Battle of Blenheim
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The Battle of Blenheim (referred to in some other countries as the Battle of Höchstädt) was a major battle of the War of the Spanish Succession fought on 13 August, 1704. The village of Blindheim (English Blenheim) lies on the Danube River, 10 miles (16 km) southwest of Donauwörth in Bavaria, southern Germany.
At the battle, the forces of the Grand Alliance of England, Austria and the United Provinces were commanded by John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough and François-Eugène, Prince of Savoy-Carignan. The French and Bavarian armies were commanded by Camille d'Hostun de la Baume, Duc de Tallard; Maximilian Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria and Ferdinand Comte de Marsin.
Blenheim was a decisive victory for the Grand Alliance, inflicting the first major defeat on the French for over 40 years, saving Vienna from the Franco-Bavarian army. The battle ended King Louis XIV’s plans to dominate Europe and extend his royal power from Spain to the Low Countries, and from Germany to Italy. It also resulted in knocking Bavaria out of the war. In total, the battle left over 30,000 men dead or wounded.
Background
By 1704 the War of the Spanish Succession was in its fourth year. The previous year had been a year of success for France and her allies, most particularly on the Danube where Marshal Villars and the Elector of Bavaria had created a direct threat to Vienna - the capital of the Holy Roman Empire whose loss would almost certainly lead to the collapse of the Grand Alliance.Chandler p.125 Vienna had only been saved by the dissention between the two commanders, leading to the brilliant Villars being replaced by the less dynamic Marsin.Chandler p.124 However, by 1704 the threat to Vienna was still very real.
Rácóczi’s Hungarian revolt was already threatening the empire's eastern approaches, and on the Rhine, Marshal Tallard was preparing to march through the Black Forest to reinforce the Franco-Bavarian army under Marsin and the Elector at Ulm. Additionally, Marshal Vendôme’s 100,000 strong army threatened an invasion from northern Italy.
To isolate the Danube from any intervention from Allied troops stationed in the Netherlands, Marshal Villeroi’s 46,000 troops were assigned to pin the 70,000 Dutch and English troops around Maastricht. The only forces immediately available for the defence of Vienna were Prince Lewis of Baden’s force of 36,000 stationed in the Lines of Stollhofen (the barrier designed to stop the French marching down the Rhine from Strasburg) to watch Tallard.
The Duke of Marlborough realised the true implications of the situation on the Danube. "My intentions are to march with the English to Coblenz and declare that I intend to campaign on the Moselle. But when I come there, to write to the Dutch States that I think it absolutely necessary for the saving of the Empire to march with the troops under my command and to join with those that are in Germany. . . in order to make measures with Prince Lewis of Baden for the speedy reduction of the Elector of Bavaria."Spencer p.127 His plan was to reinforce the Imperial forces and destroy the Franco-Bavarian army on the Danube before Tallard could reinforce it.
Prelude
Marlborough’s march
“A scarlet caterpillar, upon which all eyes were at once fixed, began to crawl steadfastly day by day across the map of Europe, dragging the whole war with it.”Spencer p.136 Winston S. Churchill.Marlborough's march commenced on 19 May from Bedburg, near Maastricht. The army (assembled by the Duke’s brother General Charles Churchill) initially consisted of 66 squadrons, 31 battalionsAt the start of the campaign an English squadron consisted of 150 mounted men; a battalion numbered 700 foot soldiers. Spencer p.134 and 38 guns and mortars totalling 21,000 men (14,000 of whom were British and Irish troops). This initial force was to be reinforced en route which, by the time Marlborough reached the Danube, would number 40,000 (47 battalions, 88 squadrons). While Marlborough led his army, General Overkirk with the Dutch would maintain a defensive position in the Netherlands (the duke did not fear for their safety, surmising the French would rather follow him than invade the Netherlands). Marlborough was right; Villeroi shadowed the duke with 30,000 men comprising of 60 squadrons and 42 battalions.
Marlborough announced to the States-General his plan was to attack the French on the Moselle (a logical sequel to the previous year’s operations on the Meuse and Rhine). By 2 May, he had received grudging approval and rushed to complete his preparations before the Dutch could change their minds.
