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Second Chechen War

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Chechnya within Russia
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Chechnya within Russia

Chechnya and Caucasus region
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Chechnya and Caucasus region

The Second Chechen War is the military campaign initiated by the Russian Federation in 1999 that recaptured the separatist region of Chechnya, which had briefly gained de facto independence as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria following the First Chechen War.

The war has been one of the fiercest and bloodiest military conflicts in the world at the turn of the millennium as the Russian military and pro-Russian Chechen paramilitary forces struggled to dislodge determined Chechen separatists. The full-scale military offensive ended with the Russian seizure of the Chechen capital Grozny in 2000, after a bitter winter siege. Chechen guerrilla resistance throughout the North Caucasus region continued to inflict heavy Russian casualties and challenge Russian political control over Chechnya for several more years. Violations of human rights conducted by the Russian forces drew international condemnation, and attacks by Chechen fighters against civilians in Russia, notably hostage takings inside a Moscow theater in 2002 and a school in Beslan in 2004, appalled the world.

Although sporadic fighting continues to this day, the Russian military and political campaign has succeeded in installing a pro-Moscow Chechen regime, and eliminating the most prominent Chechen separatist leaders including former president Aslan Maskhadov and leading warlord Shamil Basayev. The war bolstered the domestic popularity of Vladimir Putin who launched the campaign one month after becoming the prime minister and went on to consolidate his political leadership over Russia. The sagging fortunes of the Chechen independence movement, plagued by internal disunity and association with Wahhabi radicalism, reflects the changing global political climate after September 11, 2001.

Historical basis of the conflict

The Russian Terek Cossack Host was established in lowland Chechnya in 1577 by free Cossacks who were resettled from the Volga to the Terek River. In 1783 Russia and the eastern Georgian kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti signed the Treaty of Georgievsk, under which Kartl-Kakheti became a Russian protectorate. To secure communications with Georgia and other regions of the Transcaucasia, the Russian Empire began spreading her influence into the mountains of the Caucasus, starting the Caucasus War in 1817. Russian forces first moved into highland Chechnya in 1830. Conflict in the area lasted until 1859. Many troops from the annexed states of the Caucasus fought unsuccessfully against Russia in the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78.

Russian Revolution

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Chechens established a short-lived independent emirate, comprising parts of Dagestan and Ingushetia and opposed by both sides of the Russian Civil War. The Chechnya state was crushed by Bolshevik troops in 1922. Then, months before the creation of the Soviet Union, the Chechen Autonomous Oblast of RSFSR was established. It annexed a part of territory of the Terek Cossack Host that was also liquidated by the Bolsheviks. Eventually, Chechnya and neighbouring Ingushetia became the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936.

During World War II Chechens were accused by Stalin of aiding Nazi forces. In 1944 Stalin deported nearly all the Chechens and Ingushs to Kazakh SSR and Kirghiz SSR, and Siberia. Up to a quarter died during the "resettlement", or were murdered. After the death of Stalin, Khrushchev allowed them to return in 1957, and their republic was reinstated.

The First Chechen War

First Chechen war. Photo by Mikhail Evstafiev
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First Chechen war. Photo by Mikhail Evstafiev

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chechnya declared its independence from the Russian Federation. In 1992, Chechen and Ingush leaders signed an agreement splitting the joint Chechen-Ingush republic in two, with Ingushetia joining the Russian Federation and Chechnya remaining independent. From 1991 to 1994, as many as 300,000 people of non-Chechen ethnicity (mostly Russians) fled the Chechen republic, and Chechen industrial production began failing after Russian engineers and workers were expelled from the Chechen Republic Ichkeria.

This simmering debate over independence ultimately led to a civil war in 1993. The Russians supported the anti-Dudayev opposition forces. The First Chechen War began in 1994, when Russian forces entered Chechnya to restore constitutional order and central rule. Following the 1996 Khasavyurt ceasefire agreement, the defeated Russian troops were withdrawn from Chechnya.

The beginning of the Second Chechen War

The 1997 election of separatist President Aslan Maskhadov led to turbulence within the country and, despite Russia's early recognition of their independent status as well as the 1997 Moscow peace treaty, a chilly relationship continued. In May 1998, Valentin Vlasov, a personal envoy of Boris Yeltsin, was kidnapped and released on November 13. Further tensions arose in January and February of 1999 as President Maskhadov announced that Islamic Sharia law would be introduced in Chechnya over the course of the next three years. In March of that year, General Gennadiy Shpigun, the Kremlin's envoy to Chechnya, was kidnapped at the airport and ultimately killed in 2000.

The Grozny government's grip on the chaotic republic was weak. On October 25 1998, Shadid Bargishev, the top anti-kidnapping official, was killed in a remote controlled car bombing as he was about to begin a major offensive on hostage takers. On December 10 Mansur Tagirov, Chechnya's top prosecutor, disappeared while returning to Grozny. On June 21 the Chechen security chief, Lecha Khulygov, and a guerrilla commander, Vakha Dzhafarov, fatally shot each other in an argument. In 1998 and 1999 President Maskhadov survived several assassination attempts. The internal violence in Chechnya peaked on July 16 1998, when fighting broke out between Maskhadov's National Guard led by Sulim Yamadayev and radical Wahhabi militants in the town of Gudermes; over 50 people were reported killed. On several occasions, Russian special forces raided Chechen territory.

