Omission (criminal)
Encyclopedia : O : OM : OMI : Omission (criminal)
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| Criminal law in English law |
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| Part of the common law series |
| Classes of crimes |
| Summary · Indictable |
| Hybrid offence · Regulatory offences |
| Lesser included offence |
| Elements of crimes |
| Actus reus · Causation (law)>Causation |
| Mens rea · Intention (criminal)>Intention (general) |
| Intention in English law · Recklessness (criminal)>Recklessness |
| Criminal negligence · Corporate liability |
| Vicarious liability · Strict liability |
| Omission · Concurrence |
| Ignorantia juris non excusat |
| Inchoate offences |
| Incitement · Conspiracy (crime)>Conspiracy |
| Accessory · Attempt |
| Common purpose |
| Defences |
| Consent · Diminished responsibility |
| Duress |
| M'Naghten Rules · Necessity in English law>Necessity |
| Provocation |
| Self-defence |
| Crimes against the person |
| Common assault · Battery (crime)>Battery |
| Actual bodily harm · Grievous bodily harm |
| Offences Against The Person Act 1861 |
| Murder · Manslaughter |
| Corporate manslaughter · Harassment |
| Public order and crimes against property |
| Criminal Damage Act 1971 |
| Malicious Damage Act 1861 |
| Public nuisance |
| Crimes of dishonesty |
| Theft Act 1968 · Theft · Dishonesty |
| Robbery · Burglary · TWOC |
| Deception · Deception offences |
| Blackmail · Handling |
| Theft Act 1978 · Forgery |
| Computer crime |
| Sexual crimes |
| Rape · Kidnapping |
| Crimes against justice |
| Bribery · Perjury |
| Obstruction of justice |
| See also Criminal Procedure |
| Other areas of the common law |
| Contract law · Tort law · Property law |
| Wills and trusts · Evidence |
| Portals: · |
- 1 Discussion
- 1.0.1 Care of children or other dependents
- 1.0.2 Statutory omissions
- 1.0.3 Duty to act when the defendant has created the danger
- 1.1 Failure to provide medical treatment
Discussion
In the criminal law, at common law, there was no general duty of care owed to fellow citizens. The traditional view was encapsulated in the example of watching a person drown in shallow water and making no rescue effort, where commentators borrowed the line, "Thou shalt not kill but needst not strive, officiously, to keep another alive." (Arthur Hugh Clough (1819-1861)) in support of the proposition that the failure to act does not attract criminal liability. Nevertheless, such failures might be morally indefensible and so both legislatures and the courts have imposed liability when the failure to act is sufficiently blameworthy to justify criminalisation. Some statutes therefore explicitly state that the actus reus consists of any relevant "act or omission", or use a word that may include both. Hence, the word "cause" may be both positive in the sense that the accused proactively injured the victim and negative in that the accused intentionally failed to act knowing that this failure would cause the relevant injury. In the courts, the trend has been to use objective tests to determine whether, in circumstances where there would have been no risk to the accused's health or well-being, the accused should have taken action to prevent a foreseeable injury being sustained by a particular victim or one from a class of potential victims.So, returning to the drowning example, the accused would be liable if the victim was a child in a pool with a water depth of six inches, or there was a floatation device nearby that could easily be thrown to the victim, or the accused was carrying a mobile phone that could be used to summon help. However, the law will never penalise someone for not jumping into a raging torrent of water, i.e. the law does not require the potential saver to risk drowning even though the individual might be a lifeguard paid to patrol the given beach, river or pool. No matter what the terms of employment, an employee can never be required to do more than what is reasonable in all the circumstances. In R v Dytham (1979) QB 722 an on-duty police officer stood and watched a man beaten to death outside a nightclub. He then left without calling for assistance or summoning an ambulance. He was convicted of the common law offence of wilful misconduct in public office. Widgery CJ said:
- The allegation was not one of mere non-feasance, but of deliberate failure and wilful neglect. This involves an element of culpability which is not restricted to corruption or dishonesty, but which must be of such a degree that the misconduct impugned is calculated to injure the public interest so as to call for condemnation and punishment.
Care of children or other dependents
The general rule is that parents, legal guardians, spouses (see R v Smith (1979) CLR 251 where the wife died after giving birth to a stillborn child, delivered by her husband at home) and anyone who voluntarily agrees to care for another who is dependent because of age, illness or other infirmity, may incur a duty, at least until care can be handed over to someone else. In three cases, the duty was implied:- R v Instan (1893) 1 QB 450, Instan lived with her aunt, who was suddenly taken ill and could no longer feed herself or call for help. She was convicted of manslaughter because she neither fed her aunt, nor called for medical help, even though she continued to stay in the house and ate her aunt's food.
- R v Stone & Dobinson (1977) QB 354. Stone and his mistress agreed to care for his sister who was suffering from anorexia. As her condition deteriorated, she became bed-ridden but no help was summoned and she died. They were convicted of her manslaughter because they had accepted her into their home and so assumed a duty of care for her.