The duke needed to move fast; earlier on 14 May, Marshal Tallard had slipped past Prince Baden with 10,000 reinforcements (including 2,400 cavalry and 200 guns) for the Franco-Bavarian army, and then slipped back, retracing his steps through the Black Forest, taking up his position between the Rhine and Danube armies.
Deception was essential for Marlborough's plan to succeed. The duke reached Coblenz on 26 May and ordered his troops to cross the Rhine (pausing to add 5,000 waiting Hanoverians and Prussians). The French soon realised however that Marlborough's intention was not the Moselle, but a second possible objective did occur to them – an allied incursion into Alsace and an attack on the city of Strasburg. Marlborough skilfully encouraged this apprehension by constructing bridges across the Rhine at Philippsburg and by advancing his artillery to Mannheim. This ruse encouraged Villeroi to come to Tallard’s aid in the defence of Alsace.
However, Marlborough crossed the River Maine on 3 June and the Neckar four days later. On 6 June Marlborough at last informed the Dutch that his true destination was the Danube, however, the most dangerous part of the march was now over, for the Lines of Stollhofen and Badens’s forces were nearby.
As the march neared its end, Marlborough rode ahead to Gross Heppach to meet with Baden and Prince Eugène to finalise the overall allied strategy. From 10 June - 14 June, it was decided that Eugène would advance with 28,000 men to the Lines of Stollhofen whilst Marlborough and Baden’s forces would combine, totalling 80,000 men, for the march on the Danube and the Franco-Bavarian army.Marlborough and Eugène were determined to work together but Baden was superior in rank to Eugène. Thus it was the Eugène got the less ‘glamorous’ role of holding the Lines of Stollhofen. Spencer p.166
By now however, both Tallard and Villeroi knew that Marlborough's destination was the Danube. Tallard met with Villeroi at Landau on 13 June to rapidly construct an action plan to save Bavaria. However, the rigidity of the French command system was such that any variations from the original plan had to be sanctioned by Versailles.Chandler p.133 Approval from Louis arrived on 27 June: Tallard was to reinforce Marsin and the Elector now encamped at Augsburg, via the Black Forest, with 40 battalions and 50 squadrons; Villeroi was to pin down the allies defending the Lines of Stollhofen or join Marshal Tallard if they move all their forces to the Danube; and Lieutenant-General Coignies was to take 8,000 men to protect Alsace. On 1 July Tallard and his army of 35,000 began its march.
Meanwhile, on 22 June, Marlborough’s forces linked up with elements of Baden’s Imperial forces at Launsheim where together they marched to seek the Elector of Bavaria and Marshal Marsin on the Danube. If this large force was to go deep within the enemy’s territory it would need a base for provisions, so on 2 July, Marlborough stormed the key fortress of Schellenburg on the heights above the town of Donauwörth. After a ferocious and bloody battle, inflicting enormous casualties on both sides, Schellenburg finally succumbed, forcing the town of Donauwörth to surrender shortly afterwards. However, after Donauwörth, success began to elude the allies – the elector refused to fight or negotiate, keeping his forces behind the strong fortifications of Augsburg.Chandler p.139
This reticence to fight encouraged Marlborough to undertake a controversial policy of spoliation in Bavaria, burning buildings and crops, determined to lure the Elector to battle before Tallard arrived with reinforcements.“[Baden] hated the policy which required him to behave, in his words, ‘like a hussar’ – the hated Hungarian cavalryman, with a reputation for vulpine savagery”. Spencer p.218 This destruction, coupled with a protracted siege of Rain, had cause Prince Eugène to lament – “ . . .since the Donauwörth action I cannot admire their performances.” Later concluding – “If he has to go home without having achieved his objective, he will certainly be ruined”.Spencer p.215
By 18 July, Tallard had learnt that Eugène had slipped away from the Lines of Stollhofen with 18,000 men and was heading towards Bavaria, hoping to join up with the duke and bring the enemy to battle. On 19 July, the French marshal reached Ulm.
Final positioning
On the 5 August Tallard arrived at Augsburg (raising the Franco-Bavarian army to 56,000). Their combined forces then set off for the Danube. Also on the 5th, Eugène reached Höchstädt.
