Robert Falcon Scott
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Robert Falcon Scott (6 June 1868 – 29 March 1912) was a Royal Naval officer and Antarctic explorer. Having narrowly failed to be the first to reach the South Pole, beaten by Roald Amundsen and his party, Scott and his party died on the Ross Ice Shelf whilst trying to return to the safety of their base. Scott has become the most famous hero of the "heroic age" of Antarctic exploration.
Early Career
Scott was born in Devonport, England. He left home at the age of thirteen to join the naval vessel HMS Britannia at Dartmouth and begin his training.Scott joined the navy as a midshipman in 1881, first sailing on HMS Boadicea, the flagship of the English Channel fleet at that time. He transferred to HMS Rover in 1887. He was promoted to sub-lieutenant on his subsequent transfer to HMS Spider. Scott rose to become a lieutenant in 1891 on HMS Amphion, specialising in torpedoes. He became a first lieutenant in 1892 aboard the HMS Majestic, at the time the flagship of the Channel fleet.
Discovery expedition (1900-1904)
At the behest of Sir Clements Markham, the former polar explorer and then President of the Royal Geographical Society, Scott commanded the National Antarctic Expedition in Discovery which began in 1900. The major achievements of the expedition were an exploration of the Ross Sea, the land to the east of the ice sea was sighted for the first time and named "King Edward VII Land" in honour of the then British monarch and a new "furthest south" was achieved. Scott, Ernest Shackleton and Dr Edward Wilson reached 82°17′ S on December 31 1902.
It was during the Discovery expedition that Scott met and explored with Ernest Shackleton, who served as his third lieutenant. Many subsequent biographers of both men wrote of an intense personal animosity and rivalry between the two. However Ranulph Fiennes, in his biography of Scott published in 2003, writes that there was in fact little evidence of this and that the two were friendly on the expedition. Fiennes dismisses the autobiography of Albert Armitage, Scott's navigator and second-in-command on the trip, whose account provides most of the primary source data of the split between Scott and Shackleton because Armitage, Fiennes says, felt slighted by Scott. Fiennes writes that Shackleton was sent home early (on the first relief ship) from the Discovery expedition only because he was ill, as Scott claimed, rather than because of a strained relationship between the two, as others have suggested. Scott and Shackleton both went on to organise and lead subsequent expeditions, and therefore found themselves in competition for experienced personnel and financial support.
Terra Nova expedition 1910-1913
Scott had, following his Discovery expedition in 1902, been keen to return to Antarctica. It was evident that he had enjoyed the command, the involvement with scientific endeavour, and had a strong personal desire to be the first to get to the South Pole. That it took nearly eight years for him mount a second expedition was due to problems raising public interest (when the North Pole was a much more immediate challenge), and in handling financial difficulties in his own family.
After his marriage to Kathleen Bruce on September 14 1908, and the birth in 1909 of his only son, Peter Scott, he embarked on his second polar expedition. His ship, Terra Nova, left London on June 1 1910, sailing via Cardiff, which it left on June 15th. Scott sailed with the ship only as far as Rotherhithe and then returned to London to continue raising money for the expedition, and departed a month later to join the ship in South Africa.
Scott was informed en route that Roald Amundsen, who had to all appearance been preparing an expedition heading to the North Pole was instead heading South. It has been suggested that Amundsen did not mean to deceive Scott, but rather Nansen who had lent him the unique ship Fram specifically for the Arctic journey. Amundsen (like Scott) had borrowed heavily to fund his expedition, and having been beaten to the North Pole by Peary in 1909, turned to the South Pole in an attempt to recoup his costs. Certainly it was Amundsen who sent word to Scott, and who hosted a party of Scott's men at his camp in Antarctica, and offered them a site adjacent to his own as a base for exploration. This amity aside, in the public mind there was certainly now a 'race to the Pole'. Scott could not have avoided it, a large part of the interest and funding for the expedition was based on 'priority', and Scott could not have been unaffected personally by a desire to be 'first'.
