Scipio Africanus
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- This article deals with the Roman general who defeated Hannibal in the Second Punic War. For other men with this name, see Scipio Africanus (disambiguation).
Biography
Early years
Scipio was born in 236 BC in Rome into the highly political Cornelii family. He survived the disastrous battles at Ticinus (where, according to one tradition, he saved his father's life) when he was 18, Trebia and Cannae. Even after the last of these defeats at the hands of the Carthaginians, he was resolutely focused on securing Roman victory. On hearing that Lucius Caecilius Metellus and other politicians were at the point of giving up the struggle and quitting Italy in despair, he gathered what few followers he could find and stormed into the meeting, where at sword-point he forced all present to swear that they would continue in faithful service to Rome.At the elections for the year 212 BCE, Scipio offered himself as a candidate for the Curule Aedileship. The Tribunes of the Plebs objected to his candidature, saying that he could not be allowed to stand because he had not yet reached the legal age (30). Scipio's reply was: "If the quirites (the Roman citizens) are unanimous in their desire to appoint me Aedile, I am quite old enough...". Scipio was elected unanimously and the Tribunes abandoned their opposition.
Campaign in Hispania
In 209 he fought his first set piece battle, and drove back Hasdrubal from his position at Baecula, on the upper Guadalquivir. Scipio was forced to make haste, as at any time he feared the armies of Mago and Gisgo would enter the field and surround his small army. Scipio's objective was, therefore, to quickly eliminate one of the armies to give him the luxury of dealing with the other two piecemeal. The battle was decided by a determined infantry charge up the center of the Carthaginian position. Roman losses remain enigmatic, but it can be fair to assume that Roman casualties were considerable in light of their infantry attempting to scale an elevation defended by Carthaginian light infantry. He then orchestrated a frontal attack by the rest of his infantry to draw out the remainder of the Carthaginian forces. However, Hasdrubal had not espied Scipio's hidden reserves of cavalry which were moving behind the enemy's lines. A cavalry charge created a double envelopment on either flank led by cavalry commander Gaius Laelius and Scipio himself. This broke the back of Hasdrubal's army and routed his forces - an impressive feat for the young Roman versus the veteran Carthaginian general. Despite a Roman victory, Scipio was unable to hinder the Carthaginian march to Italy. This is probably to haunt Scipio's memory for all time, for much historical criticism has been leveled at his inability to effectively pursue Hasdrubal, who would eventually cross the Alps only to be defeated by Gaius Claudius Nero at the Battle of the Metaurus. One popular theory is that Scipio merely wanted the glory of securing Spain, and an extended mountainous campaign endangered that reality. Others cite the Roman soldiers' appetite for plunder preventing him from rallying in pursuit. The most probable from a strategic standpoint is simply the fact that both Gisgo's and Mago's armies, both of superior numerical strength, could at any point pursue his Roman army, resulting with the possiblity that Scipio could be trapped between Hasdrubal's army on one side, and Gisgo's and Mago's on the other. In fact, mere days after Hasdrubal's defeat, Mago and Gisgo were in fact able to converge in front of the Roman positions, bringing into question what would have happened had Scipio pursued Hasdrubal.
After winning over a number of Hispanian chiefs he achieved in 206 a decisive victory over the full Carthaginian levy at Ilipa (now the city of Alcalá del Río, near Hispalis, now called Seville), which resulted in the evacuation of Hispania by the Punic commanders.
After all this rapid success in conquering Spain, and with the idea of striking a blow at Carthage in Africa, he paid a short visit to the Numidian princes Syphax and Massinissa. Numidia was of vital importance in a Carthage whose main source of manpower was in mercenaries and allied forces, and most of these were abroad. In addition to supplying the amazing Numidian cavalry (refer to the Battle of Cannae for their significance), Numidia operated as a buffer for vulnerable Carthage. Scipio managed to receive support from both. Unfortunately, Syphax later changed his mind and married Sophonisba, daughter of Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo, and fought against Massinissa and Scipio in Africa. On his return to Hispania, Scipio had to quell a mutiny which had broken out among his troops. Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal had meanwhile marched for Italy, and in 206 Scipio himself, having secured the Roman occupation of Hispania by the capture of Gades, gave up his command and returned to Rome.