Terrorist incidents 1996-1999

Despite the signing of the 1996-1997 peace agreements the pro-Chechen terrorist activity in Russia continued.

Conflict in Dagestan

Basayev in Dagestan
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Basayev in Dagestan

In August and September of 1999, Shamil Basayev (who served as Commander of the Chechen Armed Forces in 1996 and was a Prime Minister of Chechen government in 1998) led two incursions by 1,200 to 2,000 Chechen, Dagestani, Arab and Kazakh militants from Chechnya into the neighbouring in Republic of Dagestan. The purpose was to help local Islamic fundamentalists who were under attack by federal forces in the villages of Kadar, Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi. At least several hundred people were killed in the fighting. The federal side admitted 279 were killed and approximately 987 wounded. This conlict saw the first use of aerial-delivered fuel air explosives (FAE) against populated areas, notably on the village of Tando. By mid-September 1999 the militants were routed from the villages they had seized and where pushed back into Chechnya.

The Russian government followed up with a bombing campaign of southeastern Chechnya, a part of the country they saw as a staging area for the militants. On September 23, Russian fighter jets bombed targets in and around Grozny.

Dagestan after 1999

Since 2000, Dagestan has been a place of a low-level conflict. The conflict claimed lives of hundreds of federal servicemen and officials as well as Dagestani insurgents and civilians. According to a July 2005 report by the Russian Academy of Sciences, there were 70 "terror attacks" in Dagestan in the first six months of 2005, compared with 30 for all of 2004. The attacks, which are becoming more sophisticated and deadly, primarily target Russian soldiers and Dagestan's police and government officials. Sources indicate that as many as 2,000 Islamic insurgents, many belonging to the Jamaat Sharia group, are involved in the Dagestani Jihad. After a string of attacks and assassinations, Jamaat Sharia has claimed legitimate power in Dagestan. On July 12, 2005, the Sharia Jammaat confirmed the death of its commander, Rasul Makasharipov.

Bombings in Russia

At the same time as the fighting in Dagestan, a series of bombings took place in Russia (in Moscow and in Volgodonsk) and in the Dagestan town of Buynaksk (On September 4, in an apartment building housing members of families of Russian soldiers, 62 people were killed.) The bombs targeted four apartment buildings and a mall; nearly 300 people were killed. The Russian government (including then-President Boris Yeltsin) blamed Chechen separatists for the bombings. Shamil Basayev has denied involvement in the attacks. Some high-profile individuals, including the Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky (who is accused of fraud and political corruption by the Russian police and lives in exile) and U.S. Senator John McCain have suggested that the FSB (a Russian intelligence service) staged the bombings to provide a pretext for an invasion of Chechnya. On September 29, Russia demanded that Chechnya extradite the criminals responsible for the bombings in Russia. A day later, Russian troops began the ground offensive.

On January 12 2004, in a hearing in Moscow City Court which was closed to the public and the press, Adam Dekushev and Jusuf Krymshankhalov were sentenced to life sentences for delivering explosives to the residential buildings. Both were the members of Karachev-based pro-Chechen Wahhabi group, trained by emir Khattab in Chechnya. The alleged mastermind of the bombings, Achemez Gochiyaev, has never been apprehended. The bombing trial, however, has raised questions by observers. One week prior to the trial, the former FSB officer and lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin had been arrested. Trepashkin represented a victim's family and claimed to have obtained evidence of FSB involvement.

Second Chechen War

In late September 1999, the Russian military began bombing targets within Chechnya and ground troops followed soon after. In response, martial law was declared in Ichkeria and reservists were called. President Maskhadov declared a ghazw (holy war) to confront the approaching Russian army. At this time, Russia's new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that the Russian troops would advance only as far as the Terek River, which cuts the northern third of Chechnya off from the rest of the republic. Putin's stated intention was to take control of Chechnya's northern plain and establish a cordon sanitaire against further Chechen aggression.

The Russian army moved with ease in the wide open spaces of northern Chechnya and soon reached the Terek River. Having quickly gained control of the north Chechen plain, the army crossed the river on October 12 1999, and began a two-pronged advance on the capital Grozny to the south. Hoping to avoid the significant casualties which plagued the First Chechen War, the Russians advanced slowly and in force. The Russian military made extensive use of artillery and air power in an attempt to soften Chechen defenses. On November 7, Russian soldiers dislodged rebels in Bamut, the rebel stronghold in the first war; at least 28 Chechen fighters and many civilians were reported killed.

Many thousands of civilians fled the Russian advance, leaving Chechnya for neighbouring Russian republics. Their numbers were later estimated to reach 200,000 to 350,000, out of the approximately 800,000 residents of the Chechen Republic. The Russians appeared to be taking no chances with the Chechen population in its rear areas, setting up notorious filtration camps in October in northern Chechnya for detaining suspected members of "bandit formations" (bandformirovaniya).

Battle of Grozny

It was not until November that the Chechen capital of Grozny was surrounded, and more than two additional weeks of shelling and bombing were required before Russian troops were able to claim a foothold within any part of the heavily fortified city. With approximately 100,000 troops supported by a powerful air force, the Russian army vastly outnumbered and outgunned the Chechen defense militia, comprising several thousand fighters, and was considerably larger than the Russian force that had been defeated in Chechnya during the previous war. In addition, Russia's tactics in this second campaign were drastically different. The strategy in 1999 was to hold back tanks, vulnerable armored personnel carriers (APC) and infantry and subject the entrenched Chechens to an intensive barrage of heavy artillery and aerial bombardment before engaging them.

