Sichuan invasion

Encyclopedia : S : SI : SIC : Sichuan invasion

The "Szechwan Invasion",also knowed how "Chungking Operation","Chunking Campaing" or tecnically The "Operation 5",was the pretend Japanese Army plan developed by "Imperial General Headquarters" for destroyed in definitive form the Chiang Kai-shek regime and take control of proper China mainland as soon as the first phase operations were concluded in the operation in southern regions.

Was an intended final, but failed operation of the Imperial Japanese Army to defeat the Chinese army in Central West China and thus conquer the sovereign nation. It took place from the spring of 1942 through to the spring of 1943. The central feature of the invasion was the sustained bombing of cities in Central West China.This invasion is analogous to the Wehrmacht's hope for the definitive defeat of the Red Army at Stalingrad during 1942.

Such plan was related for proper Chiang Kai Shek in own book "The Soviet Russia in China" and Wego W.K. Chiang(Chiang s son) in your book "How the Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek gaining the Chinese-Japanese eigth years War,1937-1945".

Contents

1 Japanese stimates about Chinese forces stregth in 1942
2 Japanese development of strategies lines for definitive defeat of Chinese forces
3 Japanese operative orders to conduct Invasion plan against Szechwan
4 Basis strategic lines for Japanese Invasion plan against Szechwan
5 Japanese Army political and administrative interests in Szechwan region
6 Suceses why turning the Japanese posiblities about implement the Szechwan Invasion
7 Japanese attempt to retaken the plans to Szechwan Invasion
8 Last operative strike attempt of Japanese Army to invade Szechwan
9 See Also
10 Sources

Japanese stimates about Chinese forces stregth in 1942

In the early spring of 1942, the Army High Command made the following estimate of the Chinese military potential.

1.The armed forces of the Chinese total some 3,000,000 men, of whom 40% (about 1,200,000) belong to the Central authorities. In turn, these Government forces comprise 650,000 troops under direct control and approximately 550,000 under subsidiary control.

The strongest of all the local forces is the Szechwan Army, with about 320,000 soldiers. In terms of numbers, it will be seen that Chiang Kai-shek still wields strong control, but the Chinese Army's equipment and human resources are poor.

When the Incident broke out, the Chinese Air Force consisted of 600 aircraft, but by now it possesses almost no offensive capability. The American Volunteer Group, which arrived with a fighter wing toward the end of 1941, constitutes the present core of Chinese air strength

Japanese development of strategies lines for definitive defeat of Chinese forces

At the beginning of April 1942, IGHQ drafted a plan for settling the China Incident, and showed the document (in private) to General Shunroku Hata, the Commander of the China Expeditionary Army in these period. The essentials follow:

Policy and essentials conduct to Szechwan plan

If the over-all situation permits (especially where the U.S.S.R. is concerned), Japan should take advantage of her successes in the southern operations to resolve in definitive form the China Incident. If the situation does not warrant, however,Japan should endeavor graduallyto hasten the collapse of the Chiang regime, by means of steadily pursuing current policies, while applying pressure from the direction of Burma.

a.In coping with the China Incident during its present stage, emphasis should be laid upon crushing the Chinese power to resist; winning the confidence of peoples in the occupied regions; and restoring public order. The Chinese will to fight should be destroyed through the application of state policy and the exertion of economic pressure. After the Aid-to-Chiang route via Burma has been completely sealed off, priority should be assigned to the annihilation of the hard core of the Nationalist Army,the so-called "Szechwan Army"

b.The following measures should be effected if an early settlement of

the Incident is planned.

(1)Essentials: The Army should transfer several divisions to China from other overseas fronts, and should conduct large-scale operations aimed at Chungking itself. In that case, the ultimate objective of the actions would be the destruction of the Nationalist Army's power of resistance in Szechwan Province. We must nevertheless continue to investigate the question

of deciding where to focus our main attention: the economic collapse which must result from occupation of the Szechwan plain; or the annihilation of the Central Nationalists armies, which constitute the backbone of Chinese power to resist.