African Campaign
In the following year, 205, he was unanimously elected to the consulship at 31. Africa was his intended destination, but his jealous enemies in the senate allowed him to go as far as Sicily and did not grant him an army. Nevertheless, Scipio there trained a volunteer army.By this time Hannibal's movements were restricted to the southwestern toe of Italy, and the war was now to be transferred to Africa. Scipio was intent on this, and his great name drew to him a number of volunteers from all parts of Italy. Interestingly, among these volunteers were the shamed survivors of the fiasco at the Battle of Cannae. Due to their public shame and berratement, they were anxious to once again prove their worth as soldiers, an asset that Scipio was quick to exploit. Scipio quickly began creating Sicily as a training camp and a staging point for his conceived invasion. However, he realized that the Carthaginian, and especially Numidian superiority in cavalry would prove decisive against the largely infantry forces of the legion. Coupled to this was that a large proportion of Rome's cavalry were dubiously loyal allies, or noble equites exempting themselves from being lowly foot soldiers. Scipio solved this pressing matter in a variety of ways, many of them quite harshly. One anecdote told how Scipio pressed into service several hundred Sicilian nobles to create a cavalry force. The Sicilians were quite opposed to this servitude to a foreign occupier (Sicily being under Roman control only since the First Punic War), and protested vigorously. Scipio assented to their exemption from service providing they pay for a horse, equipment, and a replacement rider for the Roman Army. In this way, Scipio (albeit by less than reputable means) created a trained nucleus of cavalry for his African campaign.
A commission of inquiry was sent over to Sicily, and it found that Scipio was at the head of a well-equipped and trained fleet and army. Scipio pressed them for permission to cross into Africa. The conservative branch of the Roman Senate, championed by Fabius Maximus, the Cunctator (Delayer), opposed the mission. Fabius still feared Hannibal's power, and viewed any mission to Africa as dangerous and wasteful to the war effort. The Senate also disdained Scipio's Hellenophile tastes in art, luxuries, and philosophies. Also, a certain amount of republican fear of powerful military leaders no doubt played a role, whilst the introduction (205) of the Phrygian worship of Cybele and the transference of the image of the goddess herself from Pessinus to Rome to bless the expedition may have affected public opinion. Thus, all Scipio could obtain was permission, but not support, to cross over from Sicily to Africa, if it appeared to be in the interests of Rome. In short, the Senate dispatched Scipio to Africa either to get rid of him, hoping he would subsequently remain politically insignificant, or possibly militarily fail.
At the commissioners' bidding he sailed in 204 and landed near Utica. Carthage, meanwhile, had secured the friendship of the Numidian Syphax, whose advance compelled Scipio to raise the siege of Utica and dig in on the shore between that place and Carthage. The following year, 204, he destroyed two combined armies of the Carthaginians and Numidians. He did so by approaching by stealth and setting fire to the Carthaginian-Numidian camp, where the combined army became panic stricken and fled only to be put down by Scipio's army. Though not a "battle," both Polybius and Livy estimate that the death toll in this single attack exceeded 40,000 Carthaginian and Numidian dead, and more captured. The praise and condemnation for this act is roughly proportional. Polybius said that it "of all the brilliant exploits performed by Scipio this seems to me the most brilliant and more adventurous." One of Hannibal's principal biographers, Theodore Ayrault Dodge, goes so far to suggest that this attack was out of cowardice, and spares no more than a page upon the event in total, despite the fact that it secured the siege of Utica, and effectively put Syphax out of the war. The irony of Dodge's accusations of Scipio's cowardice is the attack showed traces of Hannibal's penchant for the ambuscade.
Scipio quickly dispatched his two lieutenants, Laelius and Masinissa, to pursue Syphax; a pursuit that ultimately dethroned Syphax, and ensured Prince Masinissa's corronation as King of the Numidians. Carthage, and especially Hannibal himself, had long relied upon these superb natural horsemen who would now fight for Rome and against Carthage.
