Battle of Hurtgen Forest

Encyclopedia : B : BA : BAT : Battle of Hurtgen Forest

The Battle of Hurtgen Forest (German: Schlacht im Hürtgenwald) is the name given to the series of fierce battles fought between the American and German forces during World War II in the Hürtgen forest (or Huertgen forest). The battles took place between September 19, 1944, and February 10, 1945, in a strategically insignificant corridor of barely 50 square miles (129 km²), east of the Belgian-German border.

The initial objectives were to take Schmidt, clear Monschau, advance to the Roer and Rhine rivers, and take control of the dams located there. As the battle progressed, the American Commanders lost sight of these objectives (U.S. Official History).

Contents

1 Overview
2 Background
3 The battlefield
4 The armies
5 First phase
6 Second phase
7 Casualties
8 Aftermath
9 Other
10 Notes
11 References
12 External links

Overview

The American High Command was flush with success after the breakout from the Normandy bridgehead and hoped they could quickly break through and push further into Germany. Multiple divisions were sent in to the Hurtgen Forest, only to be decimated and replaced by still more divisions. Even with armor, air, and artillery support, all advantages held by the Americans were negated by the inhospitable forest terrain. Despite smaller numbers, the Germans were able to impede the stronger American force thanks to the difficult terrain and having good defensive positions.

It was the perfect military scenario for the over-stretched German army. If over taken, the Germans could have easily flooded the entire Hürtgen Valley from the surrounding dams, delaying the American's advance. The Germans were heavily entrenched in the forest and inflicted heavy casualties in the longest single battle the American Army has ever fought in its history. The Germans inflicted well over 24,000 casualties on the American forces during the battle. The Americans suffered an additional 9,000 casualties due to fatigue, illness, and friendly fire. Twelve thousand German casualties were also claimed. Despite this, Hürtgenwald is largely forgotten as the Battle of the Bulge, which began shortly afterwards, took the spotlight away from it. The fact that the victory was hard to obtain, and the the length of the engagement, plus the casualties, made it a difficult event to glorify from either side.

Background

By mid-September, 1944, the Allied pursuit of the German army after Normandy had slowed due to extended supply lines and the consequent German recovery. The next strategic objective was to move up to the Rhine along its entire length and prepare for its crossing. Courtney Hodges’ 1st Army experienced hard resistance pushing through the Aachen Gap and perceived a potential threat from enemy forces using the Hurtgen Forest as a base.

In early October, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division arrived along with elements of the U.S. XIX Corps and VII Corps, which encircled the town of Aachen. Although the 1st Infantry Division called for the surrender of the German garrison in the town, the German commander, Colonel Gerhard Wilck, would not surrender it until October 21.

It was also necessary to remove the threat posed by the Roer dams. In German hands, the stored water could be readily released, swamping any forces moving downstream. The direct route to these was through the Hurtgen.

In hindsight, military historians are no longer convinced of these arguments. An American historian, who served in the Hurtgen, has described it as “a misconceived and basically fruitless battle that should have been avoided”.

The battlefield

The Hurtgen Forest occupies a rugged area between the Roer river and Aachen. The dense conifer forest is broken by few roads and tracks and firebreaks and vehicular movement is restricted. In the autumn and early winter of 1944, the weather was cold and wet and often prevented air support. Ground conditions varied between snow and just wet.

The defenders had prepared the area with blockhouses, minefields, barbed wire and booby-traps, hidden by the snow. The dense forest allowed infiltration and flanking attacks and it was sometimes difficult to establish a front line or to be confident that an area had been cleared of the enemy. The small numbers of routes and clearings had also allowed German machine-gun, mortar and artillery teams to pre-range their weapons and fire accurately.

American advantages of numbers (of 5 to 1 in some cases), armour, mobility and air support were greatly reduced. In the forest, relatively small numbers of determined and prepared defenders could be highly effective. As the American divisions took casualties, the replacements were inexperienced recruits: the U.S. Official History says: “Any numerical advantage the Americans may have possessed lay in bug-eyed replacements, who began to arrive in small, frightened bunches”. The impenetrable forest also limited the use of tanks and also hid anti-tank teams equipped with panzerfausts. Later in the battle, it proved necessary to blast tank routes through the forest. Transport was similarly limited by the lack of routes: at critical times it proved difficult to reinforce or supply front line units or to evacuate their wounded.

The tall forest canopy also favoured the defenders. Falling artillery rounds would normally detonate as airbursts. While defenders were protected from shrapnel by their defensive positions, attackers were in the open and vulnerable – lying flat (the natural response) or open foxholes were no protection. Conversely, attacking mortar teams needed clearings in which to work – these were few and dangerous, so support was often unavailable to rifle teams.