Scott's expedition, however, had a very large scientific component that went well beyond the observations (primarilly geographical and meteorological) that were expected of exploration parties at the time. Scott carried equipment and had a program of work for extensive geological and zoological study. Partly for this reason, and also because his ship Terra Nova did not have the strength of the Fram to withstand the ice further south, he elected to set up his base camp on Ross Island, some 100km north of Amundsen's who had landed and set up base on the edge of the Ross Ice Shelf hundreds of miles from the nearest land.
After a year spent undertaking science work, and laying provisions along the route of the party who were to make the journey to the South Pole, a five man party (Scott, Lieutenant Henry Bowers, Dr Edward Wilson, Petty Officer Edgar Evans and army Captain Lawrence Oates) set out. On arriving at the South Pole on January 17-18, 1912, Scott found that Amundsen had been there a month earlier. Scott had some months before predicted this would likely be the case. Amundsen returned to his base in good order, while Scott's entire party perished on the return journey. Scott acknowledged that there had been no margin for error or delay in his calculations and his party eventually succumbed to injury, frostbite, malnutrition and exhaustion. As their progress slowed the worsening (seasonal) weather further reduced their pace. It is plausible that had Scott's men 'beaten' Amundsen to the South Pole the moral effect might have given them more impetus on their return journey, and it may been that Wilson would have then countenanced (or Scott would have insisted on) leaving the rock samples behind (for later retrieval) during the worsening weather as they approached the One Ton supply depot.
The first to die was Evans, who was injured in a fall and suffered a swift mental and physical breakdown near the foot of the Beardmore Glacier. Oates, afflicted by frostbite, had lost the use of one foot. His condition deteriorated, until at a point some 30 miles short of the One Ton supply depot he had come to the view that he could not go on. Waking one morning, Oates left the tent, stepping out into the blizzard with the memorable words "I am just going outside and may be some time". It was his 32nd birthday. His body was never found. The search party (see below) erected a cairn near the spot in memory of 'a very gallant gentleman'.
The tent containing the bodies of the remaining three members of the South Pole party were found six months later by a search party led by Atkinson which included amongst others, Apsley Cherry-Garrard. The South Pole team's last camp was only eleven miles (20 km) from the One Ton supply depot. With them were found their diaries, and their sled still loaded with rock samples. Scott's journal contained the final lines: 'Had we lived I should have had a tale to tell of the hardihood, endurance and courage of my companions which would have stirred the heart of every Englishman', and ending with the words, 'We shall stick it out to the end, but we are getting weaker of course and the end cannot be far. It seems a pity, but I do not think I can write more. For God's sake, look after our people. R. Scott'.
Cherry-Garrard records that after retrieving the diaries and the rock samples, the tent was collapsed over the bodies of Scott, Wilson and Bowers and a cairn of ice and snow erected to mark the place. Atkinson knew that the place they made this burial was part of the Ross Ice Shelf, moving north towards the open sea at a rate of 500 metres a year, and that ultimately they were committing the bodies of Scott, Wilson and Bowers for burial at sea.
After his death: the legend of \"Scott of the Antarctic\"
News of Amundsen's success reached Europe before Scott's fate was known. When Scott's death, and that of his companions, became known there was genuine sentiment expressed throughout the British Empire. Cherry-Garrard described the somber mood as the Terra Nova returned to New Zealand with the remaining expeditioners. Scott's eloquent diary became a best seller, and through it the public became aquainted with the story of Oates and Scott. The British establishment (Church, Government and Military) on the verge of confrontation with Germany were quick to adopt and further the view of Scott as a heroic figure. Books, art, sculpture, film and poetry subsequently developed the tragic, as well as the heroic aspects of the story. Streets, churches and towns throughout the British Empire were name after Scott and his companions.
