to sink towards the bow. Twenty minutes after the attack at 16:24 Captain Bonzo ordered the crew to abandon ship. Inflatable life rafts were deployed and the evacuation began without panic.

The two escort ships were unaware of what was happening to the Belgrano, as they were out of touch with the Belgrano in the gloom, and had not seen the distress rockets or lamp signals. Adding to the confusion, the crew of the ARA Bouchard felt an impact that was possibly the third torpedo striking at the end of its run (an examination of the ship later showed an impact mark consistent with a torpedo). The two ships continued on their course westward and began dropping depth charges. By the time the ships realised that something had happened to the Belgrano it was already dark and the weather had worsened scattering the life rafts.

Argentine and Chilean ships rescued 770 men in all from May 3 to May 5. In total 323 of the Argentine crew were killed in the attack.

Controversy over the sinking

The Belgrano sinking after being struck by torpedoes fired by HMS Conqueror

There was some controversy surrounding the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano:

At the time of the attacks the ship was sailing away from the Falkland Islands.

Though the ship was heading away from the Falkland Islands, it had been moving towards the task force all the previous day. It had only turned around because an airstrike on the task force was cancelled, because there was not enough wind to launch planes from the aircraft carrier operating to the north of the Falklands. The ship had in fact been ordered back towards the coast to wait for more favourable conditions for an attack. Hector Bonzo, captain of the Belgrano commented on this move "We were heading towards the mainland but not going to the mainland; we were going to a position to await further orders".

Also the Belgrano could have been brought about in minutes and entered a region of shallow water called Burdwood Bank in a few hours, where it would have been impossible for the trailing British submarine to follow.

The ship was outside the 200 mile (370 km) exclusion zone.

Though the ship was outside of the 200 mile exclusion zone, both sides understood that this was no longer the limit of British action — on 23 April a message was passed via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Argentine government, it read:

In announcing the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty's Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft, which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft, including civil aircraft engaged in surveillance of these British forces, will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.

Interviews conducted by Martin Middlebrook for his book, The Fight For The Malvinas, indicated that Argentine Naval officers understood the intent of the message was to indicate that any ships operating near the exclusion zone could be targeted. Argentine Rear-Admiral Allara who was in charge of the task force that the Belgrano was part of said, "After that message of 23 April, the entire South Atlantic was an operational theatre for both sides. We as professionals, said it was just too bad that we lost the Belgrano". Also the rules of engagement were changed specifically to permit the engagement of the Belgrano outside the exclusion zone before the sinking.

The sinking of the ship hardened the stance of the Argentine government and effectively ended any chances of a peaceful settlement.

The sinking of the Belgrano certainly was the single largest loss of life in the conflict, however it took place after a day of fighting which had seen the deaths of several Argentine pilots. As far as both sides were concerned the shooting war had already begun. The British were likely never to accept anything less than the return of the Islands, which the Argentinians were not likely to do.

Key decision makers were not aware that the ship was sailing away from the Falklands at the time the order was given.

According to the British historian, Sir Lawrence Freedman, in a new book written in 2005, neither Margaret Thatcher nor the Cabinet was aware of the Belgrano's change of course before the cruiser was attacked, as information from HMS Conqueror was not passed on to the MoD or Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward (commander of the RN task force).[link]. In his book, One Hundred Days, Admiral Woodward makes it clear that he regarded (correctly as it turned out) that the Belgrano was part of a southern part of a pincer movement aimed at the task force, and had to be sunk quickly. He wrote:

The speed and direction of an enemy ship can be irrelevant, because both can change quickly. What counts is his position, his capability and what I believe to be his intention.

Later political controversy

Some details of the action were later "leaked" to a British MP, Tam Dalyell, by a senior civil servant, Clive Ponting, resulting in the unsuccessful prosecution of the latter under the Official Secrets Act.

In May 1983, Margaret Thatcher appeared on Nationwide, a live television show on BBC One, where Diana Gould grilled her about the sinking, claiming that the ship was already west of Falklands and heading towards the Argentinian mainland to the west. Gould also claimed that the Peruvian peace proposal must have reached London in the 14 hours between its publication and the sinking of the Belgrano, and the escalation of the war could have thus been prevented. In the following emotional exchange, Thatcher answered that the vessel was a threat to British ships and lives and denied that the peace proposal had reached her.[link] After the show, Thatcher's husband Denis lashed out at the producer of the show in the entertainment suite, saying that his wife had been "stitched up by bloody BBC poofs and Trots."[link].

Thatcher herself commented during the interview "I think it could only be in Britain that a prime minister was accused of sinking an enemy ship that was a danger to our navy, when my main motive was to protect the boys in our Navy".

General characteristics

Displacement: 9,575 tons (empty) 12,242 (full load)
Length: 608.3 ft (185 m)
Beam: 61.8 ft (18.9 m)
Draft: 19.5 ft (5.9 m)
Speed: 32.5 knots (60 km/h)
Complement: 1,138 officers and men
Armament:
* 15 x 6 in (152 mm) guns,
* 8 x 5 in (127 mm) AA guns,
* 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns,
* 2 British Sea Cat missile AA systems (added 1968)
* 2 helicopters

References

[The Times article] June 27, 2005, Evans, M. and Hamilton, A.
Dalyell, Tam, MP. Thatcher's Torpedo. Cecil Woolf, 1983. ISBN 0-90082821-66-3.
Freedman, Sir L. Official History of the Falklands: Vol 2. Frank Cass, 2005 ISBN 0714652075
Gavshon, Arthur and Rice, Desmond. The Sinking of the Belgrano. Secker & Warburg, 1984. ISBN 0-436-41332-9
Middlebrook, Martin. The Fight For The Malvinas. ISBN 0140107673
Norton-Taylor, Richard. The Ponting Affair. Cecil Woolf, 1985. ISBN 0-900821-73-6
Woodward, Admiral Sandy. One Hundred Days. ISBN 0007134673.