The armies

The Hurtgen Forest lay within the area of Courtney Hodges’ 1st US Army. Responsibility fluctuated between the V Corps and VII Corps.

At the start, the forest was defended by the 275th and 353rd Infantry Divisions; under strength but well prepared – 5000 men (1000 in reserve), commanded by General Schmidt; they had little artillery and no tanks. As the battle progressed, reinforcements were added in. American expectations that these troops were weak and ready to withdraw were not matched by events.

First phase

This phase concentrated on the town of Schmidt, astride an important German supply route, and the southern part of the forest.

The engagement began on September 19, 1944 with a probe by the U.S. 60th Infantry Regiment that entered the Hurtgen Forest but was beaten back by the terrain and opposition.

On October 5, the U.S. 9th Infantry Division attacked the town of Schmidt; using the 60th and 39th Infantry Regiments while the 47th held a defensive position. The Monschau / Dueren road was quickly cut but both regiments were slowed by defences and suffered significant casualties: the 60th’s 2nd battalion was reduced to a third after the first day. The 39th was halted at the Weiser Weh stream; there were problems with narrow paths, air bursts in trees, fire breaks blocked or enfiladed. Evacuation and supply was difficult or impossible.

The slogging match continued. By October 16, 3000 yards had been gained at the cost of 4500 casualties. The U.S. 28th Infantry Division, a Pennsylvania National Guard unit, arrived on October 16th to relieve the battered 9th.

The 28th Division was reinforced with armour, tracked transport Weasels and air support. Of its three regiments, one was deployed to protect the northern flank, another to attack Germeter, and the third to capture Schmidt, the main objective. The area had terrible terrain with the Kall trail along a deep river ravine. This was not tank country, despite the need to support the infantry.

The attack by 28th Division started on 2nd November: the defenders were expecting it and were ready. The 109th Infantry Regiment was impeded after 300 yards by an unexpected minefield, pinned down by mortar and artillery fire and harassed by local counter-attacks. One mile was gained after 2 days, the 109th dug-in and endured casualties. The 112th Infantry Regiment attacked Vossenack and the neighbouring ridge, which were captured on 2nd November. The 112th was then halted on the Kall by strong defences and difficult terrain. The 110th had to clear the woods next to the River Kall, capture Simonskall and maintain a supply route for the advance on Schmidt; again these were very difficult tasks due to weather, prepared defences, determined defenders and terrain. The weather prevented tactical air support until 5th November.

The 112th captured Schmidt on 3rd November, cutting the German supply route to Monschau but no American supply, reinforcement or evacuation was possible as the Kall trail was blocked. A strong German counter-attack by tanks of 116th Panzer Div and infantry from 89th Division rapidly expelled the Americans from Schmidt and they were unable to counter-attack. For 2 days, the 112th remained hard pressed to hold its positions outside Schmidt.

On 6th November, the 12th Infantry Regiment was detached from the 4th Division and sent to reinforce the 28th Division.

At Vossenack, the 2nd battalion of the 112th disintegrated after constant shelling and fled a German attack. The fortuitous arrival of 2 US armoured platoons of tanks and M10s, supported by those 2nd battalion men who had held tight and 2 companies of 146th Engineers, who fought as infantry. Fighting for Schmidt continued until 10th November.

Second phase

In this phase, 4th Div was to clear the northern half of the forest between Schevenheutte and Huertgen, capture Huertgen and advance to the Roer south of Duren. From 10th November, this would be VII Corps’ responsibility and it was part of the main VII Corps effort to reach the Roer. The 4th Division was now fully committed to the Hurtgen, although its 12th Infantry Regiment was already mauled from its action at Schmidt leaving just 2 fully effective regiments to achieve the divisional objectives.

U.S. VII Corps was opposed by German forces, mainly from the 81st Corps, consisting 3 understrength divisions. In the Huertgen, there was the 275th Division – 6500 men with 150 artillery pieces. They were well dug-in and prepared.

The attack started on 16th November. The two infantry regiments attacked in parallel columns: the 8th along the northern edge of the forest towards Dueren, 22nd further south in parallel. The open flanks invited infiltration. Similar tactics elsewhere in Huertgen had “invited disaster”.

Attacks by 8th Infantry Regiment on Weh creek hit heavy resistance and were defeated with heavy losses. The 22nd failed to take Raven’s hedge, beaten back by heavy machine-gun and artillery fire along the firebreaks. After 3 days there were 300 losses, including high losses amongst officers and NCOs.

By 18th November tanks were deemed essential, so engineers blasted tank routes through the forest. Communications and logistics remained a problem so, on the 19th November, the attack paused to allow re-supply and evacuation. German reinforcements arrived from 344th and 353rd Divisions and resistance stiffened further.

