Lion of Babylon tank
Encyclopedia : L : LI : LIO : Lion of Babylon tank
The Lion of Babylon tank (Asad Babil) is an Iraqi-built version of the Soviet T-72 tank MBT (main battle tank), assembled in a factory established in the 1980s near Taji, north of Baghdad.
Production History
This was the most ambitious attempt by Saddam Hussein's Regime to developed an indigenous tank production, triggered in part when some western governments imposed an embargo in order to force a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war.
A steel plant was in place in Taji since 1986, built by a Western German Company, manufacturing steel for several military uses and meeting the standards to retrofitted an rebuilt tanks already on duty in the Iraqi Army, such as the T-55 family and the T-62. But the first locally-built T-72 came off the production line in early 1989, after a license agreement was achieved with a Polish contractor to provide essential parts for assembly. The new imposed UN arms embargo following the iraqi invasion of Kuwait (August 1990) soon limited the complex activity to the production of spare parts for the Lions and other tanks in the iraqi stock[link].
In most aspects, the Lion of Babylon is (at least physically) identical to the first model T-72. Nevertheless, the two differ considerably, both in the quality of construction and durability of materials used. The tank is equipped with additional armour at the front and rear as protection against missile attacks. A few examples feature a laser range-finder for its 125-mm main gun. American military intelligence believed some of them featured Belgium-made thermal sights (see Crusade, pag.443).
Combat Performance
The Asad Babil was generally credited as being the most common tank in Iraqi service during the first Persian Gulf War (1990-91), but that honor goes, in fact, to the Type 69, produced in China but widely refitted by the Iraqis. Remember that the production was barely two years old when the conflict started. Only Republican Guard divisions were equipped with iraqi-built T-72s. Much to the distress of Russian armaments designers, many of the failings of the Iraqi armies were blamed upon the original T-72, with little note that the vehicle itself was an Iraqi copy of an older export model, and nowhere near its up-to-date Soviet counterpart in capability. Even in the hands of competent crewmen, the Lion of Babylon is utterly outclassed by the M1 Abrams, as was demonstrated in both Gulf Wars, and almost certainly by every other contemporary Western main battle tank as well. For example, a 120-mm depleted uranium (DU) APDFS round from an M1 could kill an Asad Babil tank well beyond 3,000 m, while the effective range of a tungsten-core 125-mm shell is scarcely 1,800 m. The only chance for the Asad Babil against American tanks was to lure them to close range combat, or trying to ambush them from dug-in positions. But even in that conditions, the M1s usually prevailed, as proven in circumstances like the Battle of 73 Easting, during Desert Storm, where dozens of Iraqi MBTs were obliterated, or near Mahmoudiyah, south of Baghdad, April 3, 2003, (Iraqi Freedom) when US tanks engaged her counterparts from just 50 yards, shattering 7 enemy T-72s without losses (see Heavy Metal: A Tank Company's Battle To Baghdad., pag. 158).
Desert Storm
The Ground War begun Feb 23, 1991, and lasted until Feb 27, when President George Bush Sr declared an unilateral cease-fire, after the last Iraqi Army Units were forced out Kuwait. The Asad Babil saw action mostly with the Republican Guard Armored Division Tawakalna (God with us), on the third day of operations. The Division was badly hit and decimated by the simultaneous assault of several American armored Task Forces.
vs the M1 Abrams
At first, combat assessment researchers thought that about a dozen of M1a were hit and damaged in some degree in the course of tank battles with Iraqi T-72s in 1991, but further ballistics information and radiological readings showed that 6 Abrams were beyond any doubt hit by friendly fire[link]. Helicopter-launched missiles are suspected of inflicting friendly damage in another 4 cases.
As we described before, the T-72s built in Taji were technologically 15 or more years outdated, so they cannot face the latest generation of US MBTs without sustain heavy losses. However, some sources dispute the claim that no M1a Abrams took damaged from this Iraqi tank. Brig. Gen. Robert Scales, in Certain Victory (pag. 269-270) describes an engagement at close range between advancing M1s and dug-in Lions where at least two American tanks were put out of action, apparently by 125-mm sabot rounds. The battle took place before midnight, February 26, 1991, against a brigade of Tawakalna Division .The Abrams tanks belonged to TF 1-37th Armour, 1st Armoured Division, both being struck from behind. Another two became the targets of anti-tank missiles .There was speculation about incoming friendly-fire from Apache helicopters of the 3rd Armored Division deployed to the south, but one of the four M1s (B-23) was definitely hit by a non-depleted uranium discarding sabot shell, since no radiological trace was found (see item B in the following link) [link]. An official document ([scan]), shows a drawing describing the projectile path right through the tank hull, defeating the armour on both sides, a kind of harm that only a large kinetic energy penetrator could make (the Hellfire missile fired from the Apaches has a high explosive anti-tank warhead). This is the summary ([scan]) detailing Abrams B-23's damage. Note that this text mentions two rounds hitting the Abrams, the first of them (a shaped charge weapon) being probably an AGM-114 Hellfire missile blast through the rear grill doors, while the second unknown round is almost certainly that depicted in the ballistic's sketch, likely from an Asad Babil gun. The damage taken from this second hit, as is described in this unclassified article, was catastrophic.
