Nuclear program of Iran

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This article is about Iran's nuclear power program. For information about western nations allegation of Iran developing nuclear weapons, see Iran and weapons of mass destruction

Originally started under the Shah of Iran in the 1950s, with the help of the United States, the Iranian nuclear programme is an effort by Iran to develop nuclear technology. After the 1979 revolution, the programme was temporarily disbanded. It was soon resumed, albeit with less Western assistance than the pre-revolution era. Iran's current nuclear programme consists of several research sites, a uranium mine, a nuclear reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include a uranium enrichment plant. The Iranian government asserts that the programme's only goal is to develop the capacity for peaceful nuclear power generation, and plans to generate 6000MW of electricity with nuclear power plants by 2010. As of 2006 nuclear power does not contribute to the Iranian energy grid.

Contents

History

Iranian newspaper clip from 1968 reads: "A quarter of Iran's Nuclear Energy scientists are women." The picture shows some female Iranian PhDs posing in front of Tehran's research reactor.

U.S.-Iran nuclear co-operation in the 1950s and 60s

The foundations for Iran's nuclear programme were laid during the Cold War, in the late 1950s under auspices of the U.S. within the framework of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Iran. A civil nuclear co-operation programme was signed as soon as 1957 with the U.S. under the Atoms for Peace program. The Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was ruling Iran at that time, and after Mohammed Mossadegh's 1953 overthrow supported by the CIA, the regime appeared sufficiently stable and friendly to the West that nuclear proliferation would not become a threat.

In 1959 the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was established, run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TNRC was equipped with a U.S.-supplied 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor, operational from 1967 and fuelled with highly enriched uranium. Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. With the establishment of Iran's atomic agency and the NPT in place, plans were drawn by the Shah Mohammad Pahlavi to construct up to 23 nuclear power stations across the country together with the USA by the year 2000.

U.S.-Iran nuclear co-operation in the 1970s

In March 1974, the Shah envisioned a time when the world's oil supply would run out, and declared, "Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn... We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23 000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants." Bushehr would be the first plant, and would supply energy to the inland city of Shiraz. In 1975, the Bonn firm Kraftwerk Union AG, a joint venture of Siemens AG and AEG Telefunken, signed a contract worth $4 to $6 billion to build the pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant. Construction of the two 1,196 MWe nuclear generating units was subcontracted to ThyssenKrupp, and was to have been completed in 1981.

By 1975 U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, had signed National Security Decision Memorandum 292, titled "U.S.-Iran Nuclear Co-operation," which laid out the details of the sale of nuclear energy equipment to Iran projected to bring U.S. corporations more than $6 billion in revenue. At the time, Iran was pumping as much as 6 million barrels (950,000 m³) of oil a day, compared with about 4 million barrels (640,000 m³) daily today.

President Gerald Ford hesitantly signed a directive in 1976 offering Tehran the opportunity to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete "nuclear fuel cycle", with all the proliferation risks that would entail. The Ford strategy paper said the "introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals."''

President Ford's team endorsed Iranian plans to build a massive nuclear energy industry, but also worked hard to complete a multibillion-dollar deal that would have given Tehran control of large quantities of plutonium and enriched uranium -- the two pathways to a nuclear bomb. Iran, a U.S. ally then, had deep pockets and close ties to Washington. U.S. companies, including Westinghouse and General Electric, scrambled to do business there.

In an interview for a newspaper article on March 27, 2005, Henry Kissinger said, 'I don't think the issue of proliferation came up'.

A number of declassified documents were found on the website of the President Ford Library and Museum[Ford library museum] Two documents in particular, dated April 22, 1975 and April 20, 1976, show that the United States and Iran held negotiations for cooperation in the use of nuclear energy and the United States was willing to help Iran by setting up uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing facilities.[Ford Administration National Security Study Memoranda]

Until the change of administration in 1977, Dick Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, some of the strongest opponents of Iran's nuclear program today, were all heavily involved in promoting an Iranian nuclear programme that could extract plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel for use in nuclear weapons.

