Arctic convoys of World War II

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The Arctic convoys of World War II travelled from the United States and the United Kingdom to the northern ports of the Soviet Union - Archangel and Murmansk.

Contents

1 Convoys
2 Strategic Impact
3 Role of intelligence
4 Summary
5 Literary Depictions
6 See also
7 External links

Convoys

There were 78 convoys between August 1941 and May 1945 (although there were two gaps with no sailings between July and September 1942, and March and November 1943). At first, the convoys sailed from Iceland but after September 1942 they assembled and sailed from Loch Ewe in Scotland. The route was around occupied Norway to the Soviet ports and was particularly dangerous due to the proximity of German air, submarine and surface forces and also because of the severe weather.

Each convoy had two name-number identifiers: PQ <number> or JW <number> for the journey to Russia, and QP <number> or RA <number> for the return journey.

Four particular convoys are notable:

On 30 May, 1942, the surviving ships Convoy PQ-16 arrives, most ships to Murmansk and 8 ships to Archangel, the convoy was such a success in terms of the War Stores delivered that the Germans made greater efforts to disrupt the following convoys. the Heavy Lift Ships from PQ17 including Empire Elgar stayed at Archangel and Moltovosk unloading convoys for over 14 months
In July 1942, convoy Convoy PQ-17 was ordered to scatter following reports that German battleships and cruisers had sailed to intercept the convoy. However, although the German ships were part of Rösselsprung, they were merely changing port and abandoned their sortie the morning after the dispersal order was given. Only 11 of the 36 merchant ships in the convoy succeeded in running the gauntlet of U-boats and German bombers.
The Battle of the Barents Sea: In December 1942, German surface forces, including the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and pocket battleship Lützow sailed to intercept convoy JW51B. The German force was driven off by a combined force of destroyers and cruisers.
The Battle of the North Cape: In December 1943, convoy JW55B was attacked by the Scharnhorst. HMS Duke of York and her escorts sank the battlecruiser in a night action.

Strategic Impact

As a result of early raids by destroyers on German coastal shipping and the Commando raid on Vaagso, Hitler was led to believe that the British intended to invade Norway again. This, together with the obvious need to stop convoy supplies reaching Soviet Russia, caused him to direct that heavier ships, centred on the battleship Tirpitz, be sent to Norway. The Channel Dash was partly undertaken for this reason. As a "fleet in being," Tirpitz and the other German capital ships tied down British resources which might have been better used elsewhere, for example combating commerce raiding in the Atlantic. The success of Gneisenau and Scharnhorst in 1941 had shown the potential German damage. However as the air gap over the North Atlantic closed, Huff-Duff (radio triangulation equipment) improved, airborne centimetric radar was introduced and convoys received escort carrier protection, the scope for commerce raiding diminished. Aside from an abortive attempt to interdict PQ12 in March 1942 and a raid on Spitzbergen in September 1943, Tirpitz was sent to spend most of World War II in Norwegian fjords. She was penned in and successively attacked until she was finally sunk in Tromsø fjord on 11 November 1944 by the RAF. The other Kriegsmarine capital ships never got to Norway (eg. Gneisenau), were chased off, or were sunk by superior forces (eg. Scharnhorst). In particular, the unsuccessful attack on convoy JW-51B (the Battle of the Barents Sea), where a strong German naval force failed to defeat a British escort of cruisers and destroyers, infuriated Hitler and led to the strategic change from surface raiders to submarines. Some capital ships were physically dismantled and armament used in coastal defences.

The major change to naval dispositions on both sides that came about as a result of the Arctic convoys arguably had a major impact on the course of events in other theatres of war.

Role of intelligence

ULTRA intelligence gained from the cracking of the Enigma code at Bletchley Park played an important part in the eventual success of these convoys. Pre-emptive action was not always possible, but the intelligence did allow the Royal Navy to prepare for battle and convoys could be given appropriate escorting forces.

Summary

In summary, about 1400 merchant ships delivered vital supplies to Soviet Union. 85 merchant vessels and 16 Royal Navy warships were lost. The Germans lost a number of vessels including one battleship and at least 30 U-boats as well as a large number of aircraft. Towards the end of the war the material significance of the supplies was probably not as great as the symbolic value hence the continuation - at Stalin's insistence - of these convoys long after the Soviets had turned the German land offensive.

Literary Depictions

At least two well-known novels were written about the Arctic Convoys: in 1946 HMS Ulysses by Scottish writer Alistair MacLean, considered a classic of naval warfare literature in general, and in 1967 The Captain by Dutch author Jan de Hartog.

The two books are very different from each other in style, characterisation and underlying philosophy (de Hartog was a Pacifist, which cannot be said about MacLean). Still, they both convey vividly the atmosphere of combined extreme belligerent action and inhospitable nature, pushing protagonists to the edge of endurance and beyond.

Both books are evidently inspired by the fate of Convoy PQ-17 , though not following its course in detail.

External links

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