Stryker Vehicle Controversy

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The Stryker family of vehicles has come under intense scrutiny since its introduction in the US Army. A congressional report initially blasted various points concerning the vehicle, only to have soldiers in the field seemingly exonerate its performance in a report by the US Army. However, the Stryker has revived some age old issues concerning whether tracked or wheeled vehicles are more effective, as well as, specific complaints concerning various Stryker features.

Contents

1 Background - the Choice of Stryker and Rejection of The Offical Protest
2 Criticisms

2.1 Disadvantages of wheeled vehicles in general
2.2 Design

2.2.1 General Criticisms
2.2.2 ICV-specific criticisms
2.2.3 For further reading
2.2.4 MGS-specific criticisms
2.2.5 For further reading

3 Counter-criticisms

3.3 Advantages of Wheeled Vehicles
3.4 Responses to Stryker-specific complaints
3.5 Responses to MGS-specific complaints
3.6 Updates

Background - the Choice of Stryker and Rejection of The Offical Protest

To properly review the controversy, one must review the choice of Stryker for the ICBT program and UDLP's (maker of M113, M2 and M8 AGS) protest of that choice.

In 1999, the US Army requested proposals for vehicles to equip the recently concepted Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). [link]. The Stryker ICV (the GM/GDLS Proposal) won this competition against different wheeled (4, 6, and 8 wheeled variants) and tracked competitors (Bionix AFV (from Singapore), M113 variant (from Turkey), MTVL, IFB, and M113A3 (the last three from UDLP)). The Stryker MGS (the GM/GDLS Proposal) won its competition against two wheeled competitiors (one from Cadillac Gage Textron, and the other from GDLS without GM) and only one tracked competitor (M8 Buford from UDLP).

The Source Selection Authority (SSA) selected the following criteria for evaluation, listed in the following priority order:

1) Schedule and performance
2) Supportability and Price/Cost
3) Management.

The M113A3 had superior cross-country mobility (and thus smaller no-go zones), especially in "Germany-Wet" (as defined by NATO standards) terrain, can potentially carry an extra soldier, was cheaper, had already met all the listed requirements, and had higher commonality with the existing fleet.

The Stryker, on the other hand, had a faster road speed and a better ride. It was more heavily armored than the proposed M113A3. It was also noted that the tires' run-flat function allows for better degraded self-extraction than the tracks. Further, GDLP made the MGS and ICV share the same basic structure, improving its commonality in this regard. Based on the LAV-25's performance record, it was estimated that it would be more reliable than the M113A3.

Due to the IBCT being an infantry unit, the choice for the ICV award was made first. Since the Stryker ICV won, this had a major impact on the MGS award ([see page 33-34]).

After the awarded contracts were announced, UDLP was incensed. In the company's view, the tests subtly favored wheeled vehicles due to the choice of a road scenario for the mobility evaluation, that different data and assumptions will improve their proposals' relative position in terms of reliability and that GD was given many subtle advantages throughout. A protest was filed.

As per procedures, the protest was judged by the General Accounting Office (GAO). Of the three ICV proposals from UDLP, the M113A3 was determined to be the best. So, the GAO compared the M113A3 versus the Stryker ICV, and the M8 Buford versus the Stryker MGS.

The GAO felt that the evaluation had been done reasonably, and estimated while UDLP did have some potentially valid points (especially over the MGS, which may not even have passed a Band 2 requirement), they probably were not influential enough to have affected the outcome. Accordingly, the GAO rejected UDLP’s protest in this [36 page report].

Since the competition, GDLS bought out GM’s defense subsidiary, and became the sole supplier of the Stryker. Also, UDLP has since been acquired by BAE.

The choice has also sparked off a controversy, further incited because at least some of the Army's predictions (as of 2001 when the reports were made) have not come true.

In 2002, for example, the Army’s Cost and Economic Analysis Center evaluated a M113A3 as being costing only [$200,000] more over a 20-year period (which totals to $137.2 million for all six brigades for the same 20-year period) while being roughly half of the cost (including upgrades to make it Stryker-equivalent) in its conversion. This is far from the “significant superiority” for support costs (exact amounts censored) in the GAO protest decision, page 23. The Stryker MGS' "tremendous long term advantages" as evaluated by the SSA had not yet begun to bear fruit, for full production won't start till 2007. (The units are currently using the M1134 Stryker ATGM instead of the Stryker MGS, in addition to their normal compliment of the former.)

Criticisms

The Stryker has been something of a controversial vehicle, with many criticisms levered at its concept, design, doctrine and costs. The Stryker MGS is most often compared by critics to the cancelled M8 AGS and the ICV to the M113A3.

A 108-page report in 2003 to a Congressman reported on many flaws of the Stryker.

