Mohammed Mossadegh
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Early life
Mohammad Mossadegh was born in 1882 in Tehran to a Bakhtiari finance minister and a Qajar princess. When his father died in 1892, he was appointed the tax collector of the province. [link] He studied at Sciences Po in Paris and received his PhD from the Neuchâtel University in Switzerland.Early political career
Mossadegh got his start in Iranian politics in 1920 when he was appointed Governor General of the Iranian province of Fars by Ahmad Shah Qajar and was bestowed with the title of Mosaddegh os-Saltaneh by the Shah. He was later appointed finance minister, in the government of Ghavam os-Saltaneh in 1921, and then foreign minister, in the government of Hassan Pirnia Moshir od-Dowleh in June, 1923. Later in 1923, he was elected to the Iranian parliament and voted against the selection of Reza Khan as Reza Shah Pahlavi.By 1944 Reza Shah Pahlavi had abdicated, and Mossadegh was once again elected to parliament. This time he ran as a member of the National Front of Iran (Jebhe Melli), a nationalist organization which he had founded that aimed to end the foreign presence that had established itself in Iran following the Second World War, especially regarding the exploitation of Iran's rich oil resources.
After negotiations for higher oil royalties failed, on March 15, 1951 the Iranian parliament (the Majlis) voted to nationalize Iran's oil industry and seize control of the British-owned and operated Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Prime minister General Haj-Ali Razmara, elected in June 1950, had opposed the nationalization bill on technical grounds. He was assassinated on March 7, 1951 by Khalil Tahmasebi, a member of the militant fundamentalist group Fadayan-e Islam.
Prime minister
On April 28, 1951, the Majlis named Mossadegh as new prime minister by a vote of 79-12. Aware of Mossadegh's rising popularity and political power, the young Shah was left with no other option but to give assent to the Parliament's vote. Shortly after coming to office, Mossadegh enforced the Oil Nationalization Act, which involved the expropriation of the AIOC's assets.Responding to the latter, the British government announced it would not allow Mossadegh's government to export any oil produced in the formerly British-controlled refineries. A blockade by British ships was established in the Persian Gulf to prevent any attempts by Iran to ship oil out of the country. Furthermore, the AIOC withdrew its British trained technicians when Mossadegh nationalized the oil industry. Thus, many of the refineries lacked properly trained technicians that were needed to continue production. An economic stalemate thus ensued, with Mossadegh's government refusing to allow any British involvement in Iran's oil industry, and Britain refusing to allow any oil to leave Iran.
Since Britain had long been Iran's primary oil-consumer, the stalemate was particularly hard on Iran. While the country had once boasted over a 100 million dollars a year in exports to Britain, after nationalization, the same oil industry began increasing Iran's debt by nearly 10 million dollars a month. The Abadan Crisis quickly plunged the country into economic difficulties.
Despite the economic hardships of his nationalization plan, Mossadegh remained popular, and in 1952 was approved by parliament for a second term. Sensing the difficulties of a worsening political and economic climate, he announced that he would ask the Shah to grant him emergency powers. Thus, during the royal approval of his new cabinet, Mossadegh insisted on the constitutional prerogative of the prime minister to name a Minister of War and the Chief of Staff. The Shah refused, and Mossadegh announced his resignation.
Ahmad Qavam was appointed as Iran's new prime minister. On the day of his appointment, he announced his intention to resume negotiations with the British to end the oil dispute. This blatant reversal of Mossadegh's plans sparked a massive public outrage. Protestors of all stripes filled the streets, including communists and radical Muslims led by Ayatollah Kashani. Frightened by the unrest, the Shah quickly dismissed Qavam, and re-appointed Mossadegh, granting him the full control of the military he had previously requested.
Taking advantage of his popularity, Mossadegh convinced the parliament to grant him increased powers and appointed Ayatollah Kashani as house speaker. Kashani's radical Muslims, as well as the Tudeh Party, proved to be two of Mossadegh's key political allies, although both relationships were often strained.
Mossadegh quickly implemented more sociopolitical changes. Iran's centuries old feudal agriculture sector was abolished, and replaced with a system of collective farming and government land ownership.
Plot against Mossadegh
The government of Britain had grown increasingly distressed over Mossadegh's policies and were especially bitter over the loss of their control on the Iranian oil industry. Despite Mossadegh's repeated attempts to negotiate a reasonable settlement with them they refused outright the same terms, and later total control over Iranian oil.
