Stalin's Missed Chance
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Stalin
“Stalin's Missed Chance” covers a theory of planned Soviet invasion raised by Viktor Suvorov, author of highly controversial books such as Icebreaker. Unlike Suvorov's works, Meltyukhov's book is based on archive materials, some of which was until recently classified. Contrary to many Western scholars (David Glantz, John D.Erickson and others), Mikhail Meltyukhov concurs with Suvorov's claim that Stalin and the Soviet military leadership had planned an offensive against Germany in 1941.
Meltyukhov rejects, however, Suvorov's claims that the German assault (Operation Barbarossa) was a pre-emptive strike: Meltyukhov affirms both sides had been preparing to invade the other, but neither believed the possibility of other side's strike.
On the eve of World War 2
According to Meltyukhov, Russia had lost its position as a Great Power during the revolution and the breakup of its empire. The Soviet leadership had the option either to accept the regional status of the USSR or to become a Great Power once again. Having decided for the latter, the Soviet leadership used Communist ideology (the Comintern, the idea of world revolution etc.) to strengthen its position. (Meltyukhov 2000:491) The key objective was to exclude a possible alliance of Capitalist countries. Although diplomatic relationships had been established with the capitalist countries, the USSR was not accepted as an equal partner.That changed, however, in the course of the political crisis of 1939, when two military and political blocs were formed: Anglo-French and German-Italian, both of which were interested in an agreement with the USSR. Moscow then had the opportunity to choose with whom and under what conditions to negotiate.
The basic aim was to retain neutrality, and after the weakening of both belligerent sides, to emerge as the decisive factor in ensuring victory for one side. Thus, “the USSR succeeded in staying out of the European war, after obtaining in this case a significant free hand in Eastern Europe, wider space to maneuver in its own interests between the belligerent sides .” (Meltyukhov 2000:491-2)
During the years 1939 and 1940, the USSR annexed several Eastern European countries and territories. The Kremlin viewed Germany as a force capable of weakening the positions of Britain and shaking the capitalist order. And “then at the suitable moment the Red Army could have destroyed Germany and would have freed Europe both from fascism and from “rotten capitalism.””(Meltyukhov 2000:492-4)
As for Soviet-German relationship during 1940, Meltyukhov points out that although both sides had the common goal of weakening Britain and negotiations were held in November 1940, an actual military alliance was never realised, for Soviets would have had to leave the whole continent to the German-Italian sphere of influence, i.e relegating the Soviets to a second-rate role in the world matters. (Meltyukhov 2000:494)
The New Phase
From that time on, it became clear that Germany was the main obstacle for the Soviet penetration into Europe, and the relationship between these two entered the new phase. Both sides began preparing for the conflict. (Meltyukhov 2000:495)The USSR took steps to normalise relationship with the Western governments (including French and Polish emigrée leaders). These negotiations intensified as rumours spread about the possible Soviet-German military conflict. In June, 1941, Soviets proposed negotiations with Germany, which would have been useful as a disguise, and the breakup would have given a justification to begin the assault. (Meltyukhov 2000:496)
“From the beginning of 1941, the measures for an increase combat readiness of troops were conducted in the Western boundary districts, large part of which was to be completed by July 1, 1941.” The Soviet economy had been on war footing from 1939 on and preparations for mobilisation were made from that time on.
According to Meltyukhov, the material resources and the system of mobilization ensured the development of the army, considerably exceeding the German army in the quantity of armament and combat materials. (Meltyukhov 2000:497) By saying that, he rejects the thesis of David Glantz' work “Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War”, which portrays the Red Army as lacking any preparation.