In November, the Kremlin appointed Beslan Gantamirov, former mayor of Grozny, as head of the pro-Moscow Chechen State Council. Gantamirov was just pardoned by President Yeltsin and released from a 6-year sentence for embezzling federal funds to rebuild Chechnya in 1995-1996; he was chosen to lead a pro-Russian Chechen militia forces in the upcoming battle. Gantamirov soon locked horns with the then interior minister, Vladimir Rushailo, who refused to supply Chechen troops with APCs, mortars or sniper's rifles, limiting their combat arsenal to "obsolete AK-47s which jammed after a few shots". In the wake of the Grozny siege, Rushailo publicly accused Gantamirov of accepting "any volunteers into the ranks of the Chechen militia including rebel fighters". However, the Chechen militia went on to play a pivotal role in the siege of Grozny, suffering more than 700 casualties during the fighting. On 30 May 2000, Russia's main official in Chechnya, Nikolai Koshman, said his deputy, Gantemirov was dismissed for "non-fulfillment of his duties." Koshman also said that the pro-Moscow Chechen militia has lost 295 out of its remaining 353 members for absenteeism. [link]

As many as 40,000 civilians, many of them ethnic Russians, remained trapped in Grozny during the Russian siege of the city, suffering from the bombing, cold and hunger. Civilian motorcades attempting to leave besieged areas via Russian-guarded safe corridors were fired on at Russian police checkpoints, wounded survivors reported.

Grozny itself was transformed into a fortress under the leadership of Chechen field commander Aslambek Ismailov. The Chechen fighters in the capital put up a fierce resistance to the Russians throughout the months of November and December. Grozny's Chechen defenders built a system of bunkers behind apartment buildings, laid mines throughout the city, placed snipers on rooftops, and withstood the heavy Russian bombardment for the chance to finally come to grips with the enemy in an environment of their choosing.

Ultimatum

In December the Russian general staff began dropping leaflets in Grozny announcing that everyone who did not leave would be considered bandits and terrorists and would subsequently be destroyed by aviation and artillery. In the face of international outrage by the United States, the European Union and human rights groups, Russia withdrew the ultimatum, but the campaign against Grozny continued with renewed vigor. By January 2000, Russia's heavy bombardments had finally begun to take their toll. Using multiple rocket launchers and massed tank and artillery fire, the Russians flattened most of Grozny in preparation for a mass assault.

Russian troops in Grozny
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Russian troops in Grozny

On January 3, Russian General Valentin Astaviyev said on state television that Russian forces had suffered only three dead in the past 24 hours; but the commander of an Interior Ministry unit in Grozny told AFP news agency that 50 men had been killed in the previous 48 hours. An undercover investigation by NTV has reported that up to 50 Russian soldiers are being killed in Chechnya daily; the figure was compiled from reports from witnesses, morgue officials, railway workers and coroner's assistants. On January 4, Chechen fighters in Grozny had launched counter attacks and broken through Russian lines in at least two places, temporarily seizing the village of Alkhan-Kala. Both sides accused each other of launching chemical attacks.

On Monday, 10 January 2000, Chechen forces outside Grozny launched a major counter-offensive, briefly recapturing major towns of Shali, Argun and Gudermes, and opening a new supply corridor to besieged capital; they also ambushed and destroyed a supply convoy near Dzhalka, on the Argun-Gudermes road. The commander for the North Caucasus, General Viktor Kazantsev, said mistakes by "soft-hearted" Russian interior ministry officials had allowed rebels to counter-attack; he said from now on only boys under 10, old men over 60 and girls and women would be considered as refugees. An interior ministry spokesman said 26 Russian soldiers had died in the past 24 hours, the heaviest one-day official death toll since fighting began last September. On January 19, Russian Major-General Mikhail Malofeyev was killed in Grozny; his body was found only 4 days later. The Russian command said small bands of rebel fighters were cutting off Russian units from the main forces; on January 21, 20 members of a Russian regiment were killed in north-west Grozny when rebels sneaked through sewage tunnels to attack them from the rear.

On January 26, the Russian government announced that 1,173 servicemen had been killed since October [link] - a more than double rise from 544 killed reported 19 days earlier, on January 6 [link], with just 300 killed reported on January 4 [link].

By mid-January, tens of thousands of Russian soldiers began an advance on central Grozny from three directions. With their supply routes interdicted by an increasingly effective Russian blockade, ammunition running low and their losses mounting, the Chechen leadership began to contemplate an escape. It was decided that taking on the Russians in frontal combat was becoming too costly. As the Russian army closed in on their positions, the Chechen commanders decided on a desperate gamble; success was not assured, for the city was encircled by mine fields and three layers of Russian forces.

Rebel breakout

The Chechens began to escape on the last day of January and first day of February under intense Russian bombardment. As the Chechen fighters broke out, moving in a southwesterly direction, they were met with artillery fire. One of the main retreating units, led by Shamil Basayev, hit a minefield between the city and the village of Alkhan-Kala. As Russian artillery fire homed in on their position, several of the Chechens' field commanders personally led their retreating soldiers in a charge across the minefields. Volunteers were asked to run ahead of the main force to clear a path for their retreating comrades. Scores of Chechen shaheed were killed as well as several prominent Chechen commanders, including generals Khunkarpasha Israpilov and Aslambek Ismailov, the mastermind behind the defense of Grozny, and the city mayor Lecha Dudayev. In addition to these commanders, many rank-and-file Chechen fighters were apparently killed in the bloody escape. The Russians later claimed to have killed 200 Chechen fighters. Another 200 were maimed, including Basayev.