Marlborough knew it was necessary that another crossing point over the Danube would be required in case Donauwörth fell to the enemy. Therefore, on 7 August, the first of Baden’s 15,000 Imperialist troops (the remainder following two days later) left Marlborough’s main force to besiege the heavily defended city of Ingolstadt.If Ingolstadt could be captured, it would give the allies control of the Danube all the way up to Passau. A successful siege also promised glory to Baden independent of Marlborough. Spencer p.221 However, Marlborough was not confidant Baden could take city, but with the prospect of the Elector breaking cover and coming to its rescue, both Marlborough and Eugène were relieved to have an excuse to be rid of their irascible colleague.Spencer p.221
On 10 August Eugène sent an urgent despatch from Munster reporting that he was falling back to Danauwörth. “The enemy have marched. It is almost certain that the whole army is crossing the Danube at Lauingen . . .The plain of Dillingen is crowded with troops. . . Everything, milord, consists in speed and that you put yourself forthwith in movement to join me tomorrow, without which I fear it will be too late.” By a series of brilliant marchesChandler p.141 Marlborough concentrated his forces on Donauwörth. By noon on 11 August General Churchill’s vanguard had reached Eugène (the rest arriving within 12 hours). Marlborough and Eugène then moved their combined forces to Munster, five miles from the French camp.
By 12 August Tallard and the Elector’s forces had encamped behind the small river Nebel, near the village of Blenheim. Their army consisted of 56,000 men and 90 guns; the army of the Grand Alliance had 52,000 men and 66 guns. Marlborough and Eugène were keen to strike at the enemy before it could organise itself effectively. It was too late to attack that evening however, so it was decided that the battle would begin the next day on 13 August.
Battle
The battlefield
The extreme right flank of the Franco-Bavarian army was covered by the Danube; to the extreme left flank lay undulating pine-covered hills. A small stream, the Nebel, fronted the French line. The ground either side of the Nebel was soft and marshy and only fordable intermittently.The French right rested on the village of Blenheim (known locally as Blindheim) where the Nebel flowed into the Danube. Between Blenheim and the next village of Oberglau the fields of wheat had been cut to stubble and were now ideal to deploy troops. From Oberglau to the next hamlet of Lutzingen the terrain of ditches, thickets and brambles was potentially difficult ground for the attackers.
Allied Planning
At 02:00 on 13 August, 40 squadrons were sent forward towards the enemy, followed at 03:00 by the main allied force pushing over the Kessel. At 06:00 they reach Schweningen, two miles from Blenheim where Marlborough and Eugène made their final plans.The allied commanders agreed that Marlborough would command 36,000 troops and attack Tallard’s force of equal strength on the left (including capturing the village of Blenheim), whilst Eugène, commanding 16,000 men would attack the Elector and Marsin’s combined forces of 24,000 troops on the right wing. Lieutenant-General John Cutts would attack Blenheim in concert with Eugène’s attack. With the French flanks busy, Marlborough could cross the Nebel and deliver the fatal blow to the French at their centre. However, Marlborough would have to wait until Eugène was in position before the general engagement could begin.
Initial manoeuvres
Just after 07:00 Marlborough’s men approached the Nebel to discern possible crossing points; pontoons were prepared and fascines cut to facilitate its crossing. At 08:00 the French artillery on their right wing opened fire; answered by Colonel Blood’s batteries.
At 09:00, the three French commanders climbed Blenheim’s church tower to finalise their plans. Under the misapprehension that Baden was still with the allied army (and therefore having numerical superiority),Only numerical superiority could explain the allies’ rash assault on their strong defensive position. Spencer p.237 the French commanders decided upon a defensive posture. It was therefore imperative that both flanks of the Franco-Bavarian position held, whatever the cost.Spencer p.237 Blenheim to their right was to be commanded by Lieutenant-General the Marquis de Clérambault and the cream of the French infantry totalling 16 battalions with 11 in reserve. In support was 12 squadrons of dragoons commanded by the Count de Hautefeuille.Spencer p.238. Chandler p.144 states nine battalions were stationed in Blenheim with 18 in reserve. Between Blenheim and Oberglau were placed 64 squadrons of cavalry commanded by General Zurlauben, supported by only nine battalions and artillery; in and around the village of Oberglau in the centre stood 38 battalions, commanded by the Marquis de Blainville (including effective Irish mercenaries known as the ‘Wild Geese’). To the left of Oberglau were the remaining 67 squadrons of cavalry. 16 battalions guarded the sector on their extreme left in the vicinity of Lutzingen.