- R v Gibbons and Procteur (1918) Gibbons and his live in lover Procteur failed to feed Gibbon's seven year old daughter. This was intentional and not merely an oversight. They were convicted on the grounds that responsible adults have a duty of care to dependent children, and by living in the house, the live in lover had taken on the role of a responsible adult.
Statutory omissions
Misprision of felony was abolished in 1967 but new statutory offences of failure to comply with a duty to disclose terrorist acts or funding under s19(2) Terrorism Act 2000, and failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering maintain the tradition. Similarly, the appropriation element in s1 theft may be committed by an act or by keeping when there is a duty to return the property, a deception under s15(4) Theft Act 1968 may be committed by what is not said or done, and "dishonestly secures" under s2(1) Theft Act 1978 may also be committed by omission (see R v Firth (1990) CLR 326 in which the defendant failed to tell the NHS that patients using NHS facilities were in fact private patients thereby obtaining the use of the facilities without payment). One of the more simple examples is the offense of failing to report a road traffic accident.Duty to act when the defendant has created the danger
A person who creates a dangerous situation may be under a duty to take reasonable steps to avert that danger. In R v Miller (1983) 2 AC 161, the defendant was sleeping rough in a building. He fell asleep on his mattress while smoking a cigarette. When he woke, he found that the mattress was smouldering but, instead of calling for help, he simply moved into another room. This allowed the fire spread. He was convicted under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 for recklessly causing damage by omission. Lord Diplock said:- ...I see no rational ground for excluding from conduct capable of giving rise to criminal liability, conduct which consists of failing to take measures that lie within one's power to counteract a danger that one has oneself created, if at the time of such conduct one's state of mind is such as constitutes a necessary ingredient of the offence.
Failure to provide medical treatment
In general terms, doctors and hospitals have a duty to provide appropriate care for their patients, and an omission may breach that duty except where an adult patient of ordinary capacity terminates the duty by refusing consent. There is a conflict in public policy. The policy of patient autonomy enshrines a right of self-determination—patients have a right to live their lives how they wish, even if it will damage their health or lead to premature death. Society’s interest is in upholding the concept that all human life is sacred and should be preserved if at all possible. It is now well established that the right of the individual is paramount. In Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) (1994) 1 WLR 290, a patient diagnosed as a chronic, paranoid schizophrenic refused to allow his gangrenous foot to be amputated. This was permitted because his general capacity showed him capable of understanding the nature, purpose and effect of the life-saving treatment. In Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) (2002) 2 AER 449 the presumption that an adult has full capacity can be rebutted if:- (a) the person is unable to understand the information relevant to the decision, especially as to the likely consequences of having or not having the treatment; or
- (b) the patient is unable to use the information and weigh it in the balance as part of the process of arriving at a decision.
In death with dignity situations where a patient is incapable of communicating his wishes, a doctor may be relieved of his duty, as the House of Lords recognised in Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland (1993) AC 789. Here a patient who had survived for three years in a persistent vegetative state after suffering irreversible brain damage in the Hillsborough disaster continued to breathe normally, but was kept alive only by being fed through tubes. It was held that treatment could properly be withdrawn in such circumstances, because the best interests of the patient did not involve him being kept alive at all costs. Lord Goff nevertheless drew a fundamental distinction between acts and omissions in this context:
- . . . the law draws a crucial distinction between cases in which a doctor decides not to provide, or to continue to provide, for his patient treatment or care which could or might prolong his life, and those in which he decides, for example by administering a lethal drug, actively to bring his patient's life to an end . . . the former may be lawful, either because the doctor is giving effect to his patient's wishes . . . or even in certain circumstances in which . . . the patient is incapacitated from stating whether or not he gives his consent. But it is not lawful for a doctor to administer a drug to his patient to bring about his death, even though that course is prompted by a humanitarian desire to end his suffering, however great that suffering may be.
Some offences require acts
Some offences appear to be capable of commission only by positive acts, e.g. s4 Criminal Law Act 1967 acting with intent to prevent the apprehension of an offender, or Protection from Eviction Act 1977 "doing acts likely to interfere with the peace and comfort of a residential occupier" albeit that in R v Yuthiwattana (1984) 80 Cr. App. R. 55, a landlord's failure to replace a lost key was held an "act" of harassment against a tenant.References
- Allen, Michael. Textbook on Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford. (2005) ISBN 0199279187.
- Beynon, Causation, Omissions and Complicity, (1987) CLR 539.
- Finnis, Bland: Crossing the Rubicon, (1993) 109 LQR 329.
- Ormerod, David. Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, LexisNexis, London. (2005) ISBN 0406977305
- Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue, (2001) Col. 89 Georgetown Law Journal, 605.
- Smith, Legal Liability and Criminal Omission, (2001) Vol 5 Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 69.
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