Another US Army official damage assessment ([scan]), asserts that an unidentified Abrams suffered three non-DU impacts, the witnesses in the field claiming a T-72 was to blame.
The damage was probably sustained during the last engagement of the Gulf War, March 2 1991, near the Rumeilah oil fields, when the 1st Brigade of the 24th Infantry Division attacked by surprise a large retreating column of the Hammurabi elite Division, comprising some Asad Babil and APCs, which apparently broke the cease-fire. Most of the Brigade-size formation was destroyed by the combined force of helicopters, A-10 attack aircraft and armoured vehicle weapons, but Rick Atkinson's book Crusade, cites one M1 destroyed and another out of action by "exploding" T-72s (pag. 484).
There are two photos, found on the Internet, showing a damaged M1, with what appear to be two large darts embedded in the rear-right side of its turret, somewhat matching the description of the US Army assessment. The tank's markings also match those identifying the 24th Infantry Division. As you can see, the impacts seem to be well aimed shots rather than random falling shells or splinters from the explosion of an enemy vehicle. The storage area around the turret seems devastated by a subsequent fire.
vs the M2 Bradley
According to Atkinson and Scales, the Lions also accounted for at least three M2 Bradley IFVs during Desert Storm and left several damaged, all of them on February 26,1991 .
The Bradleys were often deployed as advanced scouts for the main armored forces. They explored the enemy lines, having been greeting by the iraqi tank's main guns in many occasions. Also, if located at striking distance, they employed their BGM-71 TOWs antitank missiles with deadly effects, taking out even some MBTs. Almost all the M2 losses were the result of this kind of missions.
Brig. Gral. Scales states that on the mentioned date, a M2 Bradley (number unknown), leading the TF 3-5th Cavalry scout platoon and commanded by a First Lieutenant Donald Murray, took a t-72 sabot round through the road wheels. This action led to the first officially reported killing of a Lion in the campaign, by First Lieutenant Marty Lener's tank (pag. 273).
Atkinson cites a mostly fraticide battle near Phase Line Bullet, a preestablished objective in the way towards northern Kuwait, west of Al-Busayyah (pag. 428 to 433). The close-range skirmish involved Bradleys from the 4th Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment against Iraqi dismounted Infantry, APCs, and T-72s of Tawakalna Division. Visibility conditions were extremely poor (less than 400 yards), due to a sandstorm combined with the fumes of burning oil wells. The iraqis employed small arms, RPG-7s, AT-3 Saggers missiles (completely aimless in such poor weather), and direct and indirect tank fire from their entrenched positions. One of the American IFVs (A-36) was hit and crippled by a 12.7-mm bullet from an Iraqi tank and then shattered by a HEAT 125-mm shell after the crew evacuated the vehicle (see item A, in the section about Bradley (Bumper # A-31))[link]. Bradley A-35 also took some damage from a mix of ricocheting 12.7-mm bursts and 125-mm HEAT near-misses, but was able to be driven out [link]. Another 3 vehicles were put out of action by M1a sabot friendly fire. The rest of the 14 IFVs platoon, all of them damaged, were forced to withdraw.
There is also another reference to a third Bradley (K12), belonging to 3rd squadron, 2nd ACR (US 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment), hit by both kinetic energy and HEAT rounds and totally destroyed, present in the following link. [link].
Invasion of Iraq
During the invasion of Iraq, the Republican Guard's Lions, most of them from the Medina Division, showed up around Baghdad, attempting a last ditch defense of the Baath Regime. Since the begining of the war, the bulk of the resistance had been conducted by regular army units, fitted with Type 69s and T-62. In the process of the final run to the iraqi capital, another M2 was struck by a 125-mm shell near Baghdad Airport in early April 2003, caught in the open while on a reconnaissance mission[link]. Other sources claim the Bradley was destroyed by an iraqi modified Type 69 fitted with a 57-mm gun[link] . This action took place during a counter-attack led by Republican Guard armored forces against the Task Force 2-7 Infantry (Mechanized) Tactical Operation Center (TOC). Other light vehicles (Humvees and heavy trucks), possibly fell to tank main guns at this instance. There is also a reference, contained in the two latest links, to a M1a2, Bumper # B-24, part of TF-1-64 AR, hit in its EAPU (external auxiliary power unit) by what the analists believed was 12.7-mm fire, the same caliber of the Type NSV machinegun mounted on the Asad Babil turret. This Abrams was damaged at the gates of Baghdad International Airport, just an hour before the Bradley incident, leading to speculation about whether a Lion fired at B-24.