The French commanders were divided as to how to utilise the Nebel.[Article from Military History Magazine – Battle of Blenheim] Tallard’s tactic - opposed by Marsin and the Elector who suggested defending the stream - was to lure the allies across before unleashing their cavalry upon them, causing panic and confusion.Tallard feared that a successful holding of the Nebel would send the allies into premature retreat so cheat him of decisive victory. Spencer p.240 While the enemy was struggling in the marshes, they would be caught in crossfire from Blenheim and Oberglau. However, this required perfect timing: if the cavalry were sent too late, the enemy might prove impossible to dislodge, wasting the impediment of this natural obstacle.Spencer p.240
Eugène was expected to be in position by 11:00, however, due to the difficult terrain and enemy fire, progress was slow. Meanwhile, Lord Cutts on the left had sent Brigadier-General Rowe to gain a bridgehead over the Nebel in front of Blenheim, pushing back two French battalions who had been holding the area around two water mills. These troops had to remain in position, cut off from the rest of their column, until Marlborough ordered the general advance.
Allied left and Blenheim
“ . . .the Gendarmerie was undoubtedly soundly beaten.”Spencer p.253 Mérode-Westerloo, commander of the Flemish troops.Marlborough’s anxiety was finally allayed when, just past noon, Colonel Cadogan reported that Eugène’s Prussian and Danish infantry were in position - the order for the general advance was given. The remaining lines of Cutts’ column now crossed the Nebel and joined Rowe’s beleaguered troops who began his assault on Blenheim at 13:00. The French in the village, supported by dragoons on the flank, opened fire when the British were 30yards away inflicting heavy casualties. Repeated French volleys, in the space of minutes, forced the British back (General Rowe was mortally wounded). Squadrons of elite Gendarmerie then fell upon Rowe's British troops. However, the allied second line, the Hessians, stood firm and repulsed the Gendarmerie with steady fire.
After Rowe’s initial attack on Blenheim had been repulsed, Lord Cutts, realising the need to counter the French cavalry attacks, asked for reinforcements; Lieutenant-General Lumley sent Colonel Palmes with five squadrons of dragoon guards to aid Cutts’ assault. On seeing these reinforcements, Tallard’s cavalry commander, Lieutenant-General Zurlauben, ordered all eight elite squadrons of the Gendarmerie to destroy them. After a flurry of swordplay, and to Tallard’s disbelief, the Gendarmerie fled the field with the dragoons in pursuit. The Elector exclaiming, “What! There is the Gendarmerie running away? Is it possible?” This episode had a huge effect on French morale.Spencer p.253
These persistent attacks on Blenheim eventually bore fruit, panicking Clérambault into making the worst French error of the day.Chandler p.145 Without consulting Tallard, Clérambault ordered his reserve battalions into the village upsetting the balance of the French position and nullifying the French numerical superiority (there is a limit to the space available for firing and reloading muskets). Marlborough, spotting this error, ordered Cutts to simply contain the enemy within Blenheim. Marlborough had secured his left flank.
Centre and Oberglau
“ . . .they began to pass [the marshes and the Nebel] as fast as the badness of the ground would permit them.”Spencer p.258 Josias Sanby, Churchill’s chaplain.While these events were taking place around Blenheim, Marlborough and Eugene were preparing to cross the Nebel. The centre consisted of 28 battalions of infantry arranged in two lines: seven battalions in the front line to secure a foothold across the Nebel (ten battalions of Hanoverians were detached and placed in reserve under Prince of Holstein-Beck), and 11 battalions in the rear providing cover from the allied side of the stream. Between the infantry, were placed two lines, 71 squadrons, of cavalry. The first line of foot was to pass the stream first, and march as far to the other side as could be conveniently done. This line would then form and cover the passage of the horse, leaving gaps in the line of infantry large enough for the horse to pass through and take their post in front.