A rebel post-operative war council was held in Alkhan-Yurt, where it was decided that the Chechen forces would retreat into the inaccessible Vedeno and Argun gorges in the southern moutains to carry on a guerrilla war against the Russians. The Russian army's last chance to destroy the rebels in a concentrated position was thus lost, and the Chechens scattered into the southern mountains to continue the war.

In Grozny itself, the Russian generals initially refused to admit that the Chechens had escaped from the blockaded city, saying that fierce fighting continued within the city. Russian spokesman and Putin's aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky said, "If they left Grozny, we would have informed you." [link] It was not until February 6 that the Russians were able to raise the Russian flag above the city centre. In March, the Russian army began to allow residents to return to the city.

Komsomolskoe

In a March attack, a large group of more than 1,000 Chechen fighters, led by field commander Ruslan Gelayev, seized the village of Komsomolskoe in the Chechen foothills. They held off a full-scale Russian attack on the town for over two weeks, although they said they suffered from 500-1,000 casualties in the greatest Chechen defeat of the war. [link]

The village was totally destroyed. Vladimir Putin put the number of Chechen dead at 600, while the Russian side admitted 350 dead and wounded.

Guerilla war in Chechnya

Despite the destruction of Grozny and the Russian victory at Komsomolskoe, fighting continues, particularly in the mountainous southern portions of Chechnya. Rebels are typically targeting Russian and pro-Russian officials, security forces, and military and police convoys and vehicles - often with IED attacks, with the Russians retaliating with an artillery and air strikes and conducting counter-insurgency operations.

Among the notable incidents:

2000

OMON in Chechnya
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OMON in Chechnya

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Rebels in Chechnya
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Rebels in Chechnya

Air war

In October 1999, at the beginning of the invasion of Chechnya, Russia was able to deploy in the war zone only 68 transport and attack helicopters – a quarter of the number amassed for the war in Afghanistan, though the number of troops sent to Afghanistan and the second Chechen war is roughly the same.

According to the official data, Russian forces lost some 31 aircraft destroyed or heavily damaged between September 1999 and July 2001, including a number of fighter bombers. However, this figure does not include the losses suffered in Dagestan.

Assassinations

Assassination of Kadyrov
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Assassination of Kadyrov

Suicide attacks

Between June 2000 and September 2004 Chechen insurgents added suicide bombs to their weaponry. Among the attacks:

Government headquarters bombing
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Government headquarters bombing

Georgia

Russian officials have accused the bordering republic of Georgia of allowing Chechen rebels to operate out of Georgian territory, and permitting the flow of guerillas and materiel across the Georgian border with Russia.

Uniliteral ceasefire and the new rebel government

On February 2 2005, Chechen rebel president Aslan Maskhadov issued a call for a ceasefire lasting until at least February 22: the day preceding the anniversary of Stalin's deportation of the Chechen population. The call was issued through a separatist website and addressed to President Putin, described as a gesture of goodwill.

But on March 8 2005, Maskhadov was "liquidated" in an operation by Russian security forces in the Chechen community of Tolstoy-Yurt, northeast of Grozny, and branded an "international terrorist."

Shortly following Maskhadov's death, the Chechen rebel council announced that Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev had assumed the leadership, a move that was quickly endorsed by Shamil Basayev. On February 2 2006 Sadulayev made large-scale changes in his government, ordering all its members to move into Chechen territory. Among other things, he removed First Vice-Premier Akhmed Zakayev from his post (although later Zakayev was appointed a Foreign Minister [link]).

Sadulayev himself was killed in June 2006, after which he was succeeded as the rebel leader by the veteran guerilla commander Doku Umarov.

Radicalization of the Chechen insurgents

The Chechen insurgents are becoming more and more radicalized. Former Soviet army officers General Djokhar Dudaev and Colonel Aslan Maskhadov, have been succeeded by people who rely more and more on the religious feelings rather than the nationalistic feelings of the population. While Dudaev and Maskhadov were seeking from Moscow recognition of the independence of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, Sadulaev and Basaev speak out more and more about the need to expel Russia from the territory of the whole North Caucasus, an impoverished mountain region inhabited mostly by Muslim, non-Russian ethnic groups.

In April 2006, asked whether negotiations with Russians are possible, the top rebel commander and then-new Vice-President Doku Umarov answered:''

"We offered them many times. But it turned out that we constantly press for negotiations and it's as if we are always standing with an extended hand and this is taken as a sign of our weakness. Therefore we don't plan to do this anymore. And the reshuffle of the [rebel] Cabinet of Ministers is connected to this."''
In the same month, the new rebel spokesman Movladi Udugov said that attacks should be expected anywhere in Russia in 2006: "The minimum goal -- not to surrender -- has been met. Today, we have a different task on our hands -- total war, war everywhere our enemy can be reached. (...) And this means mounting attacks at any place, not just in the Caucasus but in all Russia." It was not clear whether Udugov meant a return to the type of terrorist acts, not seen since 2004, or military style operations. Reflecting growing radicalization of the Chechen-led guerrillas, Udugov said their goal was no longer Western-style democracy and independence, but an Islamist "North Caucasian Emirate."