Amundsen's achievement was unfairly eclipsed (in the British empire at least) by Scott's reputation. There were also accusations that Amundsen had breached convention by intruding into the Ross Sea, which had since James Clark Ross's discovery in 1841 been - in the public mind - an area of exclusively British endeavour. Coventions in exploration of that time gave subsequent exploration rights to the nation that first discovered an area. The public (but not Scott) would not have been aware that Norway had in fact previously undertaken significant exploration work - at the invitation of the British - in the Ross Sea in 1893 and 1898, and on the latter expedition discovered the Bay of Whales that Amundsen used as his base in 1911.
The mythologising of Scott, particularly after Cherry-Garrard's publication of 'The Worst Journey in the World' took on an extra dimension - that of Scott as the flawed but very human character compared with Amundsen. Amundsen was portrayed in the British press as a professional explorer in an age where the amateur was seen as morally superior, and as a man pursuing personal ambition rather than national glory or the advancement of science. In fact Amundsen was not unlike Scott, a highly driven amateur who had at times difficult relations with his men and was uncomfortable in the public spotlight.
Scott's widow, Kathleen, was granted the rank (but not the style) of a widow of a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath, but (despite popular belief) this did not amount to Scott being posthumously knighted, there being no such provision in the English law. It has in recent times been suggested that Kathleen, as Scott lay dying, was conducting an affair with the famous polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen (who had hired his ship, the Fram, to Amundsen). Certainly if this was known at the time it was not reported widely. Kathleen Scott a reputation for being independent and strong willed, but never more formidable than when defending the reputation of Robert Scott, and of their child, Peter Scott.
Scott's brother-in-law, the Reverend Lloyd Harvey Bruce, was the rector of the tiny Warwickshire village of Binton, and he commissioned a large stained glass memorial window, showing scenes from Scott's expedition, which still exists today. A large and recently refurbished memorial to Scott can be found in Plymouth, England overlooking the harbour. It is engraved with words from Scott's journal. Other notable memorials can be found in Christchurch and Port Chalmers, New Zealand, the Terra Nova's last two ports of call before sailing for Antarctica. The New Zealand permanent research base on Ross Island and the US permanent research base at the Pole, are named Scott Base and Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station respectively.
The debate
Criticism of Scott, and particulary of his planning for and conduct of the Terra Nova expedition was naturally muted at the time of his death, and in the years of the First World War that followed. In addition to the pressure brought by the public and institutions, and by Scott's widow, Kathleen, to preserve Scott's 'memory' unsullied, there was a natural reluctance by those who had direct knowledge of the circumstances of that expedition to speak ill of the dead, or enter the public fray.
Nevertheless, there was sufficient dissent from the view of Scott as 'faultless hero' for Aspley Cherry-Garrard in his 1922 classic 'The Worst Journey in the World' to address questions regarding Scott's competence. In doing so he opened the public debate on Scott, and the view that Scott was in some ways a flawed man whose character and errors of judgement contributed to the failure of the expedition. Cherry-Garrard, with the benefit of having 'been there', observed that the expedition was a success from the scientific viewpoint. He had no illusions that the scientific achievement was modest, but saw that it was part of a process of building knowledge of Antarctica. As a biolgist he believed that a better understanding of the wildlife of Antarctica (particularly penguins) was a worthwile endeavour. Significantly however, he indicated that there was nothing to be learnt from these early explorers in regard to travel across Antarctica. He predicted the future lay in air travel.
Cherry-Garrard's defence of the scientific achievement of the Terra Nova expeditions, however, did not extend without qualification to Scott's planning and management of the journey to the pole. Cherry-Garrard had lost his closest friends, Wilson and Bowers, and he held Scott responsible to some degree. Cherry-Garrard clashed with Kathleen on what was 'appropriate' to say publicly, with the result that his criticism in his book was muted, and the full story remained in his private papers. Cherry-Garrard was, however, also troubled by his own role in resupplying, but not continuing beyond, the One Ton Depot in March 1912 while Scott was only 55 miles further south.