After the 1979 Revolution

After the 1979 Revolution, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its plans to restart its nuclear programme using indigenously-made nuclear fuel, and in 1983 the IAEA even planned to provide assistance to Iran under its Technical Assistance Programme to produce enriched uranium. An IAEA report stated clearly that its aim was to “contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology”. However, the IAEA was forced to terminate the program under U.S. pressure. The revolution was a turning point in terms of foreign cooperation on nuclear technology.

Another result of the 1979 Revolution was France's refusal to give any enriched uranium to Iran after 1979. Iran also didn't get back its investment from Eurodif. The joint stock company Eurodif was formed in 1973 by France, Belgium, Spain and Sweden. In 1975 Sweden’s 10% share in Eurodif went to Iran as a result of an arrangement between France and Iran. The French government subsidiary company Cogéma and the Iranian Government established the Sofidif (Société franco–iranienne pour l’enrichissement de l’uranium par diffusion gazeuse) enterprise with 60% and 40% shares, respectively. In turn, Sofidif acquired a 25% share in EURODIF, which gave Iran its 10% share of Eurodif. Reza Shah Pahlavi lent 1 billion dollars (and another 180 million dollars in 1977) for the construction of the Eurodif factory, to have the right of buying 10% of the production of the site.

The U.S. was also paid to deliver new fuel and upgrade its power in accordance with a contract signed before the revolution. The U.S. delivered neither the fuel nor returned the billions of dollars payment it had received. Germany was paid for in full, billions of dollars for the two nuclear facilities in Bushehr, but after three decades, Germany has also refused to export any equipment or refund the money. Iran's government suspended its payments and tried refunding the loan by making pressure on France by handling terrorist groups, including the Hezbollah who took French citizens hostage in the 1980s. In 1982, president François Mitterrand refused to give any uranium to Iran, which also claimed the $1 billion debt. In 1986, Eurodif manager Georges Besse was assassinated; the act was allegedly claimed by left-wing militants from Action Directe. However, they denied any responsibility during their trial.() In their investigation La République atomique, France-Iran le pacte nucléaire, David Carr-Brown and Dominique Lorentz pointed out toward the Iranian intelligence services' responsibility. More importantly, they also showed how the French hostage scandal was connected with the Iranian blackmail. Finally an agreement was found in 1991: France refunded more than 1.6 billion dollars. Iran remained shareholder of Eurodif via Sofidif, a Franco-Iranian consortium shareholder to 25% of Eurodif. However, Iran abstained itself from asking for the produced uranium.()

Kraftwerk Union, the joint venture of Siemens AG and AEG Telefunken who had signed a contract with Iran in 1975, fully withdrew from the Bushehr nuclear project in July 1979, after work stopped in January 1979, with one reactor 50% complete, and the other reactor 85% complete. They said they based their action on Iran's non-payment of $450 million in overdue payments. The company had received $2.5 billion of the total contract. Their cancellation came after certainty that the Iranian government would unilaterally terminate the contract themselves, following the revolution, which paralyzed Iran's economy and led to a crisis in Iran's relations with the West. The French company Framatome, a subsidiary of Areva, also withdrew itself.

In 1984, Kraftwerk Union did a preliminary assessment to see if it could resume work on the project, but declined to do so while the Iran-Iraq War continued. In April of that year, the U.S. State Department said, "We believe it would take at least two to three years to complete construction of the reactors at Bushehr." The spokesperson also said that the light water power reactors at Bushehr "are not particularly well-suited for a weapons program." The spokesman went on to say, "In addition, we have no evidence of Iranian construction of other facilities that would be necessary to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel."

The Bushehr reactors were then damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes between March 24, 1984 to 1988 and work on the nuclear program came to a standstill. In 1990, Iran began to look outwards towards partners for its nuclear program; however, due to a radically different political climate and punitive U.S. economic sanctions, few candidates existed.

According to IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming, IAEA inspectors visited Iran's uranium mines in 1992.