Soviet and German Offensive Plans
As Meltyukhov shows with his study, the General Staff of Red Army had already begun developing a plan for the assault on Germany in October 1939. This process intensified in March 1940, and at least four different versions of the plan were developed throughout 1940 and 1941. The concentration of troops was disguised as maneuvers; in May/June 1941 the preparation for Soviet invasion in Germany reached the final stage, as the full-scale concentration of troops began. (Meltyukhov 2000:497)Military actions would have began with the surprise blow by the Soviet Air Force on the airfields of Eastern Prussia, Poland and Romania. The overall Soviet superiority in aviation would have made it possible to subject German airfields in a 250 km-deep border zone to continuous airstrikes, which would have led to a significant weakening of the enemy and would have facilitated Red Army ground forces operations. The ground forces were supposed to have two major strike directions: one striking towards Eastern Prussia and Poland and the other into Romania in the south. (Meltyukhov 2000:503)
The basic idea of Soviet military planning consisted in the fact that the Red Army was to concentrate near the border under disguise of maneuvers and to go over to a sudden decisive attack. “The absence of any references to the possible defensive operations of the Red Army shows that the discussion was not about the preparation for a pre-emptive strike but for the assault on Germany and its allies. This idea is clearly expressed in the document of May 15, 1941, by which the Red Army was to be guided in the beginning of war.” Meltyukhov suggests, that the assault on Germany was initially planned to take place on June 12, 1941, but was postponed due to the fact that the Soviet leadership feared an Anglo-German reconciliation against Soviet Union after the flight of Rudolf Hess May 12, 1941. (Meltyukhov 2000:498-9)
Basis for this assumption is revealed by Molotov's recollection 40 later in a conversation to Russian journalist Ivan Stadnyuk: "I don't remember all the motives for cancelling this decision, but it seems to me that Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess' flight to England played the main role there. The NKVD reconnaissance reported to us, that Hess on behalf of Hitler had proposed Great Britain to conclude peace and to participate in the military march against the USSR... If we at this time would have unleashed ourselves a war against Germany, would have moved forces to Europe, then England could have entered the alliance with Germany without any delay... And not only England. We could have been face to face with the entire capitalist world"[#endnote_Stadnyuk]
Meltyukhov believes that “the question about the new period of the completion of war build-up was solved on May 24, 1941, at the secret conference of military-political leadership at the Kremlin. Now accessible sources show that the full concentration and the development of the Red Army on Soviet Western districts was to be completed by July 15, 1941. The rate of the concentration of the Red Army on the Western borders was increased. Together with the transfer of 77 divisions of the second strategic echelon, from June 12 to June 16, 1941, began the re-dislocation of troops of the second echelon of armies and reserves of the military districts near Western boundary.(Meltyukhov 2000: 499)
As for German offensive plans, Meltyukhov rightly points out that the German leadership hoped for a rapid crushing defeat of the USSR which would have given Germany necessary resources for victory in a long war with England, and maybe the USA. Hitler’s idea could thus be characterised as striving for a victory in the East for the purpose of winning the war against the West. (Meltyukhov 2000:500)
Therefore, Meltyukhov claims, the apologies by Nazi leaders of a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union were groundless, since Hitler had regarded the concentration of Soviet troops as merely defensive. Operation Barbarossa was scheduled a long time before, and Hitler hadn't really comprehended the Soviet invasion threat, the concentration of Soviet troops was estimated as defensive reaction to the discovered Wehrmacht deployment. With regards to the failure of the Soviet leadership to comprehend the German threat, Stalin hadn’t believed Hitler was going to invade and risk war on two fronts. (Meltyukhov 2000:502)
What is more, it is believed that Stalin was looking forward to German ultimatum and thus the Soviets evaluated the concentration of German troops as a means to pressure the Soviets.