(2)Timing: The proper time for commencing operations will occur when

the results of cutting off the Aid-to-Chiang route, plus the successes in the southern operations, exert critical influence upon China. Moreover, it will be necessary to consider holding certain forces in reserve against eventualities,when the southern operations have been brought to a momentary halt; the situation versus the Soviet Union has to be completely stabilized. The time for initiating operations against West China(Szechwan low lands,Red Higth Valley and Chengtu plains) should therefore not be set before autumn 1942 at the earliest.

c.The following are the objectives of measures to be adopted during a

sustained war in West China area: In the occupied areas, efforts must be made to strengthen the economic structure and to maintain public peace and order.In so far as the unoccupied regions are concerned, the fall of the Chiang regime must be spurred, by enforcing intensive blocking and cut-off measures, as well as by implementing state policies. To maintain public peace and, in turn, to win the people's hearts and stabilize the national livelihood, a"clean-up" campaign should be executed. That is, the "Seigo Kosaku program of pacification",whereby the future occupation authorities would establish a maximum of "model villages"in which law and order were maintained in colaboration with local supporters.

d.The inmediate installing of any government form for sustaining Japanese policies in region.such government was conformed by Japanese and local partidaires or in your defect any chinese supporters provided from Japanese Chinese held-lands or Nanjing area for realizing the administrative,political,economical and minimal police works.the most important security operations against suppose resistance opposers groups results of enventual defeat of ancient regima was charged to Kempeitai anti-guerrilla units andJapanese Army forces.the local newest government was responsible to reconstruct and developed the local economy,industry,agriculture and mining in region to conduct the natives at well collaboration with Japanese Army in region.

Japanese operative orders to conduct Invasion plan against Szechwan

On September 3, 1942, IGHQ ordered the China Expeditionary Army to prepare for the Chungking Operation(Sczechwan Invasion), with the code name "Operation 5."

Essentially the order stipulated that the final decision concerning implementation this plan should only be taken after ascertaining the general war outlook in the autumn, although part of the preparations should be undertaken from September on. Moreover, even if the operation were finally decided upon, the time to initiate it should be planned for the period after the spring of 1943.

Chiang Kai Shek in your book sayed "The Imperial General Headquarters envoyed the order for retireing 16 Divisions and logistics support units from Japan reserves,Manchukuo and Southern Areas(included New Guinea and Salomon islands also) for reinforzed the Japanese expeditionary forces in Central China area for preparing the principal force of Ten Divisions in south Shanshi and other support group conformed by six Divisions of Ichang in Hupei amongst other Divisions ubiqued in Changteh,in Hunan,for striking Szechwan and the occupation ofChungking in September 1942" in coincidence Germans closed in upon Stalingrad in December 3,1942 also.

Basis strategic lines for Japanese Invasion plan against Szechwan

The basic strategy was one Pincers operation from northern area in Shansi ,Central are Hupei and south sector in Hunan,with heavy aerial support for strategic bombing of Chungking,following by enter of Japanese Army and colaboratinst forces.such strikes was receiving another support provided by Japanese navy patrol boats from Yangtze river.

These units was debt to occupied first Wanhsien,how echelon in route to advance at proper Chungking.another area for cut-off any scape route of chinese refugees was the occupation of North Kweichow for advanced to Suifu in route to Chengtu.the north Japanese group was poses the option to advance for South Shensi for captured Sian and Hangchung for taken directly Chengtu.

In last alternative,Japanese can to utilized airborne forces by cut-off enemy scape routes and take directly the proper Chungking metropolitan area also

Japanese Army political and administrative interests in Szechwan region

Chiang was thinked why one possibly interests in Japanese "Bombardment of Chungking" was support of the pretend Japanese operations against Chungking metropolitan area inside of Invasion to Szechwan.same opinion was expresed for General Wego W.K. Chiang for explain the japanese intense Japanese Navy and Army Aviation air strikes against Chungking another explain was possibly Japanese conduct one "Terror Campaing" for conduct the Chinese autorities to seated at negotiation table with Japanese for finalizing the conflict and making Peace treated separate of other Allieds.