But regardless of goals and tasks announced by the current leaders of the separatists, the insurgents continue to enjoy the support of a significant part of the population of the Chechen Republic.

Caucasus Front

In May 2005, two months after Maskahdov's death, the Chechen separatists announced that they had formed a Caucasus Front within the framework of "reforming the system of military-political power." Along with the Chechen, Dagestani and Ingush "sectors," the Stavropol, Kabardin-Balkar, Krasnodar, Karachai-Circassian, Ossetian and Adighy "jamaats" were included in it. This, in essence, means that practically all the regions of the Russia's south will be involved in the hostilities.

Destroyed military vehicle in Nazran after the Ingushetia raid
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Destroyed military vehicle in Nazran after the Ingushetia raid

The Chechen separatist movement has taken on a new role as the official ideological, logistical and, probably, financial hub of the new insurgency in the North Caucasus. Increasingly frequent clashes between federal forces and local militants continue in Dagestan, while sporadic fighting erupts in the other southern Russia regions, most notably in Ingushetia.

Restoration of federal government

Government of Akhmad Kadyrov

Russian President Vladimir Putin established direct rule of Chechnya in May 2000. The following month, Putin appointed Akhmad Kadyrov interim head of the government.

Constitution

On March 23 2003, a new Chechen constitution was passed in a referendum. The 2003 Constitution granted the Chechen Republic a significant degree of autonomy, but still tied it firmly to the Russian Federation and Moscow's rule; the new constitution went into force on April 2 2003. The referendum was strongly supported by the Russian government but met a harsh critical response from Chechen separatists. Many citizens chose to boycott the ballot.

The international opinion was mixed, as enthusiasm for the prospect of peace and stability in the region was tempered by concerns about the conduct of the referendum and fears of a violent backlash. Chief among the concerns are the 40,000 Russian soldiers that were included in the eligible voters' list (out of approximately 540,000). No independent international organization (neither the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) nor the United Nations) officially observed the voting, but observers from Organization of the Islamic Conference, League of Arab States, Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, CIS, muslim countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Yemen, Oman et al.) have recognized a referendum free and democratic. The OSCE, the United States State Department, and the United Kingdom's Foreign Office all questioned the wisdom of holding the referendum while the region was still unsettled.

Elections

On October 5 2003, presidential elections were held in Chechnya under the auspices of the March constitution. As with the constitutional referendum, the OSCE and other international organizations did not send observers to monitor proceedings. The Kremlin-supported candidate Akhmat Kadyrov earned a commanding majority, taking about eighty percent of the vote. Critics of the 2003 election argue that separatist Chechens were barred from running, and that Kadyrov used his private militia to actively discourage political opponents.

At night on August 21 2004, a week before the appointed elections of the President of the Chechen Republic, large-scale military operation was carried out by Chechen fighters in the capital city of Grozny, targeting polling stations and other government targets. The Kremlin-backed Militsiya General Alu Alkhanov was reported to have won the elections with almost 74%, with over 85% of the people having voted according to Chechen elections commissions head Abdul-Kerim Arsakhanov. [link]

The latest Chechen elections were held in November 2005. The independent observers said that there were plenty of Russian troops and more journalists than voters at polling stations. Lord Judd, a former Council of Europe special reporter on Chechnya, regarded the elections as flawed; "I simply do not believe we will have stability, peace and a viable future for the Chechen people until we have a real political process," he said. [link] The candidates all belonged to Moscow-based parties and were loyal to Chechnya's Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov. [link]

Government of Ramzan Kadyrov

Since December 2005, the pro-Moscow militia leader Ramzan Kadyrov is functioning as the Chechnya's prime minister and the republic's de-facto ruler. Kadyrov, whose irregular forces are accused of carrying out many of the abductions and atrocities; has become Chechnya's most powerful leader since the 2004 assassination of his father Akhmat.

The 29-year-old was elevated to full-time premier in March 2006, in charge of an administration that is a collection of his allies and teip (clan) members. Same month, the Ramzan Kadyrov government officially took control of Chechnya's oil industry and rejected a federal proposition of the republican budget, demanding much more money to be sent from Moscow; for years, Chechnya was know as a Russia's "financial black hole" where the funds are widely emblazed and tend to vanish without trace. On March 30, 2006, Interfax reported Chechen People's Assembly Chairman Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov has spoken in favor of a complete withdrawal of all Russian federal forces except the border guards.

In April 2006 Kadyrov himself criticized remaining units of federal police, namely Operational/Search Bureau (ORB-2), and called for their immediate withdrawal from the republic. He also called for refugee camps scattered about Chechnya to be closed down, saying they were populated by "international spies" intent on destabilizing the region. Later this month, Abdurakhmanov said Chechnya should be merged with Ingushetia and Dagestan; Ingush and Dagestani leaders disagreed. Paradoxically, a merger would reflect the will of Chechen separatists of establishing an Islamic state across the North Caucasus.

Ramzan Kadyrov (centre) with the Kadyrovtsy, after a rebel attack on Tsentoroi.
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Ramzan Kadyrov (centre) with the Kadyrovtsy, after a rebel attack on Tsentoroi.