With Carthage now deserted by her allies, and being surrounded by a veteran and undefeated Roman army which Dodge states was the best ever fielded, Carthage began opening the diplomatic channels of negotiation. It was here that the unthinkable occurred: Hannibal Barca returned to Carthage. Despite Scipio's moderate terms offered to Carthage, Carthage suddenly suspended negotiations and again prepared for war. It is a testament to Hannibal's leadership that suddenly the mood in Carthage changed. The army that Hannibal returned with is a subject of much debate. Apologists for Hannibal often claim that his army was mostly Italians pressed into service from Southern Italy, and that most of his elite veterans (and certainly cavalry) were spent. Scipio's advocates tend to be far more suspicious, and believe the number of veteran forces to remain significant. Hannibal did have a trained pool of soldiers who had fought personally in Italy to call upon, as well as a devastating weapon: eighty massive war elephants. Hannibal could boast a strength of 58,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, to which Scipio could answer with 34,000 infantry and 8,700 cavalry. The two generals met on a plain between Carthage and Utica forever immortalized as Zama to do battle on October 19, 202 BC. Despite mutual admiration, negotiations floundered due to Roman allegations of "Punic Faith," referring to the breach of protocols which ended the First Punic War by the Carthaginian attack on Saguntum, as well as Scipio’s increasingly extreme demand and a perceived breach in contemporary military etiquette (Hannibal's numerous ambuscades).
The Battle of Zama itself is recounted elsewhere, but it is noteworthy to cite Scipio's contribution to its outcome. Hannibal had arranged his infantry in three phalangial lines designed to overlap the Roman lines. His strategy, so oft reliant upon subtle strategems, was simple: a massive forward attack by the war elephants would create vulnerable gaps in the Roman lines, and these would be attacked from lines of infantry, and supported by cavalry. Rather than lining his Roman forces in the traditional manipular lines, which put the velites, principes, and triarii in succeeding lines of 500 men groups, Scipio instead put the maniples in a chequer pattern, with his elite heavy infantry in diagonals. This was done to match the length of the Carthaginian line, but also as a strategem against the war elephants. When the Carthaginian elephants charged, they found well laid troops before the Roman position, and were greeted by Roman trumpeters which drove many amok out of confusion and fear. Roman javelins were used to good effect, and the sharp trops caused great distress among the pachyderms. Many of them were so distraught, in fact, they charged back into their own Carthaginian lines. However, the Roman infantry was greatly rattled, and it was in this time that Massinissa's Numidian and Laelius' Roman cavalry began to charge the opposing cavalry off the field. This was done to great success, but perhaps too much vigor as both commanders pursued their routing Carthaginian counterparts. The resulting infantry clash was fierce and bloody, with neither side achieving local superiority. The battle was won when the pursuing allied cavalry rallied, and charged the rear of Hannibal's army, causing what many historians have called the "Roman Cannae."
Because of the exertions of Rome and her allies against Carthage many Roman aristocrats, especially Cato, expected Scipio to raze that city to the ground after his successful campaign. However, Scipio dictated extremely moderate terms in contrast to an immoderate Roman Senate. Despite his moderation towards the Carthaginians, he was cruel towards the Roman and the Latin deserters, the Latins were beheaded and the Romans crucified. By Scipio's consent Hannibal was allowed to become the civic leader of Carthage as a byproduct of Scipio's moderation (which the Cato family did not forget).
Return to Rome
Scipio was welcomed back to Rome in triumph with the agnomen of Africanus. He refused the many further honours which the people would have thrust upon him such as Consul and Dictator for life. In the year 199 BCE, Scipio was elected Censor and for some years afterwards he lived quietly and took no part in politics.In 193 he was one of the commissioners sent to Africa to settle a dispute between Massinissa and the Carthaginians, which the commission did not achieve. This may have been because Hannibal, in the service of Antiochus III, might have come to Carthage to gather support for a new attack on Italy. In 190, when the Romans declared war against Antiochus III of Syria, Publius offered to join his brother Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, if the Senate entrusted the chief command to him. The two brothers brought the war to a conclusion by a decisive victory at Magnesia in the same year.