In 1995, Iran signed a contract with Russia to resume work on the partially complete Bushehr plant, installing into the existing Bushehr I building a 915MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor, with completion expected in 2007. There are no current plans to complete Bushehr II reactor.

In 1996, the U.S. tried, without success, to block China from selling to Tehran a conversion plant. China also provided Iran with gas needed to test the uranium enrichment process.

Since 2000

Seen here in this ISNA footage is Gholam Reza Aghazadeh and AEOI officials with a sample of Yellowcake during a public announcement on the 11 April 2006 in Mashad that Iran had managed to successfully complete the fuel cycle by itself.

On August 14, 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, a prominent Iranian dissident, revealed the existence of two unknown nuclear sites, a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz (part of which is underground) and a heavy water facility in Arak.

Though it is often claimed that Iran had "concealed" its enrichment program from the IAEA "in violation of the NPT" until it was "caught cheating" in 2002, the fact is that Iran was not obliged to inform the Agency about those facilities at the time since according to Iran's safeguards agreement with the IAEA in force at the time, "Iran is not required to allow IAEA inspections of a new nuclear facility until six months before nuclear material is introduced into it." In fact, it was not even required to inform the IAEA of their existence until then, a point conceded by Britain at the March 2003 Board of Governors meeting. This `six months' clause was a standard part of all IAEA safeguards agreements. Nonetheless, Iran allowed intrusive inspections of the facilities by the IAEA pursuant to the Additional Protocol, and the IAEA concluded that the facilities were not related to any secret nuclear weapons program.(Iran and the invention of a nuclear crisis by Siddharth Varadarajan, http://www.hinduonnet.com/2005/09/21/stories/2005092105231000.htm)

On November 14, 2004, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator announced a voluntary and temporary suspension of its uranium enrichment program (enrichment is not a violation of the NPT) after pressure from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany acting on behalf of the European Union (EU) (known in this context as the EU-3). The measure was said at the time to be a confidence-building measure, to continue for some reasonable period of time, six months being mentioned as a reference. On November 24, Iran sought to amend the terms of its agreement with the EU to exclude a handful of the equipment from this deal for research work. This request was dropped four days later.

On August 8 and August 10, 2005, the Iranian government resumed its conversion of uranium at the Isfahan facility, coming only five days after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, allegedly with continued suspension of enrichment activities. This led to (on September 19, 2005) the European Union pressuring the IAEA to bring Iran's nuclear program before the United Nations Security Council. In January 2006, James Risen, a New York Times reporter, alleged in his book State of War that in February 2000, a U.S. covert operation - code-named Operation Merlin - had backfired. It originally aimed to provide Iran with a flawed design for building a nuclear weapon, in order to delay the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Instead, the plan may have accelerated Iran's nuclear program by providing useful information, once the flaws were identified.

On February 4 2006, the 35 member Board of Governors of the IAEA voted 27-3 (with five abstentions: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa) to report Iran to the UN Security Council. The measure was sponsored by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and it was backed by the United States. Two permanent council members, Russia and China, agreed to referral only on condition that the council take no action before March. The three members who voted against referral were Venezuela, Syria and Cuba. PDF

On April 11 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully enriched uranium. President Ahmadinejad made the announcement in a televised address from the northeastern city of Mashhad, where he said "I am officially announcing that Iran joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology." The uranium was enriched to 3.5% using over a hundred centrifuges. At this level, it could be used in a nuclear reactor if enough of it was made; uranium for a nuclear bomb would require around 90% enrichment and many thousands of centrifuges to be built and operated.

On April 13 2006, After US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said (on Wednesday, April 12, 2006) the Security Council must consider "strong steps" to induce Tehran to change course in its nuclear ambition; President Ahmadinejad vowed that Iran won't back away from uranium enrichment and that the world must treat Iran as a nuclear power, saying "Our answer to those who are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one phrase. We say: Be angry at us and die of this anger," because "We won't hold talks with anyone about the right of the Iranian nation to enrich uranium."