Marlborough ordered General Churchill to lead the formation forward. As they crossed the Nebel, the allies, expecting Tallard to attack quickly, were astonished and relieved at the French commander’s inaction, allowing the allies to gain a foothold on the French side of the stream.Spencer p.258 However, when Tallard finally did make a move, the ensuing assault was fierce. With the added momentum afforded by the downward gradient of the hill, the French cavalry initially gained the upper hand against the allied cavalry that by now had pushed ahead of the infantry.
Tallard’s cavalry pushed back the first line of allied horse, however, dense volleys from the supporting allied infantry repelled the French attack. As the French hovered indecisivelySpencer p.261 a concentrated allied charge pushed them back. Tallard’s original plan had involved forays of infantrymen from Blenheim falling on the flanks of the allied advance, but with Cutts containing the French within the village, this was now not possible.
Meanwhile, Holstein-Beck was assaulting the village of Oberglau. However, these forces were cut down by the French and Irish troops, capturing and mortally wounding the prince during the action. Seeing this setback was potentially fatal to the allies,Tallard later recorded: “At this moment I saw the hope of victory”. Spencer p.264 Marlborough took personal command to stem the reverse. Crossing the Nebel with the three Holstein-Beck reserve battalions, aided by Colonel Blood’s artillery, the duke eventually steadied the allies’ wavering line.
However, Marlborough realised his battalions were still in danger and urgently asked Eugène for assistance. Despite Eugène being hard-pressed himself on the far side of Oberglau, he sent a detachment of Imperial cuirassiers under General Fugger which, striking hard against the enemy who were already charging, scattered them in confusion.Chandler p.146 The Franco-Irish force fell back, and became besieged inside Oberglau.
Allied right
“ . . .Prince Eugene and the Imperial troops had been repulsed three times – driven right back to the woods – and had taken a real drubbing.”Spencer p.270 Mérode-Westerloo.On the allied right, Eugène's Prussian and Danish forces were desperately fighting the numerically superior forces of the Elector and Marsin. His force consisted of four of the eight allied columns that had arrived before the Franco-Bavarian army. After initial success in crossing the Nebel, Eugène's forces were driven back and were in danger of complete collapse (it was at this time that Eugene' released General Fugger to aid Marlborough). However, the leadership of Eugène and the Prussian commander, Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, kept the Imperialist infantry from quitting altogether.Spencer p.268 Each time the Imperialists forces advanced, they were repulsed; Eugène realised that all he could do was to hold on until the enemy made a mistake or Marlborough could make a breakthrough.
Breakthrough
“The [French] foot remained in the best order I ever saw, till they were cut to pieces almost in rank and file.”Spencer p.279 Captain Robert Parker.
By 16:00, with French troops besieged in both Blenheim and Oberglau, the allied centre of 81 squadrons supported by 18 battalions was firmly planted amidst the French line of 64 squadrons and just nine battalions. Tallard called for infantry reinforcements, but due to Clérambault’s decision to commit all his reserves inside Blenheim, and the Elector and Marsin refusing on the grounds that they were too hard-pressed by Eugène, no infantry was forthcoming. Notwithstanding the lack of infantry support, Tallard charged at 17:00, temporarily checking the allied advance. However, Major-General Lord Orkney rallied his men and repelled the French attack; by 17:30 the allied advance was once again under way.
The nine French infantry battalions came under fire from Captain Gibbon’s artillery and were overwhelmed – the French cavalry was pushed back by weight of numbers and completely broken. Looking on, Tallard realised that the battle was almost certainly lost.Spencer p.279
The allied trumpeters sounded for one last cavalry charge, driving through the centre of the French and putting them to rout. The majority of Tallard's retreating troops headed for Höchstädt – Marlborough sent Hompesch and 30 squadrons to pursue them. However, most did not make the safety of the town, plunging instead into the Danube, where upwards of 3,000 French horsemen drowned; others were cut down by the pursuing cavalry.
After a final rally behind his camp’s tents, Marshal Tallard was caught up in the rout and pushed towards Sonderheim. However, after being surrounded by a squadron of Hessian troops, Tallard surrendered to Lieutenant-Colonel de Boinenburg, the Prince of Hesse's aide-de-camp.
