Infiltration tactics

Encyclopedia : I : IN : INF : Infiltration tactics

In warfare, infiltration tactics involve small, lightly-equipped infantry forces attacking enemy rear areas while bypassing enemy front-line strongpoints, isolating them for attack by follow-up friendly troops with heavier weapons. These tactics were first used by the stormtroopers of the German Army in 1917 during the First World War, where they were also called Hutier tactics, after General Oskar von Hutier, who used these tactics to great effect during Operation Michael in March 1918.

The first use of German infiltration tactics occurred on 3 September 1917 when the German Eighth Army decisively ended the long siege before the Russian city of Riga. The same tactics were then employed to create a break through of the allied lines during the Battle of Caporetto in October 1917, in which the future General Erwin Rommel was involved and decorated as a battalion commander.

Ironically the idea for infiltration tactics was first proposed by French Army captain Andre Laffargue TACTICAL RESPONSES TO CONCENTRATED ARTILLERY. Laffargue published a pamphlet "The attack in trench warfare" in 1915, based upon his experiences in combat that same year. He advocated that the first wave of an attack identify hard-to-defeat defences, but not attack them: subsequent waves would do this.

His pamphlet was published "for information" by the French, but not implemented, and was not even translated by the English. Germany captured copies of the pamphlet in 1916 and put its ideas into practice.

Hutier tactics

Infiltration attacks began with brief and violent bombardments of the enemy front lines, to suppress and demoralize the soldiers stationed there. Unlike regular trench warfare, the bombardment was also directed at the enemy rear areas, to destroy or disrupt roads, enemy artillery, and enemy command units. This was done to confuse the enemy, and reduce their capability to launch effective counterattacks from secondary defense lines. For maximum effect, the exact points of attack were concealed until the last possible moment.

These attacks were led by light infantry, who would attempt to penetrate at enemy weak points, bypassing heavily-defended enemy positions in the front line. The attacks would be followed by other infantrymen with heavier weapons, who would then have a great advantage in attacking these isolated enemy strongpoints. Other reinforcements would enter these points, and the entire enemy line would shortly collapse.

This tactic worked well in the early stages of its conception, and was used heavily. However, because of its overuse in the early stages of its creation, effective defences were quickly found. Also, as in the case of the more traditional mass attack, reserves had to consolidate any gains against an enemy counter-attack. One of the problems of World War I was that even when a breakthrough was made, the ground was so devastated that moving up reserves and materiel was difficult, allowing the enemy time to regroup. Thus, even with the new tactics and their relatively light use of artillery, attacks would tend to bog down sooner or later, and no massive breakthrough was possible. However, the new tactics, applied consistently over time, were much more effective than the old ones. It is interesting to note that the Russian General Brusilov and his staff anticipated several of these tactics during the successful Brusilov Offensive.

Infiltration tactics led to the creation of the modern military formation of the fire team, a small group of soldiers with a certain degree of , capable of penetrating enemy territory on missions of sabotage and misdirection. Similar methods were used by other armies in the Second World War where they became standard infantry tactics.

References

House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. U.S. Army Command General Staff College, 1984. [Available online] (5 February 2005) or through University Press of the Pacific (2002).
Pope, Stephen and Wheal, Elizabeth-Anne, eds.The Macmillian Dictionary of the First World War. Macmillian Reference Books, 1995.

Notes

[TACTICAL RESPONSES TO CONCENTRATED ARTILLERY] (Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth)

From Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Original article here. Support Wikipedia by contributing or donating.
All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License See Wikipedia Copyrights for details.