Operation Desert Fox
Encyclopedia : O : OP : OPE : Operation Desert Fox
Operation Desert Fox was the military codename for a major four-day bombing campaign on Iraqi targets from December 16-December 19, 1998 by the United States and United Kingdom. These strikes were undertaken in response to Iraq's continued failure to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as their interference with United Nations Special Commission inspectors.
It was a major flare-up in the Iraq disarmament crisis. The stated goal of the cruise missile and bombing attacks was to "degrade" Saddam Hussein's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction.
President Clinton announced a new policy toward Iraq of "regime change." On October 31, 1998 the president signed into law H.R. 4655, the "Iraq Liberation Act." [link] [link] The new Act appropriated funds to Iraqi opposition groups in the hope of removing Saddam Hussein from power and replacing his regime with a democracy. However, Clinton never seriously intended to enforce the "regime change" portion of the act.
The Act also said that "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces," except in direct aid to an active Iraqi rebellion.
Historical Background
The U.S. intelligence community was concerned about Iraq's involvement in weapons of mass destruction. Just a few months prior to Operation Desert Fox, President Clinton had ordered an attack on a suspected chemical weapons facility in Sudan, known as Operation Infinite Reach. According to testimony by William Cohen, "...the U.S. intelligence community obtained physical evidence from outside the al-Shifa facility in Sudan that supported long-standing concerns regarding its potential role in Sudanese chemical weapon efforts that could be exploited by al Qaeda." (Page 9) [(PDF)]
Officials later acknowleged, however, "that the evidence that prompted President Clinton to order the missile strike on the Shifa plant was not as solid as first portrayed. Indeed, officials later said that there was no proof that the plant had been manufacturing or storing nerve gas, as initially suspected by the Americans, or had been linked to Osama bin Laden, who was a resident of Khartoum in the 1980s."[link] The U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research wrote a report in 1999 questioning the attack on the factory, suggesting that the connection to bin Laden was not accurate; James Risen reported in the New York Times: "Now, the analysts renewed their doubts and told Assistant Secretary of State Phyllis Oakley that the C.I.A.'s evidence on which the attack was based was inadequate. Ms. Oakley asked them to double-check; perhaps there was some intelligence they had not yet seen. The answer came back quickly: There was no additional evidence. Ms. Oakley called a meeting of key aides and a consensus emerged: Contrary to what the Administration was saying, the case tying Al Shifa to Mr. bin Laden or to chemical weapons was weak."[link] The Chairman of El Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries, who is critical of the Sudanese government, more recently told reporters, "I had inventories of every chemical and records of every employee's history. There were no such [nerve gas] chemicals being made here."[link] Sudan has since invited the U.S. to conduct chemical tests at the site for evidence to support its claim that the plant might have been a chemical weapons factory; so far, the U.S. has refused the invitation to investigate. Nevertheless, the U.S. has refused to officially apologize for the attacks, suggesting that some privately still suspect that chemical weapons activity existed there.[link]
The Planning
Iraq had terminated cooperation with the U.N. inspection team in August 1998, but under U.S. and U.K. pressure he agreed to allow them back in the country in November.
The justification for Desert Fox, after a lot of twists and turns regarding Iraq’s alleged unwillingness to cooperate with the UN, came on December 15, 1998, when chief UN inspector Butler filed a report to the UN Security Council charging that Iraq had failed to provide the promised “full cooperation” to inspectors and had further initiated “new forms of restrictions upon the commission’s work.” Earlier in the year, Iraq accused Butler and other UNSCOM officials of acting as spies for the United States, claims later supported by Scott Ritter, an American officer on UNSCOM's staff.
UNSCOM weapons inspectors were not expelled from the country by Iraq as has often been reported (and as George W. Bush alleged in his infamous "axis of evil" speech). Rather, according to Butler himself in his book Saddam Defiant (2000), it was U.S. Ambassador Peter Burleigh, acting on instructions from Washington, who suggested Butler pull his team from Iraq in order to protect them from the forthcoming U.S. and British airstrikes.
The potential number of targets for an air campaign focused on Iraq’s WMD was quite large. Coalition sources listed some 100 chemical-related facilities and another 90 biological-related facilities across the country. Although this target list did not include most of a large number of dual use facilities, many inspected and monitored by UNSCOM. Secretary Cohen noted that attacking Iraq’s missile research and development and production program was the surest way to “degrade” and “diminish” Saddam’s ability to use WMD and otherwise threaten his neighbours. Still, even here, the number of potential targets was extensive; UNSCOM had been monitoring 63 missile-related sites and some 2,000 missiles that were permitted by the UN. In the end though US and British aircraft would eventually strike only eleven during Desert Fox and these were nearly all missile-related.