On April 14 2006, The Institute for Science and International Security ([ISIS]) published a series of analyzed satellite images of Iran's nuclear facilities at Natanz and Esfahan. Featured in these images is a new tunnel entrance near the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan and continued construction at the Natanz uranium enrichment site. In addition, a series of images dating back to 2002 shows the underground enrichment buildings and its subsequent covering by dirt, concrete, and other materials.

Nuclear power as a political issue

Iran's nuclear programme has become political in two ways: local and international. Iranian politicians use it as part of their populist platform, and there is international speculation about Iran's possible use of nuclear technology. Iran is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it ratified in 1970 — however, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) believes that recent Iranian non co-operation makes it impossible to conduct adequate inspections to ensure that the technology is not being diverted for weapons use.

Iran's nuclear programme and the NPT

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. [1968 Non Proliferation Nuclear Treaty]

Iranian nuclear power has become a political discussion of significance in both Iran and Western countries. A considerable disjunct emerges between the political views of Iranians and that of the West. The Iranian public sees nuclear power as a way to modernise and diversify energy-sources. The Iranian public, nearly all political candidates, and the current government are unified on this point: Iran should be developing its peaceful nuclear industry. Western governments feel the 'peaceful' nuclear programme has hidden intentions, including the possible production of nuclear weapons.

Iranians and the International Atomic Energy Agency say that there is currently no evidence that Iran is using its nuclear power capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, and the known facilities do not have the capability to produce weapons grade material. Any other use outside peaceful energy production would be a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Iran ratified in 1970. Some of Iran's leaders before the revolution have also expressed their support in this regard. Ardeshir Zahedi for example, who signed Iran into the NPT during the Pahlavi dynasty, in an interview in May 2006, voiced his support for Iran's Nuclear Programme stating it as an "inalienable right of Iran".[link]

Views on Iran's Nuclear Power Programme

The Iranian Point of View

Iran says that nuclear power is necessary for a booming population and rapidly industrialising nation. It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large amounts harms Iran's environment drastically [18].

Additionally, Iran wishes to diversify its sources of energy, which will eventually become depleted. Iran's oil reserves are currently estimated at 133 gigabarrels, at a current pumping rate of 1.5-1.8 gigabarrels per year. This is only enough oil to last the next 74-89 years assuming pumping rates are steady and additional reserves are not found. In taking a stance that the Shah expressed decades ago, Iranians feel its valuable oil should be used for high value products, not simple electricity generation. (Quote from the Shah in 1974 "Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn... We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23 000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants.") Iran also raises financial questions, claiming that developing the excess capacity in its oil industry would cost it $40 billion, let alone pay for the power plants. Harnessing nuclear power costs a fraction of this, considering Iran has supplies of accessible uranium ore [19].

Dr. William O. Beeman, Brown University's Middle East Studies program professor, who spent years in Iran, says that the Iranian nuclear issue is a unified point of their political discussion:

"The Iranian side of the discourse is that they want to be known and seen as a modern, developing state with a modern, developing industrial base. The history of relations between Iran and the West for the last hundred years has included Iran's developing various kinds of industrial and technological advances to prove to themselves--and to attempt to prove to the world--that they are, in fact, that kind of country."

The nuclear-power issue is exactly that. When Iranians talk about it, and talk about the United States, they say, "The United States is trying to repress us; they're trying to keep us down and keep us backward, make us a second-class nation. And we have the ability to develop a nuclear industry, and we're being told we're not good enough, or we can't". And this makes people furious--not just the clerical establishment, but this makes the person on the street, even 16- and 17-year-olds, absolutely boil with anger. It is such an emotional issue that absolutely no politician could ever back down on this question. [21]

Dr. William O. Beeman also points out that the United States policy towards the Iranian nuclear program has shifted greatly from the 1970s:

"White House staff members, who are trying to prevent Iran from developing its own nuclear energy capacity and who refuse to take military action against Iran "off the table", have conveniently forgotten that the United States was the midwife to the Iranian nuclear program 30 years ago.

