Battle of Hamburger Hill
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The Battle of Hamburger Hill was one of the most controversial battles of the Vietnam War.
The battle took place on Dong Ap Bia (Ap Bia Mountain) in the rugged, jungle-shrouded mountains along the Laotian border of South Vietnam. Rising from the floor of the western A Shau Valley, Ap Bia Mountain is a looming, solitary massif, unconnected to the ridges of the surrounding Annamite range. It dominates the northern valley, towering some 937 meters above sea level. Snaking down from its highest peak are a series of ridges and fingers, one of the largest extending southeast to a height of 900 meters, another reaching south to a 916-meter peak. The entire mountain is a rugged, uninviting wilderness blanketed in double- and triple-canopy jungle, dense thickets of bamboo, and waist-high elephant grass. Local Montagnard tribesmen called Ap Bia "the mountain of the crouching beast." Official histories of the engagement refer to it as Hill 937, but the soldiers who fought there dubbed it "Hamburger Hill".
The battle
The battle on Hill 937 occurred during Operation Apache Snow, the second part of a three-phased campaign intended to destroy Vietnam People's Army (VPA) base areas in the remote A Shau Valley. This campaign was a series of operations intended to neutralize the A Shau, which had been an infiltration route into South Vietnam prior to 1966, when the North Vietnamese seized the CIDG-Special Forces outpost in the valley and established a permanent presence. Subsequent U.S. efforts to clear the valley had been consistently unsuccessful. Lieutenant General Richard Stilwell, commander of XXIV Corps, amassed the equivalent of two divisions supported by substantial artillery and air support to accomplish the task. The North Vietnamese had moved their 6th, 9th, and 29th Regiments into the base area to recover from losses sustained during a previous U.S. Marine operation (Dewey Canyon) in February.Assigned to Apache Snow were three airmobile infantry battalions of the 101st Airborne Division (Major General Melvin Zais, commanding). These units of the division's 3rd Brigade (commanded by Colonel Joseph Conmy) were the 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry (LtCol. Weldon Honeycutt); 2nd Battalion, 501st Infantry (LtCol. Robert German); and the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (LtCol. John Bowers). Two battalions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam's (ARVN) 1st Division (the 2/1st and 4/1st ARVN) had been temporarily assigned to the 3rd Brigade in support. Other major units participating in Apache Snow included the 9th Marine Regiment; the 3rd Battalion, 5th Cavalry; and the 3rd ARVN Regiment.
Col. Conmy characterized the operation as a reconnaissance in force (RIF). His plan called for the five battalions to "combat assault" into the valley by helicopter on May 10 1969 and to search its assigned sector for VPA troops and supplies. If a battalion made heavy contact with the VPA, Conmy would reinforce it by helicopter lift with one of the other units. In theory, the 101st could reposition its forces quickly enough to keep the VPA from massing against any one unit, while a U.S. battalion discovering an VPA unit would fix it until a reinforcing battalion could lift in to cut off its retreat and destroy it.
The U.S. and ARVN units participating in Apache Snow knew, based on existing intelligence and previous experiences in the A Shau, that the operation was likely to encounter serious resistance from the VPA. Beyond that, however, they had little intelligence as to the VPA's actual strength and dispositions. Masters of camouflage, the North Vietnamese completely concealed their bases from aerial surveillance. When the VPA moved, they did so at night along trails under triple-canopy jungle. They effected their command and control mainly by runner and wire, leaving no electronic signature to monitor or trace. U.S. battalion commanders had to generate their own tactical intelligence by combat patrols, capturing equipment, installations, documents, and occasionally prisoners to provide the raw data from which to draw their assessment of the VPA order of battle and dispositions. It was this time-consuming and hit-or-miss task which characterized the main efforts of the LtCol. Honeycutt's 3/187th Infantry during the first four days of the operation.
Initially, the operation went routinely for the 101st Airborne Division. Its units experienced only light contact on the first day, but documents captured by 3/187th indicated that the 29th VPA Regiment, nicknamed the "Pride of Ho Chi Minh" and a veteran of the 1968 Tet Offensive assault on Hue, was somewhere in the A Shau Valley. Past experience in many of the larger encounters with the VPA indicated the North Vietnamese would resist violently for a short time and then withdraw before the Americans brought overwhelming firepower to bear against them. Prolonged combat, such as at Dak To and Ia Drang, had been relatively rare. Honeycutt anticipated his battalion had sufficient capability to RIF Hill 937 without further reinforcement, although he did request that the brigade reserve, his own Bravo Company, be released to his control.
Honeycutt was a protégé of General William C. Westmoreland, the former commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam. He had been assigned command of the 3/187th in January and had by replacement of many of its officers given it a personality to match his own aggressiveness. His stated intention was to locate the VPA force in his area of responsibility and engage it before it could escape into Laos.