Fall of Blenheim
“ . . .our men fought in and through the fire . . .until many on both sides were burned to death."Spencer p.294 Private Deane, 1st Regiment Foot Guards.On the French left, under pressure from Prince Eugène and Prince Leopold’s fourth advance of the day, and seeing Tallard's army in full flight, the Elector and Marsin decided the battle was lost and also fled for Höchstädt (albeit in better order than Tallard's men), leaving Blenheim on their right to fend for themselves.
Clérambault's insistence on confining his huge force in the village was to seal his fate that day.Spencer p.291 Realising this tactical mistake had contributed to Tallard's defeat in the centre, Clérambault deserted Blenheim and the 27 battalions defending the village. However, whilst preparing to cross the Danube, he fell from his horse into the river and drowned.
By 18:00, General Churchill, with lieutenant-generals Orkney and Ingoldsby, had surrounded the village. Ingoldsby and Orkney attacked the village in flank and rear, while General Cutts attacked the front. Ignorant of the defeat of the main force, the French garrison fought with determination,Spencer p.294 led now by Marshal Blansac. However, after Blansac discovered the fate of Tallard, the French tried to flee Blenheim but were soon surrounded. Orkney secured the surrender of the Régiment Royal and Saint-Ségond's brigade, however there were still 20 battalions and 12 squadrons in the village. The French officers were divided between fighting on till the death, or mass surrender. By 21:00, to the disgust of the Navarre regiment who burnt their colours in protest, the decision had been made and the French garrison finally laid down their arms.
Aftermath
The remnants of the Elector of Bavaria and Ferdinand de Marsin’s forces limped back to Strasburg, losing another 7,000 men through desertion. Of the 4,500 Franco-Bavarian officers who fought at Blenheim, only 250 were not killed, wounded or captured. Ulm and Ingolstadt soon fell, and with them, all of Bavaria. Tallard (along with the cream of his officers) was imprisoned in Nottingham until 1711.The Elector abandoned his country and family in order to continue fighting for Louis. By the Treaty of Ilbersheim, signed 7 November, 1704, Bavaria (apart from Munich), was placed under Austrian military rule. Bavaria had been knocked out of the war and Vienna was saved from attack.
For Marlborough and Eugène the campaigning season was still ongoing. They were both keen to sweep the French out of Germany, however, Baden insisted on following up the siege of Ingolstadt with the siege of Landau which was only taken in November. Meanwhile Marlborough had decided to carry on the war along the Moselle. In the autumn and winter Augsburg, Ulm, Trèves and Trarbach joined Ingolstadt and Landau as allied prizes.
The Duke of Marlborough’s fame and prestige grew and in February 1705, Queen Anne granted him the Park of Woodstock so that a palace could be built for the duke in celebration of his great victory. The duke however, was never to see the completion of the magnificent building that was to become known as Blenheim Palace. Prince Eugène was equally well rewarded: for his services the emperor gave Eugène a Viennese palace, the Stadtpalais.
The Battle of Blenheim was the first major French defeat for over 40 years, and one of the first major English victories on the continent since the Battle of Agincourt nearly 300 years before. British historian Sir Edward Creasy considered the battle of Blenheim to be one of the pivotal battles in history. He wrote: "Had it not been for Blenheim, all Europe might at this day suffer under the effect of French conquests resembling those of Alexander in extent and those of the Romans in durability."Edward Shepherd Creasy , The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World 1851. Marlborough's descendant Winston S. Churchill wrote: “The destruction of the Armada had preserved the life of Britain: the charge at Blenheim opened her to the gateways of the modern world.”Spencer p.340 It was a seminal moment in Britain's history.Spencer p.340
Notes
References
- Spencer, Charles. Blenheim: Battle for Europe. Phoenix, 2005. ISBN 0304367044
- Chandler, David G. Marlborough as Military Commander. Spellmount Ltd, 2003. ISBN 186227195X
- Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army. Oxford University Press, 1995.
External links
- [Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World. Edward Shepherd Creasy. Chapter xi. The Battle of Blenheim, 1704.]
- [Article from Military History Magazine – Battle of Blenheim]
- [Robert Southey's anti-war poem 'After Blenheim', also known as 'The Battle of Blenheim']
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