Disadvantages of wheeled vehicles in general

Critics claim that a wheeled vehicle suffers many disadvantages versus a tracked vehicle:

Inferior cross-country ability due to higher ground pressure. A track distributes vehicular weight over an area equal to the width of the tracks multiplied by its length on the ground, which tends to be comparable to the vehicle's length. Tires distribute weight only over the relatively small areas of tire contact with the ground. Thus tracks can go over terrain where wheels would sink. This also means it is more likely to set off pressure-detonated mines
The performance of a wheeled vehicle suffers more with excess weight than a tracked vehicle.
Wheels are high and vulnerable targets for even small arms. The wheel wells cannot be protected by track-style armored skirts, for that would interfere with the vehicle turning.
Wheels can turn the vehicle, but tracks can pivot the vehicle. Thus large wheeled vehicles (Stryker), have larger turn radii and inferior maneuverability.
Wheeled vehicles find it very difficult to surmount obstacles (such as barricades) that a tracked vehicle would easily climb over.
A wheeled vehicle is not really faster in field conditions when one takes into account the tracked vehicle's superior maneuverability and off-road performance.
Part of the wheeled vehicle's reputation for superior maintainability is due to the fact they are usually of lower mass.
Any advantages a wheeled vehicle has over steel tracked counterparts can be reduced by using new [band-track] and electric-drive technology. Conventional tracks consist of linked solid metal segments with rubber pads attached; a rubber band track consists of coils of steel cables coated in rubber. While rubber band tracks cannot support the weight of tanks, they have been tested up to weights of 30 tons and were used on US Army halftracks in the Second World War. The M113 APC and its upgraded MTVL form, the most often proposed alternatives to Stryker, could easily be fitted with these tracks. Between the band tracks and an electric-drive motor, it can actually match the Stryker's theoretical road speed of about 62MPH.

Design

In addition to generic criticisms from the choice of wheels over tracks, critics claim there are many flaws with the Stryker. They also caution that any positive testimonial must be evaluated against the fact that five of the six planned Stryker brigades were previously foot-infantry units, hence the Stryker (or any armored vehicle) provides a great improvement on their former mobility and protection. Further, Iraq's many paved roads and very dry climate make a number of criticisms less significant in the current conflict, yet no less valid overall. Although Canadians have had quite a bit of trouble with the LAV IIIs (which the Stryker is based on) getting stuck in the mud in Afghanistan and rolling over...

General Criticisms

A lack of amphibious ability. M113s and BMPs can swim either by using their tracks or (when so equipped) with waterjets. The wheeled BTR-90 of similar weight can swim using waterjets, and other wheeled vehicles like the LAV-150 can even swim (slowly) on wheels, but not the Stryker.
Its armor is ineffective against Rocket Propelled Grenade attacks, a very common type of attack. A 5,000 lb improvised "slat" armor add-on, looking like a fence around the vehicle, was fielded for Iraq operations to explode an RPG before it hits the vehicle and give added protection. But a December, 2004 report showed that even with the added slat-armor, the Stryker has been only 50 percent effective overall against Rocket Propelled Grenades during combat in Iraq. The slat armor add-on does not protect the rear or all of the large wheel wells and only defeats RPGs with High Explosive (HE) warheads. Armor-Piercing tipped RPGs have been known to punch through the slat-armor.
A original "Key Performance Factor" was for it to be air-transportable by C-130. Instead of flying 1000 miles, critics claim it can only fly 100. Size and weight drastically limit what support and personnel gear can be carried with Stryker.
It cannot be heliborne short of using a Mi-26.
It is quieter (than some) but larger and taller than comparable tracked vehicles.
As of now, the RWS has no stabilization ability. The RWS is considered to be slow, and hard to work with due to its Black and White optical camera system.
It is argued that any C4I technologies to be fitted on Stryker giving it its purported Situational Awareness advantage can also be installed on existing, more survivable and efficient vehicles
Computer systems for communications, intelligence and other systems have malfunctioned in the desert heat due to air conditioning problems.
Since Stryker is barely airmobile and unit cost is high, funds could be more effectively spent on more versatile systems instead of a narrow-focus armored car. Israeli M113 Zeldas and US (informally named) SuperGavins are successful in urban combat yet can cope with conditions that would strand armored cars.

ICV-specific criticisms

As with any external, unprotected, vehicle mounted weapon, the vehicle commander must expose himself in the hatch to reload or correct a weapons malfunction. Gunshields/TAGS gunshields as used on modified M113s would reduce exposure, but a crewman would still be forced to exit the hull to clear or reload. Reloading concerns limit firepower since magazine only holds 200 rounds. If the weapon is emptied in combat, enemy rifle fire can deter or prevent reloading.
High tire usage is a problem due to the vehicle being overweight.
The interior is limited with a squad of fully combat equipped soldiers, to include body armor with ballistic plates and a second load of ammunition that is also carried on the vehicle.
The rear-sentry hatches allow for only two soldiers to engage targets prior to dismount. The rest of the squad cannot fight from within the vehicle and are essentially passengers until dismount.