The Iran-based newspaper Baztab recently reported that the United States had provided 5 kg of 19.7% enriched uranium to Iran before the revolution. The 1979 revolution marked a turning point in US policy, justified by a government that was becoming more fundamentalist and anti-Western. This previous involvement provided foreign countries the opportunity to keep tabs on the progress of the Iranian programme, but since 1979 foreign involvement in the programme is virtually null.

After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its plans to restart its nuclear programme using indigenously-made nuclear fuel, and in 1983 the IAEA even planned to provide assistance to Iran under its Technical Assistance Programme to produce enriched uranium. An IAEA report stated clearly that its aim was to “contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology”. However, the IAEA was forced to terminate the programme under U.S. pressure.

Iran also believes it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a right which in 2005 the U.S. and the EU-3 began to assert had been forfeited by a "clandestine" nuclear programme that supposedly came to light in 2002. In fact, Iran's enrichment programme was openly discussed on national radio, and IAEA inspectors had even visited Iran's uranium mines. [16]. ([24]) Iranian politicians compare its treatment as a signatory to the NPT with three nations that have not signed the NPT: Israel, India, and Pakistan. Each of these nations developed an indigenous nuclear weapons capability: Israel by 1968 [25], India by 1974 [26] and Pakistan by 1990 [27].

Other nations' views

Nuclear facilities in Iran

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Anarak has a waste storage site, near Yazd.

Arak was one of the two sites exposed by Alireza Jafarzadeh in 2002. Iran is constructing a heavy water moderated reactor at this location, which should be ready for commissioning in 2014. [link] [link]

Ardekan

Bonab

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Facility ([28.83484° N 50.89356° E]) is located 17 kilometers south of the city of Bushehr (also known as Bushire), between the fishing villages of Halileh and Bandargeh along the Persian Gulf.

The facility was the idea of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who envisioned a time when the world's oil supply would run out. He wanted a national electrical grid powered by clean nuclear power plants. Bushehr would be the first plant, and would supply energy to the inland city of Shiraz. In August 1974, the Shah said, "Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn... We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23 000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants".

In 1975, the Bonn firm Kraftwerk Union AG, a joint venture of Siemens AG and AEG Telefunken, signed a contract worth $4 to $6 billion to build the pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant. Construction of the two 1,196 MWe nuclear generating units was subcontracted to ThyssenKrupp AG, and was to have been completed in 1981.

Kraftwerk Union was eager to work with the Iranian government because, as spokesman Joachim Hospe said in 1976, "To fully exploit our nuclear power plant capacity, we have to land at least three contracts a year for delivery abroad. The market here is about saturated, and the United States has cornered most of the rest of Europe, so we have to concentrate on the third world."

Kraftwerk Union fully withdrew from the Bushehr nuclear project in July 1979, after work stopped in January 1979, with one reactor 50% complete, and the other reactor 85% complete. They said they based their action on Iran's non-payment of $450 million in overdue payments. The company had received $2.5 billion of the total contract. Their cancellation came after certainty that the Iranian government would unilaterally terminate the contract themselves, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which paralyzed Iran's economy and led to a crisis in Iran's relations with the West.

In 1984, Kraftwerk Union did a preliminary assessment to see if it could resume work on the project, but declined to do so while the Iran-Iraq war continued. In April of that year, the U.S. State Department said, "We believe it would take at least two to three years to complete construction of the reactors at Bushehr." The spokesperson also said that the light water power reactors at Bushehr "are not particularly well-suited for a weapons program." The spokesman went on to say, "In addition, we have no evidence of Iranian construction of other facilities that would be necessary to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel."

The reactors were then damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes from 1984 to 1988. Shortly afterwards Iraq invaded Iran and the nuclear program was stopped until the end of the war.

In 1990, Iran began to look outwards towards partners for its nuclear program; however, due to a radically different political climate and punitive U.S. economic sanctions, few candidates existed.