Unable to resolve the issue singlehandedly due to its post second world war problems, Britain looked towards the United States to settle the issue. The United States was falsely informed that Mossadegh was increasingly turning towards Communism and was moving Iran towards the Soviet sphere at a time of high Cold War fears.
Acting on the fears created by Britain the United States and Britain began to publicly denounce Mossadegh's policies for Iran as harmful to the country.
In October of 1952, Mossadegh declared that Britain was "an enemy", and cut all diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. In November and December 1952, British intelligence officials suggested to American intelligence that the prime minister should be ousted. The new US administration under Dwight Eisenhower and the British government under Winston Churchill agreed to work together toward Mossadegh's removal. In March of 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles directed the US Central Intelligence Agency, which was headed by his younger brother Allen Dulles, to draft plans to overthrow Mossadegh [link].
On April 4, 1953, CIA director Dulles approved $1 million to be used "in any way that would bring about the fall of Mossadegh". Soon the CIA's Tehran station started to launch a propaganda campaign against Mossadegh. Finally, according to The New York Times, in early June, American and British intelligence officials met again, this time in Beirut, and put the finishing touches on the strategy. Soon afterward, according to his later published accounts, the chief of the CIA's Near East and Africa division, Kermit Roosevelt, Jr. a grandson of Theodore Roosevelt, arrived in Tehran to direct it.
The plot, known as Operation Ajax, centered around convincing Iran's monarch to use his constitutional authority to dismiss Mossadegh from office, as he had attempted some months earlier. But the Shah was uncooperative, and it would take much persuasion and many meetings to successfully execute the plan. Meanwhile, the CIA stepped up its operations. According to Dr. Donald N. Wilber, who was involved in the plot to remove Mossadegh from power, in early August, Iranian CIA operatives pretending to be socialists and nationalists threatened Muslim leaders with "savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh," thereby giving the impression that Mossadegh was cracking down on dissent, and stirring anti-Mossadegh sentiments within the religious community.
Mossadegh became aware of the plots against him and grew increasingly wary of conspirators acting within his government. He set up a national referendum to dissolve parliament. Some purport that the vote was rigged, with Mossadegh claiming a 99.9 percent victory for the "yes" side. Allegations that Mossadegh was resorting to dictatorial tactics to stay in power were in turn cited by US- and British-supported opposition press as a reason to remove Mossadegh from power. Parliament was suspended indefinitely, and Mossadegh's emergency powers were extended.
Inside Iran, Mossadegh's popularity was eroding #redirect as promised reforms failed to materialize [[Citing sources citation needed]] and the economy continued to suffer due to heavy British sanctions. The Tudeh Party abandoned its alliance with Mossadegh, as did the conservative clerical factions.
In August of 1953 Mossadegh attempted to convince the Shah to leave the country. The Shah refused, and formally dismissed the Prime Minister, in accordance with the foreign intelligence plan. Mossadegh refused to leave, however, and when it became apparent that he was going to fight, the Shah, as a precautionary measure foreseen by the British/American plan, flew to Baghdad and on from there to Rome, Italy, after hesitantly signing two decrees, one dismissing Mossadeq and the other nominating General Fazlollah Zahedi Prime Minister, subsequent to pressure from the US and UK intelligence agencies. The choice had fallen on Zahedi, whom in the months before, Rosevelt and Wilbur had identified as perfectly suitable to carry out the dirty work, during and following the coup. Fazlollah Zahedi was to prove that they had betted on the right horse, afterall he had fallen out with Mossadeq and resigned from his post as minister of the iInterior, as well as having been briefly detained already on suspicions of planning a coup of his own, by Mossadeq's orders in February of 1953. Fearing imminent arrest, Zahedi went into hiding, with another affair, the torture death of Tehran's chief odf Police, General Afshartus being blamed on him by the authorities.
