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Planned invasion of Australia during World War II

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In February 1942, Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who had planned the Attack on Pearl Harbor as part of the Japanese strategic planning for the Pacific (1905-1940), proposed an immediate invasion of Australia. This proposal was, however, eventually rejected by the Japanese high command.

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Diversionary operations and naval interests

Admiral Yamamoto's plan appeared to be a diversionary invasion plan rather than a plan to occupy Australia. He wanted to draw large American forces away from launching attacks on the Japanese island chain far to the north of Australia. Sato was at first part of the planning for some of the invasion proposals that Admiral Yamamoto had suggested but were never approved. Later he developed a new version of the proposal, which he proposed to Japanese High Command.

Different strategic purposes were envisaged for the operation by different people. The proposed operation could be one great diversionary action, replacing the alternative operation of occupying New Caledonia, New Hebrides, West Samoa and the nearby islands, or it could be a suitable operation for making a formal occupation of Australian territory, to bring it under Japanese dependency inside the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere alliance, following the thoughts of Nobuhiro Sato, another Navy theorist.

There was interest in such an operation amongst the Japanese Navy Staff, for possible control of the strategic area, natural and economic resources, taking direct political and military control as in Taiwan or the South Pacific Mandate.

Another alleged proposer and supporter of Yamamoto's Plan of Australian Invasion was Captain Sadatoshi Tomioka, chief of the plans division in the First Section (Operations) of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, under the lead of Rear Admiral Shigeru Fukudome. Admiral Osami Nagano, the Chief of the Navy General Staff, was also in favour of the Australian invasion plan.

It was Tomioka who was primarily responsible for the suggestion of Australia as Japan's next major objective. Australia, he argued, could eventually become the "springboard" for a future counter-offensive against Japan. To prevent this it would either have to brought under Japanese control or if this were not possible at least cut off from the United States. This plan was rejected by Army High Command, allegedly because they did not possess the minimal quantities of forces needed for such an operation, estimated at ten divisions by their strategy experts. Another plan proposed by the Navy around the same time was the Invasion of Ceylon (possibly linked with the Army plan of Indian Invasion); this plan was also rejected by Army Staff. Within the Navy there existed the so-called "Australia-first" school of thought, which defended the importance of such an objective to the Navy and Empire commands as part of political and strategical planning in southern areas;between other suporters and knowers of these naval school of thought stayed the Commander Chuichi Nagumo amongst officers Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya. 

General Tomoyuki Yamashita agreed with Yamamoto's Invasion Plan and even volunteered to lead the invasion. However, the plan was opposed by Tojo, as he believed that there were no contingency plans considered.


The Army proper, using its occupation forces in New Guinea (called the "Nineteenth Army"), formed a study unit (the North Australian Region Group) to analyze the tactical and strategical issues of an Australian invasion using local knowledge. One of the heads of this group was Takeshi Mori. The same unit also confirmed reports of the strength of Australian forces at the time: 350,000 men (10 divisions), 500 aircraft, reinforced by one to two U. S. Army divisions then arriving, plus New Zealand units.

Faced then with the Army's rejection of an all-out invasion of Australia, the Naval General Staff, was forced back on a less ambitious plan. It involved the isolation of Australia and stoppage of her flow of war material. This was to be done by the gradual extension of Japanese control over the Pacific islands of New Guinea, the Solomons, New Caledonia and Fiji.



Strategic and tactical lines of Australian invasion

Kenosuke Sato, a Navy theorist, proposed that a large Japanese invasion force of troop transports and warships head south from Japan to make a beach landing halfway between Townsville, Queensland and Brisbane, while other forces landed in Darwin and the northwest area of Western Australia.


Yamamoto petitioned the Japanese General Staff to land two or four Japanese Army divisions on the northern coastline of Australia, which was very poorly defended. They were to follow the north-south railway line to Adelaide, thus dividing Australia into two fronts. When Adelaide had been taken by this first unit, a second force would land on the southeast coast of Australia and drive northwards to Sydney and southwards to Melbourne.


Sato has stated that the Japanese had realized that it would have been too difficult to move a large force south from Darwin and had then decided to attack the Queensland coast midway between Townsville and Brisbane. He indicated that communications were good and the population was sparse in that area.


The city of Brisbane was reportedly the first objective. The Japanese believed that Brisbane could be taken quite quickly with a minimum of cost and resistance.


Sydney was the next objective and was to be attacked by land and amphibious forces. They then planned to move on to Melbourne, but by this time, they anticipated that Australia would have surrendered. Mr. Sato claimed that morale in Australia was low at that time, and that Australian complaints about Britain deserting Australia was evidence of this fact.





Appointment of Japanese Administrator

Kenosuke Sato was to be appointed civil administrator of the occupied Australian territories after a successful Japanese invasion in 1942. He worked on preparing the political and administrative details with Admiral Kanyei Chuyo, Chief of 8° Unit "Yashika" of the Japanese Navy Intelligence Services, and the Tokyo Bureau (Australian Section) of the Navy intelligence unit.


He indicated that Australians would not have been treated very harshly if they had surrendered. He seemed to know a great many leading Australians and he indicated that he was quite certain a good number of Australians would have agreed to co-operate with the Japanese.



Opposition to Invasion

Ultimately, Tojo opposed the plan and recommended that Emperor Hirohito reject it. In particular, Tojo was more interested in using forces in others operations in Mainland Asia such as "Operation Otsu" or "KANTOKUEN" Plan,the Japanese invasion of the Soviet Far East and Siberia, against Russians; "Szechwan Invasion", the planned destruction of the Chinese Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek government, with the defeat of the Chinese Army in Sichuan allowing a definitive occupation of China; or "Plan 21", the Japanese invasion of British India along with Indian nationalist forces under the command of Subash Chandra Bose.


Tojo was concerned that the Japanese transport and merchant fleets were extended to their limits and the Americans could readily divert their B-17 Flying Fortresses to Sydney to destroy the invading forces. In the last interview he gave before his execution on 23 December 1948 Tojo insisted that Japan had no plans for the physical invasion of Australia or New Zealand. In a statement he said in reply to a specific question regarding any contemplated invasion of New Zealand and Australia: 


"We never had enough troops to do so. We had already far over-stretched our lines of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities to mount such a terrific extension of our already over-strained and too thinly spread forces. We expected to occupy all New Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasion - no, at no time." quoted from the below at awm.gov.au


This "Australia first" Navy plan was rejected by the Army even more quickly than Kuroshima's proposed Invasion of Ceylon. Ten combat divisions was the minimum required for the Australian operation and the Army High Command emphatically declared that it could not spare them. The truth was that the Japanese Army generals were not interested in any of these plans. They knew that Germany was planning a big attack in the Caucasus and they were confident of a Wehrmacht victory there. When this had been achieved, they wanted to be ready to stab their ancient enemy Russia in the back. For this reason they were holding large forces in reserve which could be hurled across the Soviet Union's Siberian border. In any event it was abundantly clear that the Army did not want to commit substantial forces to the southeast area and would have no part of an attempt to invade Australia.


Hirohito decided to delay the invasion plan until Japanese forces had taken Burma and joined forces with the Indian Nationalists forces. The fate of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway ensured the ambitious Japanese Navy Invasion Plan for Australia was finally abandoned.



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