For further reading

MGS-specific criticisms

The C-130H and earlier variants cannot carry the heavier Mobile Gun System at all, thus totally failing the "Key Performance Factor" above. The Stryker MGS's listed transport weight, at [41572lbs], is only marginally less than the "brochure" maximum carring capacity of a C130J ([41,790lbs]). Since transport weight is lower than the combat weight, the vehicle cannot be transported in any kind of combat-ready state even on the C-130J.
Instead of using a low pressure gun like the M8 (or the Russian 2S25), the Stryker MGS uses a modified version of the M60's 105mm M68A1 (M68A1E4) cannon. This gun has far too much recoil for the Stryker's weight class.
Thus, they added a muzzle brake. Muzzle brakes reduce recoil at the cost of extra blast and noise. The noise level in tests approached 200dB. It is estimated that means a soldier cannot safely approach within 450m of a firing Stryker MGS. The blast debris was also extensive, forcing the crew to fight in the buttoned-up position.
Even with the muzzle brake, the recoil still damages the MGS' more delicate internals, such as night vision electronics, the lights, instrumentation and helmets worn by test dummies. Without the muzzle brake, the recoil mechanism is destroyed.
Unlike the M8 autoloader, the MGS autoloader apparently cannot reliably select the right type of round. It also has a carousel with half the capacity, reducing its battle endurance.
Only 2-axles on a Stryker are equipped with run-flat tires. The MGS is too heavy to be supported on 2 axles.
The lack of a winch means the Stryker can not perform a self recovery.

For further reading

Counter-criticisms

Advantages of Wheeled Vehicles

The raised hull of a Stryker can reduce land mine damage compared to an unmodified/unoptimized tracked vehicle design.
Critics claim that it is the tracked vehicle that is weight-inefficient. ^{[[Citing sources citation needed]]}
Tires do have the bright spot of having the run-flat option. This allows Strykers with extensive damage to tires from IEDs to continue their mission, or at least limp out of the area. Thrown tracks stop tracked vehicles until a towbar is attached or the track is repaired/replaced in situ.
Wheeled vehicles generally have lower life running costs and can last longer between maintenance cycles. Ability to put mileage on them that could wear out an M2 Bradley makes them very mobile in theater, lets them shift quickly and often.
Wheeled vehicles are quiet in comparison to tanks with conventional steel track, though less so in comparison to modern "band tracks".
Band tracked vehicles are easier to immobilize than other vehicles. Attacks that a metal track can shrug off could easily destroy a band track.
Wheeled vehicles consume considerably less fuel than tracked vehicles, reducing logistical demands and reducing the number of fuel convoys required to substain a force.
Wheeled vehicles can travel long distances on their own tires, while tracked vehicles suffer excess track wear unless they are carried by tank transporters over long distances.
Wheels don't destroy roads or curbs when driven over them, making them friendlier for policing missions.
Wheels give the Stryker the speed to engage in mid to high-speed chases through heavy traffic. Strykers can reach speeds in excess of 70 mph.
Stryker vehicles have an advantage in being able to drive with one or two wheels blown off, which they have had to do on many occasions where tracked vehicles would be disabled. Repairing tracks requires work outside the vehicle. So the crew is forced with a dangerous repair job or abandoning their vehicle. Metal tracks take more than two hours to perform battlefield repairs to its tracks, and Band Tracks have to be replaced (taking even more time).