Once again, massive protests broke out across the nation. Anti- and pro-monarchy protestors violently clashed in the streets, leaving almost 300 dead. Funded with money from the U.S. CIA and the British MI6, the pro-monarchy forces, lead by retired army General and former Minister of Interior in Mossadeq's cabinet , Fazlollah Zahedi, gained the upper hand on 19th August 1953 (28 Mordad). The military intervened as the pro-Shah tank regiments stormed the capital and bombarded the prime minister's official residence. Mossadegh managed to flee from the mob that set in to ransack his house, and surrendered to General Zahedi the following day, who had meanwhile established his makeshift headquaters at the Officers' Club. A tearful Dr. Mossadeq was received in dignity however and placed under arrest in a comfortable appartment at the Officers' Club for some weeks to come.
Shortly after the return of the Shah on 22nd August 1953 from the brief selfimposed exile in Rome, Mossadeq was tried by a military tribunal for high treason. Zahedi and the Shah were inclined, however, to spare the ailing man's life (the death penalty would have applied according to the laws of the day). Mossadeq received a sentence of 3 years in solitary confinement, at a military jail, and was exiled to his village, not far from Tehran, where he remained under house arrest until his death, on March 5, 1967.
Zahedi's new government soon reached an agreement with foreign oil companies to "restore the flow of Iranian oil to world markets in substantial quantities." [link].
Legacy
The extent of the US role in Mossadegh's overthrow was not formally acknowledged for many years, although the Eisenhower administration was quite vocal in its opposition to the policies of the ousted Iranian Prime Minister. In his memoirs, Eisenhower writes angrily about Mossadegh, and describes him as impractical and naive, though stops short of admitting any overt involvement in the coup.Eventually the CIA's role became well-known, and caused controversy within the organization itself, and within the CIA congressional hearings of the 1970s. Die-hard CIA supporters maintain that the plot against Mossadegh was strategically necessary, and praise the efficiency of agents in carrying out the plan. Critics say the scheme was paranoid and colonial, as well as immoral.
When the Iranian revolution occurred in 1979, the overthrow of Mossadegh was used as a rallying point in anti-US protests. To this day, Mossadegh's image in Iran is mixed. His secularism and western manners have made official government praise mild at best in the now fundamentalist theocratic state. Yet many others still view him as a victim of US aggression.
In March 2000, then secretary of state Madeleine Albright stated her regret that Mossadegh was ousted: "The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development and it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America." In the same year, the New York Times published a detailed report about the coup based on CIA documents. [link].
Mossadegh had a flamboyant personality and was well-known for theatrics, including weeping, fainting, and napping in public. His numerous eccentricities, such as wearing his bathrobe in parliament made him a well-known figure. His controversial actions captured the attention of the world, and he was named as Time Magazine's 1951 Man of the Year.
In early 2004, the Egyptian government changed a street name in Cairo from Pahlavi to Mossadegh, to facilitate closer relations with Iran.
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Sources
Further reading
- Farhad Diba, "Dr.Mohammad Mossadegh; A Political Biography". London: Croom Helm, 1986, ISBN 0709945175
- Mostafa Elm, "Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath". Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994, ISBN 0-8156-2642-8
- Mark Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran, Cornell University Press, 1991, ISBN 0801424127
- Mary Ann Heiss, Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954, Columbia University Press,1997, ISBN 0231108192
- Stephen Kinzer, All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley & Sons, 2003, ISBN 0471265179
- Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, Yale University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-300-09856-1
- Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne. Translated into Persian as Mosaddegh va Coup de Etat by Ali Morshedizad, Ghasidehsara Pub. Co.
External links
- [James Risen: Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran -- A special report.; How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79)]. The New York Times, April 16, 2000.
- [link] New YorK Times Archive containing declassified US intelligence Documents on the Coup of 1953
- [In Memory of August 19, 1953] by Sasan Fayazmanesh, August 18, 2003.
- [Mossadegh's photo album]
- [How the United States Destroyed Democracy in Iran in 1953] Historical and Investigative Research Francisco Gil-White 2005.
- [Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran] Book and declassified documents from the National Security Archive, June 22, 2004
- [The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup - U.S. National Security Archive]
- [Notes on Donald N. Wilber]
- [An alternative view by Ardeshir Zahedi]
- [50 Years After the CIA’s First Overthrow of a Democratically Elected Foreign Government]
- [How to Overthrow A Government: The 1953 U.S. Coup in Iran]
- [A short account of 1953 Coup in Iran]
- [The Sunday Herald, Over A Barrel]
- [Mossadegh in jazirehdanesh(In Persian)].
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