Iran Air Flight 655

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The USS Vincennes shot down an Iran Air passenger aircraft similar to this Iran Air Airbus, killing all 290 passengers including 66 children and crew on board.

Iran Air Flight 655 (IR655) was a commercial flight operated by Iran Air that flew from Bandar Abbas, Iran to Dubai. On Sunday July 3, 1988, the airplane flying IR655 was shot down by the U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes between Bandar Abbas and Dubai, killing all 290 passengers and crew aboard, including 38 non-Iranians and 66 children.

The plane, an Airbus A300B2, registered as EP-IBU and flown by captain Mohsen Rezaian, left Bandar Abbas at 10:17 am Iran time (UTC+0330), 27 minutes after its scheduled departure time of 9:50 am. It would have been a 28-minute flight. After takeoff, it was directed by the Bandar Abbas tower to turn on its transponder and proceed over the Persian Gulf. The flight was assigned routinely to commercial air corridor Amber 59, a twenty-mile-wide lane on a direct line to Dubai airport. The short distance made for a simple flight pattern: climb to 14,000 feet (about 4300 m), cruise for a short time, and descend into Dubai.

At that same time, the Vincennes, under the command of Captain William C. Rogers III and fitted with the then-new AEGIS combat system, was nearby in the Strait of Hormuz.

The Vincennes had been rushed to the area after the April 14 mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts by Iranian forces. Iran had purchased Silkworm missiles from China, and an AEGIS cruiser was the only type of vessel that could counter the threat. Roberts had been operating in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Earnest Will, the effort to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War.

On the morning of July 3, the Vincennes crossed into Iranian territorial waters during clashes with Iranian gunboats. The USS Sides (FFG-14) and USS Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082) were nearby.

Contents

1 U.S. government accounts
2 Independent sources
3 Radio frequencies
4 Possibly relevant factors
5 Medals awarded
6 Compensation
7 Fiction
8 References
9 See also
10 External links

U.S. government accounts

According to U.S. government accounts, the Vincennes mistakenly identified the Iranian airplane as an attacking military fighter. The officers identified the flight profile being flown by the A300B2 as being similar to that of an Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force F-14A Tomcat during an attack run.An Airbus A300B2 is 177 feet long (54.08 m), nearly three times as long as an F-14, which is 61 ft 9 in long (18.6 m). Analysis of the radar return's strength can tell them apart, but this is not done in a busy environment because of the time it requires. ^{[[Citing sources citation needed]]} According to the same reports the Vincennes tried more than once to contact Flight 655, but there was no acknowledgement.

At 10:24 am, with the civilian jet 11 nautical miles away, the Vincennes fired two SM-2ER Surface-to-air missiles. The first missile broke the aircraft in two and damaged the tailplane and right wing. After the engagement, the Vincennes' crew realized that the plane had been a civilian airliner.

This version was finalized in a report by Admiral William Fogarty, entitled Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988. Only parts of this report have been released (part I in 1988, part II in 1993), a fact criticized by many observers.

The unclassified version of a Congressional report of a U.S. Navy investigation headed by Admiral William Fogarty did not accurately show the location of the USS Vincennes some 2 NM (4 km) inside Iranian territorial waters.

Independent sources

Newsweek reporters John Barry and Roger Charles wrote that Rogers acted recklessly and without due care. Their report accused the U.S. government of a cover-up.^{[[Citing sources citation needed]]} An analysis of the events by the International Strategic Studies Association described the deployment of an Aegis cruiser in the zone as irresponsible and felt that the expense of the ship had played a major part in the setting of a low threshold for opening fire. On November 6 2003 the International Court of Justice concluded that the U.S. Navy's actions in the Persian Gulf at the time had been unlawful.

Three years after the incident, Admiral William J. Crowe admitted on Nightline that the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles. This contradicted earlier Navy claims.

Captain David Carlson, commander of the USS Sides, the warship stationed nearby the Vincennes at the time of the incident, is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have said that the destruction of the aircraft "marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers' aggressiveness, first seen four weeks ago" - referring to incidents on June 2, when Rogers had sailed the Vincennes too close to an Iranian frigate undertaking a lawful search of a bulk carrier, launched a helicopter within 2-3 miles (3.2-4.8 km) of an Iranian small craft despite rules of engagement requiring a four-mile (6.4 km) separation, and opened fire on a number of small Iranian military boats. Of those incidents, Carlson commented, "Why do you want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats? It wasn't a smart thing to do." At the time of Rogers' announcement to higher command that he was going to shoot down the plane, Carlson is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have been thunderstruck: "I said to folks around me, 'Why, what the hell is he doing?' I went through the drill again. F-14. He's climbing. By now this damn thing is at 7,000 feet." However, Carlson thought the Vincennes might have more information, and was unaware that Rogers had been wrongly informed that the plane was diving.

Radio frequencies

Throughout its final flight IR655 was in radio contact with various air traffic control services using standard civil aviation frequencies, and had spoken in English to Bandar Abbas Approach Control seconds before the Vincennes launched its missiles. The Vincennes at that time had no equipment suitable for monitoring civil aviation frequencies, other than the International Air Distress frequency. Subsequently U.S. Navy warships in the area were equipped with dialable VHF radios, and access to flight plan information was sought, to better track commercial airliners.

The official ICAO report stated that 10 attempts were made to contact Iran Air 655, seven on military frequencies, three on commercial frequencies and addressed to the supposed "Iranian F-14".