On May 11, Honeycutt assigned Alpha and Delta Companies to RIF the north and northwest fingers of Ap Bia Mountain, while Bravo and Charlie Companies climbed towards the summit by differing routes. Moving out of the helicopter landing zone (LZ) on the north ridge, Bravo Company made heavy contact with the VPA within a kilometer of the summit late in the day. Honeycutt quickly directed Cobra helicopter gunships, known as aerial rocket artillery (ARA), to support a hasty assault. In the heavy jungle, the Cobras mistook the 3/187th battalion command post on the LZ for an NVA unit and attacked, killing two and wounding thirty-five, including Honeycutt. The friendly fire incident disrupted battalion command and control and forced 3/187th to withdraw into night defensive positions. The contact, however, confirmed that a substantial North Vietnamese force was present, which Honeycutt estimated as a reinforced platoon or company.
For the next two days, Honeycutt manuevered his companies toward positions for a coordinated battalion attack on the 13th, but was frustrated by both difficult topography and North Vietnamese resistance. One unit, Delta Company, descended into a steep muddy ravine on May 12 in a flanking maneuver, suffered numerous losses, and was unable to extricate its casualties until May 14. The company eventually returned to the battalion LZ on May 15 without participating in the assault.
Map reconnaissance and helicopter overflights had not indicated that the initial scheme of maneuver was impractical, but the three RIF contacts indicated that the NVA were in greater strength than originally estimated, had likely received reinforcements from Laos, and were entrenched in well-concealed bunkers. The VPA commander's demonstrated tenacity and willingness to replace heavy losses indicated he intended to put up a stiff fight for Hill 937.
The 1/506th had made no significant contacts in its area of operations, and at midday May 13, the brigade commander, Col. Conmy, decided it would move to cut off North Vietnamese reinforcement from Laos and to assist Honeycutt by attacking Hill 937 from the south. Its Bravo company was heli-lifted to Hill 916, but the remainder of the battalion made the movement on foot, from an area 4 kilometers from Hill 937, and both Conmy and Honeycutt expected the 1/506th to be ready to provide support no later than the morning of May 15. Although Bravo Company seized Hill 916 by May 15, it was not until May 19 that the battalion as a whole was in position to conduct a final assault, primarily because of nearly impenetrable jungle.
The 3/187 conducted multi-company assaults on May 14 and 15, incurring heavy casualties, while the 1/506th made probing attacks on the south slopes of the mountain on May 16 and 17. The difficult terrain and well organized North Vietnamese forces continually disrupted the tempo of U.S. tactical operations on Hills 916, 900, and 937. Steep gradients and dense vegetation provided few natural landing zones (LZs) in the vicinity of the mountain and made helicopter redeployments impractical. The terrain also masked the positions of the 29th VPA Regiment, making it nearly impossible to suppress anti-aircraft fire, while the jungle covered the movement of VPA small units so completely that it created a nonlinear battlefield. VPA soldiers, able to maneuver freely around the landing zones, shot down or damaged numerous helicopters with small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and crew-served weapons. The VPA also assaulted nearby logistical support LZs and command posts at least four times, forcing deployment of units for security that might otherwise have been employed in assaults. Attacking companies had to provide for 360-degree security as they maneuvered, since the terrain largely prevented them from mutually supporting each other. VPA platoon- and company-size elements repeatedly struck maneuvering U.S. forces from the flanks and rear.
The effectiveness of U.S. maneuver forces was limited by narrow trails that funneled attacking companies into squad or platoon points of attack, where they encountered VPA platoons and companies with prepared fields of fire. With most small arms engagements thus conducted at close range, U.S. fire support was also severely restricted. Units frequently pulled back and called in artillery fire, close air support, and ARA but the VPA bunkers were well sited and constructed with overhead cover to withstand bombardment. During the course of the battle the foliage was eventually stripped away and the bunkers exposed, but they were so numerous and well constructed that many could not be reduced by indirect fire. Napalm and recoilless rifle fire eventually accounted for destruction of most fortifications.
U.S. battle command of small units was essentially decentralized. Though Honeycutt constantly prodded his company commanders to push on, he could to do little to coordinate mutual support until the final assaults, when the companies maneuvered in close proximity over the barren mountain top. Fire support for units in contact was also decentralized. Supporting fires, including those controlled by airborne forward air controllers, were often directed on the platoon level. Consequently overloaded command and control nets and other factors resulted in five attacks by supporting aicraft on the 3/187th, killing seven and wounding 53. Four of the incidents involved Cobra gunship helicopters, which in one case were more than a kilometer away from their intended target.