General Wego,added why if probably why Japanese decided also to installing the Nanjing puppet regime of Wang Chingwei in Chungking or sugest at proper Chiang for convert your regime in political support of Japanese policies in region,inside of Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere;also in eventually to any offensive against Russians in Siberia and Central Asiamainland.another possiblity was the Japanese stablishment decided to installing your proper own Civil or Military Governor-General for administered such areas how possibly Japanese Army fief in own territorial and political sphere of influence in AsianMainland,for extend this control to Tibet and Sinkiang more later also.

Suceses why turning the Japanese posiblities about implement the Szechwan Invasion

Since the latter half of 1942, however, the center of gravity of the Pacific War had shifted to Guadalcanal and its environs. In that region the U. S. Army's counteroffensive was gradually mounting in violence, and was beginning to exert pressure upon the Japanese forces amongst the severe Japanese Navy defeat during Battle of Midway. IGHQ considered it to be a full-scale assault and judged chat the coming result of the struggle for Guadalcanal would have a serious bearing upon the conduct of subsequent operations in Szechwan area.

Chiang Kai Shek continuing your relate "But in june 1942,Japanese forces suffer the humiliant defeat in Battle of Midway along in August the U.S. forces initiated the counterofensive against Salomon Islands,with disembarc in Tenaru River,Guadalcanal(Operation Watchtower).the Japanese suffering frequent losses at finish of September 1942,decided to delay the implement of invasion plan to Szechwan.later in November at having totally defeat the Japanese forces in Guadalcanal,(Battle of Guadalcanal,Battle of Tassafaronga and Battle of Rennel),your situation was turning completelly,Japan loss all posibility to trasladed with impunity your own forces in area(Japanese was obliged to used all disposable vessels in your retireing,the "Operation KE" during nigth of Febrary 1-2 1943,last part of so-called "Tokyo Express").at finish of 1942,the plannings for Szechwan Invasion was suspended".On December 10, IGHQ was compelled to order the China Expeditionary Army to suspend its preparations for the "Chungking campaign".

Japanese attempt to retaken the plans to Szechwan Invasion

About that time the China Expeditionary Army Nanjing Command, on the other hand, was entertaining strong hopes of undertaking thrust-operations against Chungking. This idea derived mainly from an estimate that one more push at this juncture could force theChungking regime to accede to a separate peace or render its existence impotent, because of the successful results achieved from the Hunan-Kweilin campaign.

IGHQ held an opposite opinion: At a time when the tide of war was going against Japan and Germany, it was unthinkable to oblige Chungking to cease fighting. There were questions to investigate concerning supply matters involved in thrusting-operations across the plains of Szechwan. Similarly, there were doubts about employing the bulk of the Expeditionary Army in a campaign against the farest West Chinese hinterland-at a time when it was imperative to strengthen the defenses of the Japanese homeland.

Last operative strike attempt of Japanese Army to invade Szechwan

Still IGHQ opinion,the China Expeditionary Army Hq,traced your own plans for Capture of Szechwan,when revised the previous plan and making new strategies. theirs issued direct orders during May 1943 at Japanese forces in West Hupei for cominzed the "Battle of West Hupei" in new attempt for controlled Szechwan and putting the finish of Chinese War.Japanese in subsequents battles suffered other defeats in hands of Nationalists Chinese Armies,supported by "Flying Tigers" (A.V.G.) Americans,commanded by General Claire Chennault.at consequence of such defeat the Japanese forces was obligued to occult during six months for preparing new offensives in area.this period Chinese Army approved for envoy seven Army corps,for Yunnan and India for clean the China-Burma route.

The Japanese Army decided envoy forces and sustaing the Battle of Changteh for prevent such Chinese movements in Yunnan area for prevent the chinese preparings in your own future counteroffensives.

Sources

Chiang Kai Shek,"The Soviet Russia in China"
General Wego W.K. Chiang "How the Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek gaining the Chinese-Japanese eigth years War,1937-1945".
Gen. Wego W.K. Chiang, Die Strategische Bedetung Taiwans, Taipei
Idem. Chinese Communists Modernization Problems, Taipei, 1979
Alphonse Max, Southeast Asia: Destiny and Reality, Montevideo, Uruguay: International Studies (spanish translation By Dr. Santiago Rompani and Prof. Alvaro Casal), 1985.

From Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Original article here. Support Wikipedia by contributing or donating.
All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License See Wikipedia Copyrights for details.