Retirement
Meanwhile, Scipio's political enemies, led by Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder, had gained ground. When the Scipiones returned to Rome, two tribunes prosecuted (187) Lucius on the grounds of misappropriation of money received from Antiochus. As Lucius was in the act of producing his account-books, his brother wrested them from his hands, tore them in pieces, and flung them on the floor of the Senate house. This created a bad impression; Lucius was brought to trial, condemned and heavily fined.
Africanus himself was subsequently (185) accused of having been bribed by Antiochus. By reminding the people that it was the anniversary of his victory at Zama he caused an outburst of enthusiasm in his favor. The people crowded round him and followed him to the Capitol, where they offered thanks to the gods and begged them to give Rome more citizens like Africanus. Others however only put his survival solely down to the influence of his brother-in-law, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus.
He then retired to his country seat at Liternum on the coast of Campania. He lived there for the rest of his life, revealing his great magnanimity by attempting to prevent the ruin of the exiled Hannibal by Rome. He died at 53 in 183 B.C, demanding that his body would be buried away from his ungrateful city.
Marriage and issue
With his wife Aemilia, daughter of the consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus who fell at Cannae, he had a daughter, Cornelia Africana, who became the mother of the two famous Gracchi by her marriage with Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus.Roman opinions
He was a man of great intellectual culture and could speak and read Greek, and wrote his own memoirs in Greek. He also enjoyed the reputation of being a graceful orator.There was a belief that he was a special favourite of heaven and held actual communication with the gods. It is quite possible that he himself honestly shared this belief; to his political opponents he was often harsh and arrogant, but towards others singularly gracious and sympathetic. According to Gellmus, his life was written by Oppius and Hyginus, and also, it was said, by Plutarch. He often visited the temple of Jupiter and made offerings there.
He appears in Cicero's De Republica and De Amicitia, and in Silius Italicus's Punica
Legacy
Military
Scipio is considered by many to be one of Rome's greatest generals; he never lost a battle. Skillful alike in strategy and in tactics, he had also the faculty of inspiring his soldiers with confidence. According to the story, Hannibal, who regarded Alexander as the first and Pyrrhus as the second among military commanders, confessed that had he beaten Scipio he should have put himself before either of them - though this particular story was probably fabricated by Livy at a later date.Music
The exploits of Scipio inspired George Frideric Handel to write the opera Scipio, the march from which remains the regimental slow march of the British Grenadier Guards.Renaissance literature and art
'The Continence [i.e. moderation] of Scipio' was a stock motif in exemplary literature and art [link], as was the 'Dream of Scipio', portraying his allegorical choice between Virtue and Luxury [link]. The Continence of Scipio, depicting his clemency and sexual restraint after the fall of Carthago Nova, was an even more popular subject. Versions of the subject were painted by many artists from the Renaissance through to the 19th century, including Andrea Mantegna and Nicholas Poussin.
Film
Shortly before Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, Benito Mussolini commissioned an epic film depicting the exploits of Scipio. Scipione l'africano, written by Carmine Gallone, won the Mussolini Cup for the greatest Italian film at the 1937 Venice Film Festival.Literature
- Ross Leckie, Carthage trilogy, source of the 2006 film (1996, Hannibal: A Novel, ISBN 0895264439 ; 1999, Scipio, a Novel, ISBN 034911238X ; Carthage, 2000, ISBN 0862419441)
Notes
P·CORNELIVS·P·F·L·N·SCIPIO·AFRICANVS in English is "Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, son of Publius, grandson of Lucius"See also
- Scipio-Paullus-Gracchus family tree
- Akinde, Michael O., Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus. [link]
- Undefeated Military Commanders
References
- H. H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician, Thames and Hudson, London, 1970. ISBN 0500400121
- B.H. Liddell Hart, A Greater Than Napoleon, Scipio Africanus, first published 1926, London
- Theodore Ayrault Dodge, Hannibal, Da Capo Press; Reissue edition, 2004. ISBN 03068136
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