On May 16, Associated Press correspondent Jay Sharbutt learned of the ongoing battle on Hill 937, travelled to the area and interviewed Zais, in particularly asking why infantry rather than firepower was used as the primary offensive tool on Hill 937. More reporters followed to cover the battle, and the term "Hamburger Hill" became widely reported.
The U.S. brigade commander ordered a coordinated two-battalion assault for May 18, with 1/506th attacking from the south and 3/187th attacking from the north, tring to keep the 29th VPA Regiment from concentrating on either battalion. Fighting to within seventy-five meters of the summit, Delta Company 3/187th nearly carried the hill but experienced severe casualties, including all of its officers. The battle was one of close combat, with the two sides exchanging small arms and grenade fire within twenty meters of each other. From a light observation helicopter, the battalion commander attempted to coordinate the movements of the other companies into a final assault, but an exceptionally intense thunderstorm reduced visibility to zero and ended the fighting. Unable to advance in what was now a quagmire, 3/187 again withdrew down the mountain. The three converging companies of 1/506th struggled to take Hill 900, the southern crest of the mountain, encountering heavy opposition for the first time in the battle.
Because of the heavy casualties already sustained by his units, and under pressure from the unwanted attention of the press, Zais seriously considered discontinuing the attack, but decided otherwise. Both the corps commander and the MACV commander, General Creighton Abrams, publicly supported the decision. Zais decided to commit three fresh battalions to the battle and to have one of them relieve the 3/187th in place. The 3/187th's losses to this point had been severe, approximately 320 killed and wounded, including more than sixty per cent of the 450 experienced troops who had assaulted into the valley. Two of its four company commanders and eight of twelve platoon leaders had become casualties.
The battalion commander of the 2/506th, LtCol. Gene Sherron, arrived at Honeycutt's CP on the afternoon of May 18 to coordinate the relief. 3/187th was medevacking its latest casualties and its commander had not yet been informed of the relief. Before any arrangements were made, Gen. Zais landed and was confronted by Honeycutt, who argued that his battalion was still combat effective. After a sharp confrontation, Zais relented, although he assigned one of Sherron's companies to Honeycutt as reinforcement for the assault.
Two fresh battalions--the 2/501st Infantry and ARVN 2/3d Infantry--were airlifted into LZs northeast and southeast of the base of the mountain on May 19. Both battalions immediately moved onto the mountain to positions from which they would attack the following morning. Meanwhile the 1/506th for the third consecutive day struggled to secure Hill 900.
The 3rd Brigade launched its four-battalion attack at 1000 on May 20, 1969, including two companies of the 3/187th reinforced by Alpha Company 2/506th. The attack was preceded by two hours of close air support and ninety minutes of artillery prep fires. The battalions attacked simultaneously, and by noon elements of the 3/187th reached the crest, beginning a reduction of bunkers that continued through most of the afternoon. Some VPA units were able to exfiltrate into Laos and Hill 937 was secured by 1700.
Results and analysis
U.S. losses during the ten-day battle reportedly totalled 70 dead and 372 wounded. To take the position, the 101st Airborne Division eventually committed five infantry battalions, about 1,800 men, and ten batteries of artillery. In addition, the U.S. Air Force flew 272 support sorties and expended more than 1 million pounds (450 t) of bombs and 152,000 pounds (69 t) of napalm. The 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th VPA Regiment suffered 630 dead discovered on and around the battlefield, including many found in makeshift mortuaries within the tunnel complex, and an unknown number of wounded that likely totalled most of the remainder of the two units.The repercussions of the battle were more political than military. Questions raised by the media concerning the necessity of the battle stirred controversy for weeks after the fighting ended. These issues flared up again when the new commander of the 101st Airborne Division, Major General John W. Wright, quietly abandoned the hill on 5 June. The debate over "Hamburger Hill" reached Congress, with particularly severe criticism of military leadership by Senators Edward Kennedy (D-Mass), George McGovern (D-SDak), and Stephen Young (D-Ohio). In its 27 June issue, Life Magazine published the photographs of 241 Americans killed in one week in Vietnam, considered a watershed turning point in the war. While only five of these were casualties on Hamburger Hill, many Americans had the perception that all the dead were victims of the battle.
The controversy of the conduct of the Battle of Hamburger Hill led to a reappraisal of U.S. strategy in Vietnam. As a direct result, to hold down casualties, General Abrams discontinued a policy of "maximum pressure" against the North Vietnamese to one of "protective reaction" for troops threatened with attack, while President Nixon announced the first troop withdrawals.
See also
Hamburger Hill the movie.References
- Zaffiri, Samuel, Hamburger Hill, May 10- May 20, 1969 (1988), ISBN 0-89141-706-0
External links
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