On 20th November, responsibility was returned to V Corps and, on 21st November, 8th Divison attacked the Weisser Weh valley, continuing to Hurtgen. The 121st Infantry Regiment hit heavy defences immediately. Despite armoured support from 10th Tank Battalion, daily advances were less than 600 yards. Hurtgen was taken on 29th November and the battle continued to Kleinhau, 1 mile north.

The final action in the Hurtgen Forest was at Merode, on the north-eastern edge of the forest. Two American companies took the village but they were destroyed in a German counter-attack.

Elements of the 8th and the 28th Infantry Divisions then advanced on Brandenberg. The 28th, just like the 9th before them (and the 4th Infantry Division, which would relieve the 28th), also took heavy casualties during their stay in the Hurtgen Forest, and on November 14th the 2nd Ranger Battalion arrived to relieve elements of the 112th Infantry Regiment. On December 6th, the Rangers moved on Bergstein, and subsequently took the strategic position of Hill 400. Shortly thereafter, on the 12th of December, the towns of Gey and Strass were taken by American Forces.

Casualties

The US Official History estimated that 120,000 troops, plus replacements, were committed to Hurtgen; by the end there had been 24,000 casualties plus 9000 non-battle. Two divisions, the 4th and the 9th, were so badly mauled that they were withdrawn from the line to recuperate.

The battle for Schmidt cost 6184 U.S. casualties – compared with about 4000 losses by 2 divisions at Omaha beach. German casualties were less than 3000.

In the second phase, 4th Division had advanced 1½ miles by 20th November, having suffered 1500 battle casualties plus several hundreds non-battle, ie, trench foot, frostbite and exhaustion. After 2 weeks, 3 miles for 4053 battle casualties plus 2000 non-battle. November total: 170 officers, 4754 men. The 22nd Infantry Division had 2500 casualties, with a start strength of 2500

Some of the units fighting in the Hürtgen Forest also fought at Omaha Beach and they said that the Hürtgen was a much bloodier fight than Omaha. Ernest Hemingway, who was there, described the battle as "Passchendaele with tree bursts,"[1] which is an appropriate epitaph.

Aftermath

On 16 December, 1944 German forces began the Ardennes Offensive, more commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge. The surprise German offensive caught Allied forces off guard, and forced a gigantic bulge in their lines. American units stationed in the area, including the 8th Division, the 104th, the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne staged a heroic defense in one of the most important battles of the war and the largest in US history.

The Ardennes Offensive was completely halted by mid-January, and in early February, American forces attacked through the Hurtgen Forest for the final time. On 10 February, the Schwammenauel dam was taken by American forces, removing the threat of the Germans flooding the forest. This marked the end of the Battle of Hurtgen Forest.

Two soldiers of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division were awarded Medals of Honor for action in the battle one of whom was LTC George Mabry, the second most highly decorated U.S. soldier of World War II.

Other

There is an ongoing discussion of whether or not the American battle plan made any sense. One possibility is that U.S. strategy grossly underestimated the strength remaining in the German military at this late point of the war. The Americans concentrated on the village of Schmidt and neither tried to conquer the strategic Roer-Dams nor recognized the importance of Hill 400 until an advanced stage of the battle.[Hopes Dashed in the Hürtgen] By Edward G. Miller and David T. Zabecki August 16, 2005 originally an article from World War II Magazine

Today tourists can visit a museum in Vossenack, look at a few of the many Siegfried Line-bunkers, and take a walk on the famous Kall-Trail.

A multiplayer map based upon this battle was featured in the game Call of Duty. The last mission in the computer game [[Medal of Honor: Allied Assault]] (Return to Schmerzen) was also partly based on this battle.

In Call of Duty 2 you play a US Army Ranger in the 2nd Ranger Battalion that, amongst other missions, capture the town of Bergstein and Hill 400.

The movie When Trumpets Fade (1998), directed by John Irvin, is set during the Battle of Hurtgen Forest and realistically evokes the gritty battle.

Notes

References

The Battle of Hurtgen Forest by Charles Whiting, 274 pp. (Orion Books, New York, 1989; Volume 4 in "The West Wall Series", Combined Publishing, 2000)
A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hurtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, 1944-1945 by Edward G. Miller, in the "Military History Series" Volume 39. Texas A&M University Press. 250 pp.
The Bloody Forest: Battle for Hurtgen September 1944 - January 1945 by Gerald Astor, 379 pp. (Presidio Press, 2000)

External links

From Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Original article here. Support Wikipedia by contributing or donating.
All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License See Wikipedia Copyrights for details.