The final target list contained roughly 100 sites or facilities, including the eleven noted above, and reflected the narrow focus of the operation. American and British planners benefited from the wealth of information on Iraq’s WMD and security apparatus gathered over several years by UNSCOM as well as an in-depth knowledge of Iraq’s air defenses gained from years of no-fly zone enforcement. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Anthony Zinni, USMC, insisted that strikes take place against only targets identified with a high degree of certainty. He and his planners were well aware that completed WMD, in the form of warheads or other stockpiles, were easy to hide. Zinni and his planners would focus on delivery systems instead. And to achieve the greatest effect and surprise, Zinni did not start a time-consuming and visible build up of forces that would give the Iraqis an opportunity to disperse personnel and WMD-related equipment. He also directed the preparation of two options, a “heavy” and a “light.” The former would hit more targets over a period of several days, the latter a smaller number of targets more rapidly. Zinni favored the “heavy” option.
Planners created seven broad target categories: Integrated Air Defense System (IADS); Command and Control; WMD Security (generally Special Republican Guards units); WMD Industry and Production; Republican Guards; Airfields; and one simply listed as “Economic.” CENTCOM planners purposely avoided “dual-use” facilities in order to minimize collateral damage. Likewise, CENTCOM and Administration spokesmen stated publicly that airstrikes would not target known WMD stockpiles or storage sites in order to avoid widespread collateral damage.
The Operation
Operation Desert Fox began in the early hours of December 16. On the first night a 33 aircraft force launched from the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) , consisting of F-14s, F/A-18s and EA-6Bs supported by E-2C Hawkeye and S-3B Viking aircraft. The first night of air strikes was conducted by Navy forces and in the form of nearly 250 ship or submarine-launched Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAM), no US Air Force or Royal Air Force participated, not even aerial tankers. It was designed for a cycle to achieve the element of surprise. F-14 Tomcats from VF-32 were armed with 1000-lb GBU-16 laser guided bombs and were assigned most of the hard targets because of the greater LANTIRN capability of the aircraft, collateral damage was unacceptable Their targets were within Baghdad city limits. The strikes apparently caught Baghdad off guard. Subsequent post-strike analysis indicated that General Zinni’s plan had achieved the desired degree of surprise. Over the course of approximately four and a half hours, US forces attacked more than 50 of the 100 targets, many of them part of Iraq’s air defense network. Defending Kuwait against possible Iraqi ground attack was Task Force Can Do compriseing of 2 Infantry companies from 3-15 IN BN and 2 Armor companies from 4-64 AR BN. This task force came from 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division and were in Kuwait for training as part of a normal deployment rotation. Later the other task force in country, Task Force Tusker which had the other 2 Infantry and Armor companies, would join their sister task force along the Iraqi border on December 17. Though no attack ever came these two ground forces were ready to defend Kuwait or attack into Iraq as needed.
On the second day, B-52s based on the island of Diego Garcia and employing air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) joined in the fray. The B-1 bomber also made its combat debut on the night of December 17, striking the Republican Guard and other military targets. US aircraft based in Kuwait now took part, as did Britain’s 12 Kuwait-based Panavia Tornado aircraft. British combat aircraft logged 32 sorties between the 17th and 19th of December, striking 11 sites, including two command and control facilities, two Republican Guard bases, six air defense sites and one airfield. British efforts eventually represented 15 per cent of the total number of missions flown during Desert Fox.
On December 19, USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) joined US and British forces in the strikes and it's airwing particiapted on the last strikes that day. By December 19, US and British aircraft and missiles had struck 97 facilities. This total included the following targets and facilities: 32 SAM or IADS; 20 command and control; 18 “security” facilities, including SRG units; 11 WMD industry and production; nine Republican Guard headquarters and barracks, including those of three heavy divisions and 1 infantry division in the Baghdad region; six airfields; and an oil refinery at Basra, the sole “economic” target on the list. The Department of Defense would not speculate on the number of Iraqi military casualties the raids had caused to this point. Baghdad claimed dozens of civilians had been killed, and admitted to only a very small number of military casualties.
According to General Zinni, the operation was so successful that he saw no need to extend the operation into Ramadan, due to begin on December 19. It would be, in Zinni’s words, “bombing for bombing’s sake.” With the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also declaring themselves “satisfied” with the progress of Desert Fox, President Clinton appeared on television the evening of December 19 and declared “victory.” The President re-stated the operation’s main goals, and concluded that “[I]t will take some time to make a detailed assessment of our operation, but based on the briefing I’ve just received, I am confident we have achieved our mission.”