Possibly relevant factors

The ship's crew did not efficiently consult commercial airliner schedules because they were not sure to which time zone they referred.
An Iranian P-3 was in the area a while before the attack, providing an unlikely potential explanation for the lack of target acquisition radar interrogation
It was first claimed that Flight 655 deviated from the centre of its air corridor, an unusual occurrence with commercial flights - namely that it was 3.35 NM off the 10 NM-wide corridor at the time of shoot-down. It is further claimed that this deviation had it bearing straight at the Vincennes. It is unclear how much of this deviation was true, and how much was claimed to obscure the Vincennes' position within Iranian territorial waters.
It is claimed that a Mode II IFF squawk of 21100 was mistakenly attributed to the Airbus track, identifying it as an Iranian military aircraft (commercial aircraft respond with Mode III squawks). However this was not the case: according to the official military report the flight was in fact using the correct squawk mode. The Vincennes simply either heard it wrong or believed it was a military plane using Mode III 36760 to deceive them. It has since been assumed that the tracking device used to identify IFF squawks was left in the original postition of Flight 655 when first sighted, which had subsequently moved, confusing the Flight 655 squawk with that of an Iranian F-14 fighter within the area. The Bandar Abbas airport was shared between commercial and military aircraft at that time.
The crew of the Vincennes' Combat Information Center (CIC) confusingly reported the plane as ascending and descending at the same time (there were two "camps"). This seems to have happened because the Airbus' original CIC track, number 4474, had been replaced by the Sides' track, number 4131, when the computer recognised them as one and the same. Shortly thereafter, track 4474 was re-assigned by the system to an American A-6, several hundred miles away, which was following a descending course at the time. Apparently not all the crew in the CIC realized the track number had been switched on them.
This incident took place just over a year after the USS Stark was attacked in the Persian Gulf by an Iraqi Mirage F-1, costing 37 lives.
The psychology and mindset after engaging in a battle with Iranian gunboatsThere are claims that Vincennes was engaged in an operation using a decoy cargo ship to lure Iranian gunboats to a fight. However, those claims are denied by Fogary in "Hearing Before The Investigation Subcommittee and The Defense Policy Panel of The Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, July 21, 1992". Also, the initial claims of Vincennes being called for help a cargo ship attacked by Iranian gunboats have been ruled out. That leads to claims that the Iranian gunboats were provoked by Helicopters inside Iranian waters and not the other way around.<[Iran Air 655, House Armed Services Hearing], July 21, 1992 might have contributed to the mistakes made. The actual reasons for the Vincennes' engagement with gunboats is not so clear to this date.
Software development expert Steve McConnell claimed:

Medals awarded

The U.S. government issued notes of regret for the loss of human life but never admitted wrongdoing, accepted responsibility, nor apologised for the incident. Officially, it continues to blame Iranian hostile actions for the incident. The men of the Vincennes were all awarded combat-action ribbons. Lustig, the air-warfare co-ordinator, won the navy's Commendation Medal for "heroic achievement," noting his "ability to maintain his poise and confidence under fire" that enabled him to "quickly and precisely complete the firing procedure."^{[[Citing sources citation needed]]} The Legion of Merit was presented to Rogers and Lustig on 3 July 1988, according to a 23 April 1990 article in The Washington Post. The citations did not mention the Iran Air flight. It should be noted that the Legion of Merit is often awarded to high-ranking officers upon successful completion of especially difficult duty assignments and/or last tours of duty before retirement.

The incident overshadowed U.S.-Iran relations for many years. Following the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 six months later, the British and American governments initially blamed the PFLP-GC, a Palestinian militant group backed by Syria, with assumptions of assistance from Iran in retaliation for Iran Air Flight 655.^{[[Citing sources citation needed]]} The cause of the crash was later determined to be a bomb associated with the Libyan intelligence service, though an Iranian group had claimed responsibility for it.^{[[Citing sources citation needed]]}

The Flight 655 incident has often been compared to that of Korean Air Flight 007 interception by the Soviet Air Force in 1983.

Then-Vice President George H. W. Bush declared a month later, "I will never apologise for the United States of America, ever. I don't care what it has done. I don't care what the facts are."

Compensation

On February 22, 1996 the United States agreed to pay Iran US$ 61.8 million in compensation ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage-earner) for the 248 Iranians killed in the shootdown, and for the aircraft . This was an agreed settlement to discontinue a case brought by Iran in 1989 against the U.S. in the International Court of Justice. The payment of compensation was explicitly characterised by the US as being on an ex gratia basis, and the U.S. denied having any responsibility or liability for the incident.

Fiction

Bradley Thompson and David Weddle, two writers on , loosely based the DS9 episode "Rules of Engagement" on the disaster.

References

Nunn Wants to Reopen Inquiry into Vincennes' Gulf Location. Washington Times, July 4, 1992. Abstract: Senator Sam Nunn called on the Pentagon to probe allegations that the Navy "deliberately misled Congress" about the location of the USS Vincennes when it shot down an Iranian civilian airliner four years ago.
Fisk, Robert. The Great War for Civilisation - The Conquest of the Middle East. London : Fourth Estate, 2005. 318-328. ISBN 184115007X
Marian Nash Leich, "Denial of Liability: Ex Gratia Compensation on a Humanitarian Basis" American Journal of International Law Vol. 83 p. 319 (1989)

External links

[ABC Nightline interview with Admiral William Crowe] aired 1 July 1992, in which Crowe admits that the Vincennes was inside Iranian waters at the time of the shooting, despite what the Navy had been claiming.
[US Senate, Armed Services Committee hearing], 8 September 1988
[A collection of US government statements on Iran Air Flight 655]
[Tragedy over the Persian Gulf], from Chapter 9 of [Trapped in the Net:The Unanticipated Consequences of Computerization] by Gene I. Rochlin
[Vincennes A Case Study], Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
[Iran Air shot down], The History Channel
[Iran Air 655 Shootdown, Iran Chamber]
[Mehr News, Mehr News Agency]
[ICJ case - Written Pleadings], Iran and U.S. cases to the International Court of Justice

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