Taliban insurgency
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The Taliban insurgency started shortly after their fall from power after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The Taliban continue to attack Afghan, ISAF and U.S. army troops and a few terrorist incidents have been registered. Al-Qaeda is closely associated with their activity. The war has also spread to Pakistan (Waziristan War). The Taliban conduct low- intensity warfare against the Afghan regular army and coalition forces.
After managing to evade U.S. forces throughout the summer of 2002, the remnants of the Taliban gradually began to regain their confidence and started to begin preparations to launch the insurgency that Mullah Mohammed Omar had promised during the Taliban's last days in power. During September 2002, Taliban forces began a recruitment drive in Pashtun areas in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to launch a renewed "jihad" or holy war against the Afghan government and the U.S-led coalition. Pamphlets distributed in secret during the night also began to appear in many villages in the former Taliban heartland in southeastern Afghanistan that called for jihad. Small mobile training camps were established along the border with Pakistan by al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives to train new recruits in guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, according to Afghan sources and a United Nations report. Most of the new recruits were drawn from the madrassas or religious schools of the tribal areas of Pakistan, from which the Taliban had originally arisen. Major bases, a few with as many as 200 men, were created in the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan by the summer of 2003. The will of the Pakistani paramilitaries stationed at border crossings to prevent such infiltration was called into question, and Pakistani military operations proved of little use.
Timeline
The Taliban gradually reorganized and reconstituted their forces over the winter 2002-2003, preparing for a summer offensive in 2003. They established a new mode of operation: gather into groups of around 50 to launch attacks on isolated outposts and convoys of Afghan soldiers, police, or militia and then breaking up into groups of 5-10 men to evade subsequent offensives. U.S. forces in the strategy were attacked indirectly, through rocket attacks on bases and improvised mines planted in the roadside. To coordinate the strategy, Mullah Omar named a 10-man leadership council for the resistance, with himself at the head. Five operational zones were created, assigned to various Taliban commanders such as the key Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah, in charge of Zabul province operations. Al-Qaeda forces in the east had a bolder strategy of concentrating on the Americans and catching them when they could with elaborate ambushes.The first sign that Taliban forces were regrouping came on January 28 2003, when a band of 80 fighters allied with the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami were discovered and assaulted by U.S. forces at the Adi Ghar cave complex 15 miles (24 km) north of Spin Boldak.[[Citing sources citation needed]] 18 rebels were reported killed and no U.S. casualties reported. The site was suspected to be a base to funnel supplies and fighters from Pakistan. The first isolated attacks by relatively large Taliban bands on Afghan targets also appeared around that time.
As the summer of 2003 continued, the attacks gradually increased in frequency in the "Taliban heartland." Dozens of Afghan government soldiers, non-governmental organization and humanitarian workers, and several U.S. soldiers died in the raids, ambushes, and rocket attacks. In addition to the guerrilla attacks, Taliban fighters began building up their forces in the district of Dai Chopan, a district in Zabul province that also straddles Kandahar and Uruzgan and is at the very center of the Taliban heartland. Dai Chopan district is a remote and sparsely populated corner of southeastern Afghanistan composed of towering, rocky mountains interspersed with thin gorges. Taliban fighters decided it would be the perfect area to make a stand against the Afghan government and the coalition forces. Over the course of summer 2003 up to 1,000 guerrillas regrouped in the area, perhaps the largest concentration of Taliban militants since the fall of the regime. As Taliban fighters gained strength, over 220 people, including several dozen Afghan police, were killed in August 2003. The U.S. military is currently sustaining approximately one death and four wounded per week in Afghanistan.
Coalition Response
As a result, coalition forces have begun preparing offensives to root out the rebel forces. In late 2005, Afghan government forces backed by U.S troops and heavy American aerial bombardment advanced upon Taliban positions within the mountain fortress. After a one-week battle, Taliban forces were routed with up to 124 fighters (according to Afghan government estimates) killed. Taliban spokesmen, however, denied the high casualty figure and U.S estimates were somewhat lower. By the first week of September, however, Taliban forces had been scattered from their base at Dai-Chopan. The newest operation (Operation Mountain Thrust) was launched on June 13, 2006 with the purposes of rooting out Taliban forces [link]. On July 3, 2006 it was reported that the army is warning Tony Blair that they face defeat in Afghanistan, and are calling for more reinforcements [link].
2006 escalation
Events had developed to such a point that Afghan President Hamid Karzai had taken the extraordinary measure of publically condemning the methods of western powers who worked to place him in power. In June 2006 he said:"And for two years I have systematically, consistently and on a daily basis warned the international community of what was developing in Afghanistan and of the need for a change of approach in this regard."
and
“The international community [must] reassess the manner in which this war against terror is conducted”
Before the summer 2006 offensive began indications existed that NATO peacekeepers had lost influence and power to other groups, including potentially the Taliban. The most noted of this is the riots in May after a street accident in the city of Kabul. Though it is very hard to gain any visibility about what is happening in Afghanistan it is possible to deduce a number of troubling probabilities given general knowledge of the situation. The continued support from tribes and other in Pakistan, the drug trade, the failure to produce a true central government and the small number of NATO combined with the long history of resistance and isolation all combine to the conclusion that if not gaining power post-Taliban forces and leaders are likely surviving and will play a significant role in Afghanistan in to the future.
What is significantly troubling is the introduction of suicide and terrorist methods in the war not used in 2001. This points to a possible expansion of foreign Jihadist influence in the war and the growth of a global movement able to deploy hundreds of suicide attackers in many different countries. Since survival of such movements depends of their ability to remain hidden from Western Intelligence it is impossible to form a good understanding of how one works while it still exists.
See also
| Main events | Specific articles | Primary participants | Other important figures |
2001:
| Related events: |
NATO members and allies
John Howard |
Political leaders:
Hamid KarzaiPervez Musharraf Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Abdullah of Saudi Arabia Kofi Annan * political leaders no longer in office. |
External links
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