Since Cherry-Garrard, others have weighed into the debate, notably Roland Huntford ("Scott and Amundsen/The Last Place on Earth", 1979) and Ranulph Fiennes ("Captain Scott", 2003). Certainly not just the elevation of Scott's reputation, but also the dimishment of Amundsen's achievement deserved 'correction', and the public seemed to gain an appetite for this by the 1970's. At that stage, looking back over 50 years, with nearly all of the particapants dead, there was not much opportunity to discover new 'facts' about the case, and the discussion has turned largely on analysis of motives and decisions made by Scott, frequently with reference to Amundsen as a model of what Scott should have done and could have achieved.
The record shows that Scott and Cherry-Garrard were unstinting in praise for Admundsen's methods and abilities as an explorer, and that Scott particularly foresaw that Amundsen would reach the Pole first because he had more dogs, and had landed closer to the Pole. In that sense they agree with modern interpreters of Amundsen's achievement. Neither Scott or Cherry-Garrard, however, saw the Terra Nova expedition as having as its sole purpose simply 'getting to the South Pole'. Undoubtedly it was necessary to stress this aspect to gain funding and public support, and no doubt it appealed to some parts of the ego of some of the participants, not least Scott himself. The scientific aspect however was not unimportant in 'selling' the expedition to institutions and business who might see little benefit in the journeying to the frozen wasteland of the South Pole, but who could see profit in the advancement of knowledge of animal and mineral resources on the reasonably accessible coast. This was of course long before the concept of a non-commercial Antarctica where no State had claim to any part of the continent.
The dual nature of Scott's expedition, incorporating both scientific and exploratory endeavour, needs to be taken into account by anyone making a comparison with Amundsen's which was perfectly focussed on the single task of reaching the South Pole. This is important not just in trying to weigh up the 'real' achievement of each, but in understanding some of the compromises that Scott made to accommodate science. This is not to say however, that any comparison of Scott's and Amundsen's methods is invalid, or that Scott did not clearly make mistakes. Some of the key considerations are:
- Scott did not have a ship to equal the immensly strong purpose-built Arctic exploration ship Fram, and had no funds to build one. Nor was the Fram available for hire, it had been contracted by Amundsen in order to make an attempt on the North Pole in 1909-1910. Knowing that the Terra Nova was not as strong a ship as the Fram, or even his previous ship Discovery, Scott did not wish to risk taking it into seas further south than Ross Island where it might have been - as had the Discovery - trapped in sea ice for the duration of the Antarctic winter. Scott instead had plans for the Terra Nova to run resupply missions between Ross Island and New Zealand. Amundsen on the other hand, having diverted his efforts from the North to the South Pole had an ideal ship in the Fram for penetrating to the Bay of Whales on the southernmost shore of the Ross Sea (closer to the South Pole) and for over-wintering there on board.
- Scott, and his financial backers, had made geological exploration a significant component of the expedition's work. The Bay of Whales, a small notch in the immense Ross Ice Shelf, hundreds of miles from land was unsuitable as a base for geological work, even if it was an ideal base for launching a 'dash' to the South Pole. Scott's base at Cape Evans on Ross Island, with access to the Trans-Antarctic mountain range to the west was a better base for geological exploration.
- Scott had explored the interior of Antarctica previously and had already determined in his mind that the Beardmore Glacier was the route to the central plateau and the South Pole. Amundsen 'punted' that there was another way through, in a direct line between his base on the Bay of Whales and the South Pole. Amundsen's gamble paid off. Scott on the other hand believed from that previous experience that it would not be possible to get dogs up the Beardmore, and so laid all of his plans around man-hauling sleds above the Beardmore.
- Scott did not have Admundsen's experience of the Arctic and particularly lacked Admundsen's intimate knowledge of the Inuit and their way of life, which included an understanding of the proper selection and management of dog teams. Scott, did not have Amundsen's supreme confidence in the ability of dogs only used them as part of his strategy below the Beardmore Glacier. He took two tractors and Siberian ponies as well. Scott did, however, consult with Nansen who had Arctic experience, and on Nansen's recommendation took with him Tryggve Gran, an expert Norwegian skier who had been planning his own expedition to the North Pole. Scott's confidence in the dog teams was, however, evidenced by the vital role he gave them in resupplying the depots that he would use on his return journey - a task that the dog teams ultimately failed in.