On April 29 2006, after a deadly clash between Kadyrov's and Alkhanov's men in Grozny, Ramzan Kadyrov officially disbanded his security service. Kadyrovtsy, an irregular army of thousands of former rebels, have been pivotal in supporting Kadyrov. Rights activists working in Chechnya say the Kadyrovtsy abused their powers to crush any rivals to Kadyrov; they have repeatedly accused Kadyrov's personal guard of using kidnapping, murder and torture to cement his rule. On May 2 2006, representatives of European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), the Council of Europe's anti-torture watchdog, said they were prevented from entering the fortress of Ramzan Kadyrov, the alleged site of prisoner abuse; rights activists claim that prisoners and kidnap victims are tortured in secret jails in Chechen villages, including Tsentoroi, the ancestral home of the Kadyrov clan.

Islamization

In 2006 Kadyrov has also started to create laws he says are more suitable to Chechnya's Islamic heritage -- banning alcohol and gambling on January 20, and enforcing women's use of headscarves -- in defiance of Russia's secular constitution. He also publicly spoke in favor of polygamy on January 13, and declared that lessons in the Koran and Sharia should be obligatory at Chechen schools. On February 11, Ramzan criticized the republican media for broadcasting immoral programs and officially introduced censorship in Chechnya. Because of the cartoon scandal that shook the whole Muslim world, Kadyrov issued a brief ban on the Danish Refugee Council, the most active humanitarian organization in Caucasus.

On June 1 Moscow-backed Chechen President Alu Alkhanov said he would prefer his republic be governed by Sharia law and suggested adapting the Islamic code, speaking in Paris after inconclusive talks with the Council of Europe. "If Chechnya were run by Sharia law, it would not look as it does today." Alkhanov also dismissed reports of conflicts with Kadyrov, who is widely believed to want to take over the presidency when he turns 30 in October and can legally assume the job.

Continuing tension

War crimes

Russian officials and Chechen rebels have regularly and repeatedly accused the opposing side of committing various war crimes including kidnapping, murder, hostage taking, looting, rape, and assorted other breaches of the laws of war. International and humanitarian organizations, including the Council of Europe and Amnesty International, have criticized both sides of the conflict for blatant and sustained violations of international humanitarian law.

US Secretary Madeleine Albright noted in her March 24 2000, speech to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights: "We cannot ignore the fact that thousands of Chechen civilians have died and more than 200,000 have been driven from their homes. Together with other delegations, we have expressed our alarm at the persistent, credible reports of human rights violations by Russian forces in Chechnya, including extrajudicial killings. There are also reports that Chechen separatists have committed abuses, including the killing of civilians and prisoners. ... The war in Chechnya has greatly damaged Russia's international standing and is isolating Russia from the international community. Russia's work to repair that damage, both at home and abroad, or its choice to risk further isolating itself, is the most immediate and momentous challenge that Russia faces." [link]

According to the 2001 annual report by Amnesty International:

There were frequent reports that Russian forces indiscriminately bombed and shelled civilian areas. Chechen civilians, including medical personnel, continued to be the target of military attacks by Russian forces. Hundreds of Chechen civilians and prisoners of war were extra judicially executed. Journalists and independent monitors continued to be refused access to Chechnya. According to reports, Chechen fighters frequently threatened, and in some cases killed, members of the Russian-appointed civilian administration and executed Russian captured soldiers. [link]
In 2001 the Holocaust Memorial Museum has placed Chechnya on its Genocide Watch List. [link]

Forced disappearances

Massacre incidents

Terrorist bombings

Moscow subway bombing
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Moscow subway bombing

Outside mediation councils

Council of Europe

The first trial concluded in February 2005. The Court ruled that the Russian government violated several articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, including a clause on the protection of property, a guarantee of the right to life, and a ban on torture and inhumane or degrading treatment, and ordered the Russian government to pay compensation to the six plaintiffs of the case. [link]
The cases concerned the Russian federal forces' indiscriminate aerial bombing of a civilian convoy of refugees fleeing Grozny in October 1999; the "disappearance" and subsequent extrajudicial execution of five individuals in Grozny in January 2000; and the indiscriminate aerial and artillery bombardment of the village of Katyr-Yurt in February 2000. The compensations were not paid, NGOs claim that applicants to the court are met with repressions, including murders and disappearance.[link]
General Baranov (left) condemning to death a man in rebel uniform (right). (CNN)
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General Baranov (left) condemning to death a man in rebel uniform (right). (CNN)

United Nations

Events in Russia

Trials of Chechen fighters

Since the Russian authorities do not treat the war as an armed conflict and enemies as combatants, the secessionist Chechen fighters are invariably described by the Russian government as terrorists or bandits. Captured rebels are routinely tried for such articles of the Russian criminal code as illegal weapons possession, "forming and participating in illegal armed groups," and banditry. This strips detainees of key rights and protections under the Geneva Conventions rules of war, including the right to be released at the end of the conflict and not to be held criminally liable for lawful combat. Participation in combat is treated as a murder or attempted murder and terrorism, making little if any distinction with incidents of actual murders and terrorism.

Trials of Russian servicemen

The cases of a Russian servicemen being tried for a war crimes are few and in between, and no one has been charged with mistreatment or murder of captured enemy fighters. Several servicemen have been accused and even convicted of a crimes against civilians:

Hostage takings

The Moscow theater hostage crisis

Moscow theater hostage takers
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Moscow theater hostage takers

On October 23 2002, over 40 militants took more than 700 hostages prisoner at a Moscow theater. The hostage-takers demanded an end to the Russian presence in Chechnya, and threatened to execute the hostages if their conditions were not met. The siege ended violently on October 26, when Russian troops stormed the building. More than one hundred of the hostages perished from the incapacitating effects of knockout gas used by the Russian forces. Many casualties resulted from the fact that unconscious victims' airways were blocked and sub-optimal care was given during the rescue.