The Pentagon determined that over the course of a 70-hour air campaign, US and British warplanes hit 85% of 100 targets. Analysts determined further that 74% of all strikes were “highly effective.” General Zinni summarized the effort during a press conference on December 21. Desert Fox involved 30,000 personnel, with another 10,000 in support outside the CENTCOM area of responsibility. The operation included more than 600 sorties, including 300 night strike sorties, flown by more than 300 combat and support aircraft. Aircraft employed 600 pieces of air-dropped ordnance, 90 air-launched cruise missiles, and 325 TLAMs. Forty naval vessels supported Desert Fox in one fashion or another and thousands of ground troops deployed to protect Kuwait against a possible Iraqi counterattack. Several weeks after the conclusion of the operation, General Zinni “upped” the estimate on the time it would take Iraq between one to two years to repair the damage it sustained on it's facilities. He based that assessment in part on the determination that many of the structures hit were not empty, as previously thought. Unique facilities and pieces of test equipment related to missile development had been destroyed. Likewise, additional analysis of damage indicated that weapon penetration of many buildings was deeper, causing structural damage beyond repair. Still hesitant to either discuss or confirm the number of Iraqi casualties, Zinni estimated anywhere from 600 to 2000 Republican Guard troops were killed. Subsequent reports settled on 600 killed from the Special Republican Guard and 800 from the Republican Guard.
Reaction
In reaction to the attack, three of five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia, France, and the People's Republic of China) called for lifting of the eight-year oil embargo on Iraq, recasting or disbanding UNSCOM, and firing its chairman, Australian diplomat Richard Butler.According to published reports that have since been discredited, Saddam Hussein sought revenge against the U.S. These reports claim that Saddam sought to direct terrorist organizations to attack U.S. targets. Farouk Hijazi, Iraq's ambassador to Turkey, reportedly met with bin Laden. ([link], [link]) Corriere della Sera, a Milan newspaper, translated by the CIA, reads: “Saddam Hussayn and Usama bin Ladin have sealed a pact. Faruk Hidjazi, the former Director of the Iraqi Secret Services and now the country’s Ambassador to Turkey, held a secret meeting with the extremist leader on 21 December.” The newspaper had direct quotes from Hijazi without specifying the source of the quotes. (Page 328)[(PDF)] Former CIA counterterrorism official Vince Cannistraro notes that bin Laden rejected Hijazi's overtures, concluding that he did not want to be "exploited" by Iraq's secular regime.[link] Hijazi, arrested in April 2003, has been cooperating with U.S. intelligence, and has offered no evidence of such cooperation. The Boston Globe reported, "Indeed, intelligence agencies tracked contacts between Iraqi agents and Al Qaeda agents in the '90s in Sudan and Afghanistan, where bin Laden is believed to have met with Farouk Hijazi, head of Iraqi intelligence. But current and former intelligence specialists caution that such meetings occur just as often between enemies as friends. Spies frequently make contact with rogue groups to size up their intentions, gauge their strength, or try to infiltrate their ranks, they said." (3 August 2003).
On January 11 1999 Newsweek magazine reported an Arab intelligence officer, reported to know Saddam personally, told Newsweek: "very soon, you will be witnessing large-scale terrorist activity by the Iraqis." The planned attacks are said to be Saddam's revenge for the "continuing aggression" posed by the no fly zones that show the countries are still at war since Operation Desert Fox.[link] On January 31 1999, Moscow newspaper Novosti claimed that "hundreds of Afghan Arabs are undergoing sabotage training in Southern Iraq and are preparing for armed actions on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. They have declared as their goal a fight against the interests of the United States in the region." [link]
No such attacks ever materialized. The 9/11 Commission report notes that after American missiles destroyed Iraqi intelligence headquarters in 1993 as punishment for a bungled assassination plot against George H.W. Bush, "no further intelligence came in about terrorist acts planned by Iraq." [link] It also reported that the Commission's investigation had uncovered no "evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States," and no evidence of any "collaborative operational relationship." [link]
Criticism
Some critics of the Clinton administration expressed concern over the timing of Operation Desert Fox. The four-day bombing campaign occurred at the same time the U.S. House of Representatives was considering articles of impeachment against President Clinton. Clinton was impeached on December 19, the last day of the bombing campaign. Critics claimed the timing of this operation was a so-called "Wag the Dog" scenario aimed at diverting media attention away from the impeachment proceedings. A few months earlier, similar criticism was leveled during Operation Infinite Reach, wherein missile strikes were ordered against suspected terrorist bases in Sudan and Afghanistan (August 20). The missile strikes began three days after Clinton was called to testify before a grand jury during the Lewinsky scandal and his subsequent [nationally televised address] later that evening (August 17), in which Clinton admitted having an inappropriate relationship with the White House intern Monica Lewinsky.External links and reference
- [Overview of Operation Desert Fox] - DefenseLink
- [Operation Desert Fox] - BBC News
- [Transcript of President Clinton's speech announcing the attack] - CNN
- [Iraq attacked in 'Operation Desert Fox'] - CNN
- [Strike on Iraq - Operation Desert Fox] - CNN
- [Operation DESERT FOX: Effectiveness With Unintended Effects]
- [Operation Desert Fox]
- Tony Holmes (2005). US Navy F-14 Tomcat Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Osprey Publishing Limited.
From Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Original article here. Support Wikipedia by contributing or donating.
All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License See Wikipedia Copyrights for details.