In 1995 Iran signed a contract with Russia to resume work on the partially complete Bushehr plant, installing into the existing Bushehr I building a 915MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor, with completion expected in 2007. The Russian state-controlled company Atomstroyexport (Atomic Construction Export), an arm of Russia's atomic energy ministry, MinAtom, is constructing the plant. There are no current plans to complete Bushehr II reactor.

Uranium Conversion Facility, Isfahan.

Chalus

The Nuclear Technology Center of Isfahan is a nuclear research facility that currently operates four small nuclear research reactors, all supplied by China. It is run by the AEOI. [link]

The Uranium Conversion Facility at Isfahan converts yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride. As of late October 2004, the site is 70% operational with 21 of 24 workshops completed. There is also a Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP) located nearby that produces the necessary ingredients and alloys for nuclear reactors. [link]

Zirconium Production Plant, Isfahan.

The Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine at Hashtgerd was established in 1991 and is run by the AEOI. [link]

Lashkar Ab’ad

Lavizan

([33°43′24.43″N, 51°43′37.55″E]) is a hardened Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) covering 100,000 square metres that is built 8 meters underground and protected by a concrete wall 2.5 meters thick, itself protected by another concrete wall. In 2004 the roof was hardened with reinforced concrete and covered with 22 metres of earth. The complex consists of two 25,000 square meter halls and a number of administrative buildings. This once secret site was one of the two exposed by Alireza Jafarzadeh in 2002. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei visited the site on 21 February 2003 and reported that 160 centrifuges were complete and ready for operation, with 1000 more under construction at the site.

The Parchin Military Complex is not a nuclear site. This was confirmed on 1 November 2005, when the IAEA was given access to the site and environmental samples were taken. Inspectors did not observe any unusual activities in the buildings visited, and the results of the analysis of environmental samples did not indicate the presence of nuclear material.

Saghand

Tehran

Yazd

Timeline

July 1968: Iran signs the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty and ratifies it. It goes into effect on March 5, 1970.

1970s: Under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, plans are made to construct up to twenty nuclear power stations across the country with U.S. support and backing. Numerous contracts are signed with various Western firms, and the German firm Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary of Siemens AG) begins construction on the Bushehr power plant in 1974.

1974: the Atomic Energy Act of Iran was promulgated. The Act covers the activities for which the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran was established at that period. These activities included using atomic energy and radiation in industry, agriculture and service industries, setting up atomic power stations and desalination factories, producing source materials needed in atomic industries, creating the scientific and technical infrastructure required for carrying out the said projects, as well as co-ordinating and supervising all matters pertaining to atomic energy in the country.

1979: Iran's Islamic revolution puts a freeze on the existing nuclear programme and the Bushehr contract with Siemens AG is terminated as the German firm leaves.

1982: Iranian officials announced that they planned to build a reactor powered by their own uranium at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre.

1983: International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors inspect Iranian nuclear facilities, and report on a proposed co-operation agreement to help Iran manufacture enriched uranium fuel as part of Iran's "ambitious programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology." The assistance programme is later terminated under U.S. pressure.

1984: Iranian radio announced that negotiations with Niger on the purchase of uranium were nearing conclusion.

1985: Iranian radio programmes openly discuss the significance of the discovery of uranium deposits in Iran with the director of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation.

1989: the Radiation Protection Act of Iran was ratified in public session of April 9, 1989 by the Parliament and was approved by the Council of Law-Guardians on April 19, 1989.

1990: Iran begins negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the re-construction of the Bushehr power plant.

1992: Iran signs an agreement with China for the building of two 950-watt reactors in Darkhovin (Western Iran). To date, construction has not yet begun.

January 1995: Iran signs an $800 million contract with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) to complete reactors at Bushehr under IAEA safeguards.

1996: China and Iran inform the IAEA of plans to construct a nuclear enrichment facility in Iran, but China withdraws from the contract under U.S. pressure. Iran advises the IAEA that it plans to pursue the construction anyway.