Russian officials blamed Maskhadov and Baseyev for the attack; both initially denied responsibility and insist that the attack was the work of independent rebels and terrorists. On November 2 Baseyev recanted his statements, assuming responsibility in a statement on his web site and apologizing to Maskhadov for not informing him of the plan.

The Beslan school siege

On September 1 2004, approximately 30 individuals seized control of Beslan's Middle School Number One and more than 1,000 hostages. Most of the hostages were students under the age of eighteen. Following a tense two-day standoff punctuated by occasional gunfire and explosions, Alpha Group of the OSNAZ raided the building. Fighting lasted more than two hours; ultimately 331 civilians, 11 commandos, and 31 hostage-takers died.

Once again, Russian officials publicly linked Baseyev and Maskhadov to the attack, and Baseyev again claimed responsibility in a September 17 website publication; Maskhadov denounced the attacks and denied involvement. The carnage at Beslan and the outcry it caused has had an unexpected effect on the tactics employed by Chechen rebels and their allies. Since September 2004, neither Chechen nor North Caucasian militants have perpetrated a single hostage-taking or any attacks on civilian targets.

Other hostage incidents

Meanwhile, the practice of taking civilians hostages exists among officers of Russian and local security agencies in Chechnya. On March 1 2004, officers of security agencies seized more than 30 relatives of Ichkerian defense minister Magomed Khambiyev, including women, in the Khambiyev family's native village of Benoy in Chechnya's Nozhay-Yurt district. Magomed Khambiyev got an ultimatum to lay down arms in exchange for lives of his relatives, and he did it giving himself up to the authorities in a few days.

Casualties

Official figures

These figures are not confirmed by serious academic sources or researches.

On 25 May 2000, Chechen militants reported on their website that they have lost 1,380 men since fighting started with Russia in the breakaway republic. Previous week, Russian military officials said they had lost 2,004 soldiers. Casualty figures from both sides are impossible to verify and are generally believed to be higher. [link]

By December 17 2002, the official death toll for federal troops was about 4,705. However, Russia's Itar-Tass news agency reported on February 17 2003, that some 4,739 were killed in Chechnya in the year 2002 alone, with another 13,108 wounded and 29 missing. [link]

According to the latest figures released by the Russian Defense Ministry on August 10, 2005, 3,450 Russian Army soldiers have been killed in action since 1999. This death toll does not include losses of the Internal Troops, Federal Security Service, Militsiya and all paramilitaries, and according to the figure cited by Interfax in March 2006 more than 1,000 Chechen policemen alone have been killed since 1999.

On June 26 2005, Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, a deputy prime minister in the Kremlin-controlled Chechen administration, said about 300,000 people have been killed during two wars in Chechnya over the past decade; he also said that more than 200,000 people have gone missing. [link] Earlier in 2004, the chairman of Chechnya's State Council, Taus Djabrailov, said over 200,000 people have been killed in the Chechen Republic since 1994. [link]

The Chechen separatist sources cite figures of some 250,000 civilians, and up to 50,000 Russian servicemen, killed during the 1994-2003 period. The rebel side acknowledged about 5,000 Chechen combatants killed as of 1999-2004, mostly in the initial phases of the war.

Independent estimates

Civilian casualty estimates vary widely, but many say about 80,000 civilians - 40 percent of them children - died in the first Chechen war. Many more have been killed since the conflict exploded again in 1999.

Funeral of a Russian officer
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Funeral of a Russian officer

Mass graves

On March 29 the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, called for a thorough investigation of the mass grave site in a statement to the 57th session of the UNHCR; Robinson stated that "cases such as the mass grave in Zdorovie discovered earlier this year, less than a kilometer from the main military base in Chechnya, must be followed up and thoroughly investigated." Three weeks earlier, the authorities buried the rest of the bodies without prior notice and without performing adequate autopsies or collecting crucial evidence that would have helped to identify the perpetrators. [link]
In June 2006, Russia's leading human rights groups has produced what it says is documentary evidence of a secret torture and murder cell in the basement of a former school for deaf children in the Oktyabrskaya district. According to Memorial, Russian police used the dungeon to torture and murder hundreds of people, and was decommissioned only last month, when the federal Russian police unit occupying the building withdrew. According to the republic's prosecutor, Valery Kuznetsov, several criminal cases involving the disappearance of people allegedly dispatched to the "temporary holding cells" are being investigated. But Nurdi Nukhajiev, Chechnya's government-appointed representative for human rights, said: "I am not saying that the people [policemen] were ideal individuals. But this is 2006 and they weren't so stupid as to leave evidence of torture and murder behind." Memorial says it collected the evidence just in time and that the building housing the cellar has since been demolished in a crude attempt at a cover-up. [link]
In 2003, residents and human rights campaigners said fragments of blown-up bodies are being found all over the war-ruined region. Rather than put a stop to human rights violations, the military appears to be doing its best to hide them, critics said. [link]

Influence on Russian politics

Early conflict

Among ordinary Russian citizens, there existed a strong perception that Chechnya was firmly a part of Russia. The notion that it might secede was implausible and unacceptable, even after events of the First Chechen War; the violent acts of Chechen militants were portrayed within Russia as having been carried out by dangerous, unrepresentative fringe groups. Within the Russian government, there was a concern that allowing Chechnya substantial autonomy might lead to a domino effect—other regions within the already-fragmented former Soviet Union might choose to follow suit.