Responses to Stryker-specific complaints

Proponents claim it is now capable of an operational radius of 600 miles. ^{[[Citing sources citation needed]]}
Reports say the Stryker has turned out to be very effective in protecting troops against Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, the most common cause of fatalities among US troops in Iraq.
It is actually smaller in its basic dimensions than a BTR-80 (in length and width, though it is taller). The Strkyer ICV variant w/o RWS is 104 inches tall, compared to the M2 Bradley which is 118.8 inches tall, and is only 6 inches taller than the M113 (98.28 inches tall). The Stryker ICV variant w/o RWS is also shorter than the USMC AAVP-7. The Strkyer ICV is not significantly taller than other armored vehicles currently in US service, and is in fact shorter than most.
Neither of the US military's frontline personel carriers, the M2 Bradley and the AAVP-7/A1 are transportable by helicopter. Heliborne assault of armored vehicles of this class is also not an commonly practiced maneauver by US forces. A standard M113A3 has a combat weight of [12.25] metric tons, which is [0.45 metric tons] from the external lift capacity of a CH-47 (for example), and is greater than its internal carry capacity. It is likely that proposed extended variations of the M113 and current uparmored M113s in service are also not helicopter transportable by the primary heavy lifter of the military service in question [the US Army].
The Stryker is within the weight limits to be airdropped by high altitude parachute systems [link], and low altitude extraction systems [link].
The armor does make it more survivable than a Humvee, the only vehicle so far the Stryker has been called upon to actually supplant.
The RPG threat was underestimated during the initial selection process, so Stryker's opposition were likewise not RPG-protected. For such protection, the M113s currently in Iraq also use Slat Armor, and the M2 Bradley uses Explosive Reactive armour (ERA). The only known APC that has enough base armor to protect it from RPGs is the Israeli Achzarit [link]. This vehicle is a converted captured 30+ year old T-55 tank. Comparing the Achzarit to the Stryker we find it has similar armmament (three light machine guns vs. Stryker's one heavy machine gun), carries less troops (7 vs. Stryker’s 9), and weighs more than twice as much (44 tons vs. Stryker’s 18.12 tons). (Reference: Even the US’s heaviest APC, the M2 Bradley, is lighter than the Achzarit.) Due to this heavy weight, a brigade equipped with this vehicle could not be rapidly air deployed.
Proponents claim soldiers are less cramped than in M2 or M113 vehicles. The ability to fire outside requires certain sacrifices which may reduce passenger survivability. Note that current Bradley Fighting Vehicles (both the M2 IFV and M3 CFV) retain only two of the original six firing ports, both in the rear doors, thus preventing all but two troops from engaging the enemy prior to dismount. Furthermore, these ports are specifically designed for the M231 Firing Port Weapon. Troops riding in Bradley vehicles cannot fire forward without dismounting. The M113 series has no firing ports what so ever, nor can its troops engage forward without exposing themselves through a large top hatch. From this one might say that the Stryker is no more deficient than any other vehicle currently in service in this role.
The M151 RWS already has two improved variants in the pipeline. The M151E1 (Block I Upgrade) will incorporate increased ammo storage, optics, and user controls. The M151E2 (Block II Upgrade) will incoporate improvements designed at engagment ability including system skew rate and on-the-move capabilities.
Durability allows fast repair and redeployment.
Proponents claim the ceramic armor may produce a reduced magnetic signature in comparison to other vehicles. ^{[[Citing sources citation needed]]}
Strykers' advanced communication systems give them excellent situational awareness, letting them coordinate fast raids and missions almost on-the-fly, even in unfamiliar territory, and expect that they will be successful (in fact, this was the purpose of fielding the Stryker in the first place).
The Stryker's tire pressure can be adjusted by the crew inside the vehicle, allowing the tires to have low pressure for travel through deserts, or higher pressure for travel down roads, without soldier leaving the protection of the armor.
Proposed Stryker variants mimick almost almost all variants of the M113 platform except for air defense, dedicated smoke generation, unarmed utility, mobile flamethrower, and as a fitter vehicle. An air defense vehicle based on LAVIII chassis has already been proposed in Canada. Armored flame throwing vehicles have largely become a thing of the past, and the Stryker could easily be modified to deploy a smoke screen. The fitter vehicle based on the M113 chassis was not deployed by the United States military. Lastly, it would appear that there is no need to supplant or otherwise replace or improve existing unarmed utility options available to the US Army or other services.

Responses to MGS-specific complaints

Many of the complaints about the MGS listed here are problems noted in vehicle testing and development. A few of these points were posted before its approval for low rate intial production, and so may no longer be valid. There is no evidence that these problems will still be around in the final design.

Updates

[Defense Industry Daily: M1126 Strykers in Combat: Experiences and Lessons]. Addresses both the Washington Post article and POGO's honest but puzzled publication of its surprise at the positive reviews it got from soldiers who had used the Strykers in combat. It includes extensive additional quotes and experiences from soldiers and reporters who have served with Strykers in Iraq, and even a Russian analyst review. It concludes by discussing the broader lessons from these experiences that apply beyond the Stryker itself. Source: [Stars and Stripes],testimony & analysis in DID article.

Soldiers and officers who use Strykers defend them as very effective vehicles; an article in the Washington Post states:

"But in more than a dozen interviews, commanders, soldiers and mechanics who use the Stryker fleet daily in one of Iraq's most dangerous areas unanimously praised the vehicle. The defects outlined in the report were either wrong or relatively minor and did little to hamper the Stryker's effectiveness, they said.".

One colonel said that the Strykers saved the lives of at least a hundred soldiers deployed in northern Iraq. See [Soldiers Defend Faulted Strykers]

Soldiers of a Stryker Unit say they will not go into combat without a Stryker.

Colby Buzzell, in "My War" and [on his blog], defends the utility of the Stryker over track armor in urban settings.

The Stryker MGS has been pushed into low-rate initial production for evaluation. [link], with plans for full production in 2007, though it has now apparently been cancelled by the US Army.^{[[Citing sources citation needed]]}

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