2002: Iran's oil production, following the OPEC double peak model, peaks at 3.4 million barrels a day and goes into terminal decline.

August 2002: Alireza Jafarzadeh exposed two secret nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak using information obtained from sources well placed within the Iranian regime by the terrorist organisation MEK.

October 2003: Iran begins to hold negotiations with IAEA members with respect to a more stringent set of nuclear inspections.[link]

October 31, 2003: The IAEA declares that Iran has submitted a "comprehensive" declaration of its nuclear programme.[link]

November 11, 2003: The IAEA declares that there is no evidence that Iran is attempting to build an atomic bomb. [link]

November 13, 2003: Washington claims that the IAEA report is "impossible to believe". The UN stands behind the facts provided in the report. [link]

June 2004: Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's foreign minister, responding to demands that Iran halt its nuclear programme, says: "We won't accept any new obligations. Iran has a high technical capability and has to be recognised by the international community as a member of the nuclear club. This is an irreversible path." [link]

June 14, 2004: Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, accuses Iran of "less than satisfactory" co-operation during the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear program. ElBaradei demands "accelerated and proactive cooperation" from Iran.

July 31, 2004: Iran states that it has resumed building nuclear centrifuges to enrich uranium, reversing a voluntary October 2003 pledge to Britain, France, and Germany to suspend all uranium enrichment-related activities. The United States contends that the purpose is to produce weapons-grade uranium.

August 10, 2004: Several long-standing charges and questions regarding weapons-grade uranium samples are clarified by the IAEA. The samples match Pakistani and Russian sources which had contaminated imported Iranian equipment from those countries. [(Jane's Intelligence)]

August 24, 2004: Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi declares in Wellington, New Zealand, that Iran will retaliate with force against Israel or any nation that attempts a pre-emptive strike on its nuclear programme. Earlier in the week, Israel's Chief of Staff, General Moshe Ya'alon, told an Israeli newspaper that "Iran is striving for nuclear capability and I suggest that in this matter [Israel] not rely on others."

September 6, 2004: The latest IAEA report finds that "unresolved issues surrounding Iran's atomic programme are being clarified or resolved outright". [link]

September 18, 2004: The IAEA, the United Nations's nuclear watchdog agency, unanimously adopts a resolution calling on Iran to suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment.

October 18, 2004: Iran states that it is willing to negotiate with the U.K., Germany, and France regarding a suspension of its uranium enrichment activities, but that it will never renounce its right to enrich uranium.

October 24, 2004: The European Union makes a proposal to provide civilian nuclear technology to Iran in exchange for Iran terminating its uranium enrichment programme permanently. Iran rejects this outright saying it will not renounce its right to enrichment technologies. A decision to refer the matter from the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations Security Council is expected on November 25, 2004.

November 15, 2004: Talks between Iran and three European Union members, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, result in a compromise. Iran agrees to temporarily suspend its active uranium enrichment programme for the duration of a second round of talks, during which attempts will be made at arriving at a permanent, mutually-beneficial solution.

November 15, 2004: A confidential UN report is leaked. The report states that all nuclear materials within Iran have been accounted for and there is no evidence of any military nuclear programme. Nevertheless, it still cannot discount the possibility of such a programme because it does not have perfect knowledge. [(BBC)]

November 22, 2004: Iran declares that it will voluntarily suspend its uranium enrichment programme to enter negotiations with the EU. Iran will review its decision in three months. The EU seeks to have the suspension made permanent and is willing to provide economic and political incentives.

November 24, 2004: Iran seeks to obtain permission from the European Union, in accordance with its recent agreement with the EU, to allow it to continue working with 24 centrifuges for research purposes.

November 28, 2004: Iran withdraws its demand that some of its technology be exempted from a freeze on nuclear enrichment activities. [(BBC)]

June 2005, the U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice said IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei should either toughen his stance on Iran or fail to be chosen for a third term as IAEA head. Following a one on one meeting between Ms Rice and Dr ElBaredai on 9 June the US withdrew its opposition and Dr ElBaradei was re-elected to his position on 13 June 2005.