- Scott noted that the dogs and ponies were both affected by parasites picked up in Siberia, and that the feeding regimes for both were unsatisfactory. It has been suggested that Scott was unduly sentimental about the dogs and ponies, but his decisions about their deployment was largely dictated by his desire to conserve them for further scientific exploration intended to go ahead in 1912, and by his conviction that neither ponies or dogs would be able to get up the Beardmore Glacier onto the central plateau and the final route to the South Pole. Scott had previous experience with ponies in Antarctica, and knew that they would not be able to start working until later in the spring than the more hardy dogs. He knew that this meant that the time available to make the dash to the Pole and return safely was reduced. In 1911 when he heard that Amundsen was at the Bay of Whales with nearly one hundred dogs Scott stated that Amundsen's ability to get away earlier with his dogs-only hauling strategy meant that - barring misadventure - Amundsen would get to the South Pole first.
- Scott underestimated the effect of changing his original plan to take only four men to the South Pole. The addition of the fifth, as he subsequently noted, resulted in more time lost and food consumed than was justified by the extra 'pulling' capacity. As Scott approached the South Pole he would have been increasingly aware - noting their rate of travel - that they had no margin for error on their return jouney. If prudence had been uppermost in his mind he might have turned back before reaching the pole, fairly certain as he was that Amundsen had already 'beaten' him to it, and bring home the rock samples as his consolations 'scientific prize'. Scott knew that his original schedule was bringing him back right on the edge of the blizzard season.
- Some comments have been made about the Winter of 1912 being particularly early or harsh. It is clear that he encountered bad weather towards the end of his journey in March (a time at which the weather is always unsettled on the Ross Ice Shelf). It is now known that the route up the west side of the Ross Ice Shelf that Scott used is subject to worse weather than Amundsen's easterly route. Furthermore Scott endured weather conditions that may occur only once in a century, on average 20° colder with blizzards for long periods. The low temperatures they encountered on the Ross Ice Barrier meant that their sledge would not slide easily over the snow in the familiar way. Their task can be better compared to pulling a full bathtub across the Sahara. Scott and his meteorologist, Simpson, had estimated that the temperatures would be high enough to allow the sledge to slide more easily. The bottom line, however, is that Scott acknowledged his margin of safety in respect of the weather was very narrow.
- Scott was continuously concerned about raising sufficient money to equip the expedition adequately. A considerable amount had been borrowed, and the ability to repay it (through further donations and product endorsements) in large part depended upon the expedition being successful in their attempt to be the first to the South Pole. As it was neither Scott nor Cherry-Garrard noted deficiencies in the equipment due to lack of funds, but they did note that the need for Scott to spend time raising funds took him away from day to day planning and management of the expedition at critical junctures. Scott's last entry in his diary, reflecting his concern at the fate of 'our people' back home, was written with a mind to the financial burden that they bore, and which he thought they would not be able to meet following the failure of the expedition. It should be noted that Amundsen, in turning at the last moment to an attempt on the South Pole was said to be mindful of his debts incurred in hiring the Fram. When Peary beat him to the North Pole in 1909, Amundsen had to quickly look elsewhere for some significant 'exploration achievement' that would enable him to raise funds to cover his debts.
Further reading
- Susan Solomon (2000) The Coldest March: Scott's Fatal Antarctic Expedition, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, ISBN 0-300-08967-8
- The Royal Navy in Polar Exploration from Franklin to Scott, E C Coleman 2006 (Tempus Publishing)
See also
References
External links
- [Southern Polar exploration - Robert Falcon Scott]
- [Secrets of the Dead - Tragedy at the Pole (PBS)]
- [South-Pole.com] - a substantial resource of polar exploration accounts and memorabilia
- *[Free eBook: The Worst Journey in the World, Volumes 1 and 2 Antarctic 1910-1913] at Project Gutenberg by Apsley Cherry-Garrard
- *[Free eBook: Scott's Last Expedition Volume I] at Project Gutenberg by Captain R. F. Scott
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