Motivated by these factors, President Yeltsin authorized the invasion of Chechnya. Many argue over whether Yeltsin genuinely believed that victory would be swift and decisive, or that his assertions to that effect were simply meant to assuage the concerns of Russian citizens. Despite assembling a much larger and better-supported force than was brought to bear in the First Chechen War, the Russian army sustained appreciable losses but won the bloody battle for Grozny.

Rise of Putin

The election of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency changed the tenor of the Chechen conflict; Putin was often less concerned about Western public opinion than Yeltsin, and continued to prosecute the war.

Putin officially reestablished Russian rule in Chechnya in 2000; this development met with early approval in the rest of Russia, but the continued deaths of Russian troops dampened public enthusiasm. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, Putin was able to attract more foreign support for his actions in Chechnya by highlighting the links between Chechen rebels and Islamist terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda.

Although large-scale fighting within Chechnya has ceased, daily attacks continue. The local government is not stable and Russians are mindful of the potential for renewed conflict. Russia continues to maintain a substantial military presence within Chechnya.

President Putin and newly-minted Chechen leaders face a difficult task of restoring stability to the region and convincing the Russian people that they can manage the situation effectively. Currently the FSB has taken over the operations in Chechnya. Most soldiers in Chechnya are now kontraktniki (contract soldiers) as opposed to the earlier conscripts. Local militias are also being used to provide security. Ironically, many of the militiamen are former Chechen rebels from the First Chechen War.

Influence on society

Chechen syndrome

The "Chechen syndrome" among security forces returning from their service in Chechnya spreads an atmosphere of violence and disregarding human rights to other parts of Russia. The regular troops and police carry the Chechen syndrome home with them, haunted by the horrors they have witnessed and committed.

Post-traumatic stress disorder

A Russian soldier in Chechnya
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A Russian soldier in Chechnya

Since the Chechen conflict began in 1994, similar cases have been reported all across Russia: depressed young veterans return embittered and traumatized to their home towns and begin lashing out at those around them; soldiers are psychologically scarred. Russian psychiatrists, law-enforcement officials and journalists have started calling the condition Chechen syndrome (CS), drawing a parallel with the post-traumatic stress disorders suffered by American soldiers who served in Vietnam and Soviet soldiers who fought in Afghanistan. "At least 70% of the estimated 1.5 million Chechnya veterans suffer CS," says Yuri Alexandrovsky, deputy director of the Serbsky National Center for Social and Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow. "Some readjust. Many don't. All need help." [link]

Police brutality

This is particulary visible in the rising brutality and criminalisation of the Russia's police forces. According to human rights activists and journalists, tens of thousands of police and security forces have done tours of duty in Chechnya, after which they return to their home regions, bringing with them learned patterns of brutality and impunity.

In a 2003 report, the International Helsinki Federation said "torture, ill-treatment and inhumane and degrading treatment are commonly employed in order to get a confession to a crime." A Human Rights Watch report said that in the first hours after detention, "police regularly beat their captives, nearly asphyxiate them, or subject them to electroshock in pursuit of confessions or testimony incriminating others".

Reliable numbers on police brutality are hard to come by. In a statement released January 31, 2006, the internal affairs department of Russia's Interior Ministry said that the number of recorded crimes by police officers rose 46.8 percent in 2005. In one nationwide poll in 2005, 71 percent of respondents said they didn't trust the police; in another, 41 percent said they lived in fear of police violence.

Impact on the Chechen population

The 2003 WHO in-depth study of the psychological health of the population of Chechnya, which has experienced crisis almost continuously since 1991, concluded that 86 percent of the Chechen population was suffering from physical or emotional "distress" - about 30 percent more than people living in the Chernobyl reactive zone. 31 percent of those studied showed symptoms of ill health recognizable as post-traumatic stress syndrome. [link]

Psychologists are discovering that a whole generation of Chechen children is showing symptoms of trauma. In 2006 Sultan Alimkhadzhiyev, pro-Russian Chechnya's deputy health minister, said the Chechen children had become "living specimens" of what it means to grow up with the constant threat of violence and chronic joblessness and poverty. "Our children have seen bombings, artillery attacks, large-caliber bombardment. They saw houses, schools and hospitals burning. They lost parents, brothers, sisters, neighbors. And they still see tanks and armored vehicles every day in the street. (...) A state of panic. Children are feeling constant fear, a premonition of tragedy." [link]

Rise of racism and xenophobia

The war in Chechnya and the associated Caucasian terrorism in Russia resulted in growing intolerance and racist violence in Russia, directed in a great part against the people from Caucasus. Even while the Russian authorities are unlikely to label attacks on people with dark skin as racist, preferring calling this "hooliganism", a report in November 2005 found that murders officially classified as racist more than doubled in Russia between 2003 and 2004 from around 20 to at least 45.

A nationwide opinion poll in 2005 found that 61% of respondents approved of the "Russia for Russians" slogan, almost twice the 31% level recorded in 1998. [link] According to the 2006 poll by the Public Opinion Foundation, 12% of Russians see "positive ideas" in fascism; 24% think that people who hold fascist views do not constitute a danger to society.

References

External links

Timelines and chronologies
Human rights issues
2005 ceasefire events
Articles
Advocacy groups and mailing lists

 


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