However, an older version of this soviet-built machinegun is also mounted on light infantry vehicles, such as the BRDM wheeled APC (armoured personnel carrier) family. The BRDM-2 is fitted with an even higher caliber weapon (14.5-mm), with the same armour-piercing capabilities of the NSV. The M1 caught fire in the main engine, and was later stripped of parts in a maintenance area.
This kind of mishaps proved that the external storage of the Abrams are highly vulnerable to small arms fire, capable of igniting packaged items dripping down to the engine compartment, as the case of the 24 ID tank in 1991.
The last Asad Babils were destroyed or abandoned by their crews after the fall of Baghdad, several of them without firing a single shot. The disintegration of the central power was followed by the disbanding of the entire Iraqi Armed Forces, sinking the country in chaos.
Conclusions
From a wide point of view, the Iraqi T-72 was affected by the same lack of manouvering skills which pervaded the Iraqi Army commander's minds since the war with Iran. The Asad Babils, like any other tank in the Iraqi inventory, were mainly employed as artillery pillboxes, rather than high-mobility combat vehicles. The Iraqi Generals wasted tons and tons of HEAT and even sabot tank shells in indirect fire missions, achieving absolutely nothing against coalition troops before being located and wiped out by helicopter or A-10 air strikes. As we have seen before, the ambushes were also mostly ineffective, and those tanks met their fate at the hands of Allied MBTs or IFVs. In any case, the overwhelming air supremacy of the Coalition would had forced to bury in foxholes even the fastest armored division in the world. However, against all odds, the Tawakalna Division (the bulk of it comprising Lion of Babylon tanks), managed to contain the offensive of two reinforced American Armoured Divisions (the 3rd an the 1st) for a lapse enough to avoid the encirclement and annihilation of the other Republican Guard Divisions, at the cost of its own destruction. Many authors sustain that the very existence of Saddam's Regime for the next 12 years can be attribute to this fact, since the surviving Republican Guard units crushed the shiite and kurd risings right after the Iraqi defeat in Desert Storm.
Armor
The Lion's armour was the same as the basic soviet T-72, without any composite armour improvement, which made this tank an easy prey for any Western counterpart of latest generation. Their sides had just 60-mm protection, the turret side and rear 300-mm standard.
Nevertheless, the 350-mm frontal ERA reactive armour, present both at the turret and the front glacis plate, worked relatively well against some shaped-charge ordinance, like the TOWs and Hellfire missiles. There are some reports of Iraqi T-72s surviving direct hits from this weapons, although becoming a mobility kill in almost all of these cases. This link shows one example:[link]. Even if the iraqi tank was ultimately destroyed, its armour forced the Bradleys to fire three TOWs before finished it. Atkinson (op. cit., pag. 444), cites another case of a TOW bouncing off a T-72 glacis plate, hitting the turret of another tank.
Another of this few cases took place in the already mentioned combat of Mahmoudiyah in 2003, when a 120-mm HEAT round from an Abrams slammed into the front of an Asad Babil turret without any significant consequences (see Conroy & Martz, op. cit., pag. 9).
There are also at least two examples of 25-mm cannon fire from Bradleys IFVs ricocheting harmlessly when fired at the Iraqi tank in Desert Storm. But in the end it was no match for the so called silver bullet: the 120-mm DU tank ammunition.
Sources
- Scales, Brigadier General Robert H. Jr: Certain Victory. Brassey's, 1994.
- Atkinson, Rick: Crusade, The untold story of the Persian Gulf War. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993.
- Conroy, Jason & Martz, Ron: Heavy Metal: A Tank Company's Battle To Baghdad. Potomac Books, 2005.
- Isby, David: Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army. Salamander Books, London, 1988.
- "Dragon's Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting." Armor, May-June 1992, VOL CI, #3.
- Jane's Armor & Artillery, Jane's Information Group, Surrey, 1988-89 Ed.
External References
From Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Original article here. Support Wikipedia by contributing or donating.
All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License See Wikipedia Copyrights for details.