Had the Soviet assault taken place
Meltyukhov asks the hypothetical question, what would have happened if the Soviets had carried out its initial plan and begun the invasion in June 12, 1941. By that time, German troops had completed preparations for the Operation Barbarossa and concentration on the Soviet boundaries, where in the strip from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea it had already gathered 81.6% out of the divisions which Wehrmacht would have on June 21[#endnote_gruppirovka]. The remaining troops were in motion and Luftwaffe had completed re-dislocation after the Balkan campaign, but “Wehrmacht had neither defensive nor offensive group [yet], and Soviet attack at this moment would have placed it on a very complicated position and made it possible [for the Red Army] to tear its forces apart.” (Meltyukhov 2000:502-3). For Soviet troops concentration, see http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/s07.gif.The situation at the border strip from Ostroleka to Carpathians is shown in the table (Meltyukhov 2000:503-Таблица 59)
| Red Army | German Army (inc allies) | Relation | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divisions | 128 | 55 | 2.3 : 1 |
| Personnel | 3,400,000 | 1,400,000 | 2.1 : 1 |
| Artillery | 38,500 | 16,300 | 2.4 : 1 |
| Tanks | 7,500 | 900 | 8.7 : 1 |
| Aircraft | 6,200 | 1,400 | 4.4 : 1 |
It is important to point out, however, that this table ignores powerful German forces positioned north of Ostrolenka, who could have interfered in the Soviet plan. These included the whole of Army Group North with 16th Army, 18th Army, and Panzergruppe 4, as well as Army Group Centre's 9th Army and Panzerguppe 3 to the north of Lomzha. The strength of the three German armies and two Panzer Groups was substantial, with 862 tanks in Panzergroup 4 and 783 tanks in Panzergruppe 3. These forces would have been directly on the already very long northern flank of Pavlov's forces in the Bialystok salient, had the Soviet attack taken place.[#endnote_Glantz] The number of tanks in Panzergruppe 2 south of Ostrolenka is also questionable, since Wehrmacht records give it 950 tanks, and not 900 as Melthyukhov states.[#endnote_Mueller] Additional to those tanks are up to 377 Sturmgeschütze, the total number present in the Wehrmacht in June 41, although not all of them would have been in Poland or East Prussia). Even including the forces from the Soviet Baltic Military District in the comparison table, there would no longer be a tank superiority of 8.7:1 anymore. Also to consider are the additional men and guns. Finally, in a straighforward comparison there is the fact that German guns had a higher calibre (105mm vs 76mm as standard divisional artillery, 150mm vs 122mm as heavy divisional artillery), and therefore higher destructive power. The table as presented by Melthyukhov is not fully capturing the reality of the situation north of the Carpathians.
It is also important to note that many of the Mechanized Corps, which would have been the main maneuver element in an attack, were considerably understrength. Tank strengths of these formations in the Western Military District ranged from 63 (17th Mechanized Corps) to 1,131 for 6th Mechanized Corps, which was probably up to or at least close to full strength in terms of tanks. [#endnote_mechkorps] The same applied to manpower, which ranged from 43% at 14th Mechanized Corps to 67% at 6th Mechanized Corps. [#endnote_mechkorps2] The Mechanized Corps also lacked motor vehicles and artillery tractors which would have been necessary to conduct a deep operation.
Meltyukhov believes, the Western leaders would have approved the Soviet strike, for it was difficult for Britain to win the war alone and the British had already done everything within their means to convince Soviets to take a less benevolent attitude towards Germany.
In a telegramm to Roosevelt (June 15, 1941), Churchill had suggested rendering Soviets every possible assistance in case a war between Germany and USSR broke out. Roosevelt accepted it without reserve (June 21). (Meltyukhov 2000:507-8)
Taken everything into account, Meltyukhov sums up: “Certainly, this offensive by the Red Army would not have led to the immediate solution on the outcome of war, but […] the Red Army could have been in Berlin no later than 1942, which would have made it possible to gain much greater territory in Europe under the control of Moscow, than it really did in 1945.” (Meltyukhov 2000:506)
References
- Мельтюхов М.И. Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 1939-1941 (Документы, факты, суждения). — М.: Вече, 2000 -- Electronic version: [link]
- ↑ Группировка войск сторон взята по: Сборник военно-исторических материалов Великой Отечественной войны. Вып. 18. С.66—68, 79—85; 1941 год. Документы. Кн.2. С.216—219.
- ↑ Glantz, D. "The Initial Period of War"
- ↑ Müller-Hillebrand 'Das Heer, Band III'
- ↑ Стаднюк И.С. Нечто о сталинизме//О них ходили легенды. М.,1994. С.423—424.
- ↑ [Tank strength of Mechanized Corps]
- ↑ [Manpower strength of Mechanized Corps]
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