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Chase, Maryland rail wreck

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The Chase, Maryland wreck occurred at 1:04 p.m. on January 4, 1987 on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor main line near Chase, Maryland at Gunpow Interlocking, about 18 miles northeast of Baltimore. Amtrak train 94, the Colonial, from Washington DC to Boston crashed into a set of Conrail locomotives running light. Amtrak train 94's speed at the time of the collision was estimated at about 108 mph. Fifteen passengers on the Amtrak train were killed, along with the Amtrak engineer. Two EMD AEM-7s (900 and 903) were destroyed.

The incident

Amtrak train 94 (the Colonial) left Washington Union Station at noon Eastern time bound for Boston, Massachusetts. The train was long and had 16 cars and was filled with travelers returning from the holiday season for their homes and schools for the second semester of the year. Two AEM-7 locomotives, Amtrak numbers 900 and 903, led the train where 903 was the lead locomotive. The engineer was 35-year old Jerome Evans.

After Baltimore, the train's next stop was Wilmington, Delaware. Shortly after Baltimore, the Northeast Corridor narrows to two tracks at Gunpow Interlocking just before crossing over the Gunpowder River. At this time, three Conrail freight locomotives, bound for Harrisburg Yard in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, were moving north on one of the adjacent freight tracks. The locomotives should have stopped short of the junction point at Chase (Gunpow interlocking) and waited for Amtrak #94 to pass, since the switches and signals at Gunpow were set for the passenger train to proceed at normal speed on straight track across the Gunpowder River bridge.

Ricky Lynn Gates, a Conrail engineer since 1973, operated the Conrail locomotives from Conrail's Bayview Yard just east of Baltimore. Gates was later determined to have apparently been in violation of several signal and operating rules, including a failure to properly test his cab signals as required before departure from Bayview. It was later discovered that someone had disabled the cab signal alerter whistle on lead unit CR 5044 with duct tape, muting it almost completely. Also, one of the light bulbs in the PRR-style cab signal display had been removed. Investigators believed these conditions probably existed prior to departure from Bayview, and that they would have been revealed by a properly performed departure test.

Speed/event recording devices indicated that the locomotives were moving at approximately 60 mph when the brakes were applied for an emergency stop. This was, Gates later claimed, when he realized that he did not have a wayside signal to proceed north at Gunpow. He was, however, moving too fast to stop before passing the signal indicating he should stop clear of the main track on which #94 was approaching.

The Conrail locomotives came to a stop on the track directly in front of #94, which approached the interlocking at 130 mph (210 km/h). With little time to react, Amtrak engineer Evans apparently saw the diesels on the line in front of him and applied the brakes for an emergency stop. The collision, however, was unavoidable.

On impact, the rearmost Conrail GE B36-7 diesel 5045 exploded and burned. It was completely destroyed down to frame, and was never rebuilt. The middle unit, 5052, sustained significant damage, but was later rebuilt and returned to service. Lead unit 5044 had little damage. AEM-7 900 was buried under the wreckage, while 903 ended up among some trees on the west side of the right of way. Several Budd Company Amfleet cars were piled up, with some crushed under the pile.

Conrail brakeman Edward "Butch" Cromwell, who was on the lead locomotive with Gates, suffered a broken leg in the collision. Gates was uninjured. The Amtrak engineer and the lounge car attendant were killed.

Because the first few cars of the Amtrak #94 were unoccupied, the death toll was kept to a bare minimum. These front cars suffered the greatest extent of damage and were almost completely crushed. According to the NTSB, had these cars been fully occupied at the time, the death toll would have been at least 100+ casualties. Some of the dead were burned alive before finally dying of smoke inhalation.

Most were on Amtrak car 21236.

With a total passenger load of about 600 people, there was a great deal of confusion after the collision. Many uninjured passengers wandered away, making it difficult for Amtrak to know the complete story. Many of the injured passengers were aided by nearby residents. Emergency personnel worked for many hours in the frigid cold, impeded as they were by the stainless-steel Amfleet cars' skin's resistance to the ordinary jaws-of-life tools at their command, to extricate trapped passengers from the wreckage as helicopters and ambulances transported injured people to hospitals and trauma centers.

It was several days before the wrecked equipment was removed and the track and electrical propulsion system were returned to service.

Aftermath

Engineer Gates later admitted that he and Edward Cromwell had been smoking marijuana and had overlooked the necessary safety precautions. Gates was eventually charged with homicide by motor vehicle, a statute in Maryland that specifies locomotives as motor vehicles. Gates resigned from Conrail rather than face disciplinary action from the company. He was subsequently sentenced to several years in a Maryland prison. Gates' history of DWI (driving while intoxicated) convictions as well as his admission that the crew had been using marijuana while operating the train led for a call to certify locomotive engineers as to their qualifications and history. Cromwell, the Conrail brakeman, "turned State's evidence" against Gates as to when the stop signals were visible.

Toxicology tests on the Amtrak engineer's body returned negative.

As a result of the wreck, all locomotives operating of the Northeast Corridor are now required to have automatic cab signalling with an automatic train stop feature. Conrail subsequently developed a device called a locomotive speed limiter (LSL), a computerized device that is designed to monitor and control the rate of deceleration for restrictive signals in conjunction with cab signals. All freight locomotives operated on the Northeast Corridor must now be equipped with an operating LSL. Previously, freight locomotives were only required to have automatic cab signals without an automatic train stop feature. Freight operations are restricted on the high speed sections of the Corridor.

Also as a direct result of this collision, federal legislation was enacted that required the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to develop a system of certification for locomotive engineers. These regulations went into effect in January, 1990. Since then, railroads are required by law to certify that their engineers are properly trained and qualified, and that they have no drug or alcohol impairment motor vehicle convictions for the five year period prior to certification.

 


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