August 8 and August 10, 2005: Iran resumed the conversion of uranium at the Isfahan facility, under IAEA safeguards, but does not engage in enrichment of uranium.

August 9, 2005: The Iranian Head of State Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. The full text of the fatwa was released in an official statement at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

August 11, 2005: The thirty-five-member governing board of the IAEA adopted a resolution calling upon Iran to suspend uranium conversion, and instructing director general Mohammed ElBaradeil to submit a report on Iran's nuclear programme by September 3, 2005. The resolution is considered by many to be weak since it does not include the threat of referral to the security council.

August 15, 2005: Iran's new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, installed his new government. Ali Larijani replaced Hassan Rowhani as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Iran's top policy-making body, with nuclear policy in his purview.

September 15, 2005: At a United Nations high-level summit, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated Iran had the right to develop a civil nuclear-power programme within the terms of the 1970 treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He offers a compromise solution in which foreign companies will be permitted to invest and participate in Iran's nuclear programme, thus ensuring that it cannot be secretly used to make weapons. The majority of the U.S. delegation left during his speech, but the U.S./UN mission denied there was a walkout.

October 10 2005, Iranian Oil Ministry Deputy for International Affairs Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian said that Iran could run out of oil reserves in nine decades.

November 5, 2005: The Iranian government approved a plan that allows foreign investors to participate in the work at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant. The cabinet also authorised the AEOI to take necessary measures to attract foreign and domestic investment in the uranium enrichment process.

November 19, 2005: The IAEA released a report saying that Iran was still blocking nuclear inspectors from the United Nations from visiting for a second time a site known as Parchin military complex, where Iran was not legally required to allow inspections at all. IAEA Director-General Mohamed El-Baradei said in the report, "Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue." Separately, Iran confirmed that it had resumed the conversion of new quantities of uranium pursuant to its rights under the NPT, despite an IAEA resolution to stop such work. [CNA]

January, 2006: Iran provides the European negotiating side with a six-point proposal, which includes an offer to again suspend uranium enrichment for a period of 2 years, pending the outcome of continued negotiations. The offer is dismissed by the Europeans, and not reported in the Western press.

January 31, 2006: The IAEA reports that "Iran has continued to facilitate access under its Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency ... including by providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and access to locations" and lists outstanding issues. PDF

January 2006: The New York Times reporter James Risen published State of War, in which he alleged a CIA operation code-named Operation Merlin backfired and may have helped Iran in its nuclear programme, in an attempt to delay it feeding them false information.

February 2, 2006: Pakistani Finance Minister Sirajul Haq: "Attack on Iran will be construed as attack on us"

March 27, 2006: In a Foreign Policy article entitled "Fool Me Twice", Joseph Cirincione, director for non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, claimed that "some senior officials have already made up their minds: They want to hit Iran." and that there "may be a co-ordinated campaign to prepare for a military strike on Iran." Joseph Cirincione also warns "that a military strike would be disastrous for the United States. It would rally the Iranian public around an otherwise unpopular regime, inflame anti-American anger around the Muslim world, and jeopardise the already fragile U.S. position in Iraq. And it would accelerate, not delay, the Iranian nuclear programme. Hard-liners in Tehran would be proven right in their claim that the only thing that can deter the United States is a nuclear bomb. Iranian leaders could respond with a crash nuclear programme that could produce a bomb in a few years."

April 26, 2006: Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that Americans should know that if they assault Iran their interests will be harmed anywhere in the world that is possible, and that the Iranian nation will respond to any blow with double the intensity.

April 28, 2006: The International Atomic Energy Agency hands a report titled Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN Security Council. The IAEA says that Iran has stepped up its uranium enrichment programmes during the 30 day period covered by the report.

June 01, 2006: The UN Security Council agrees to a set of proposals designed to reach a compromise with Iran.