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Tax protester arguments

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Tax protester arguments are a number of heterodox theories that deny that a person has a legal obligation to pay a tax for which the government has determined that person is liable. Tax protester arguments are typically based on an asserted belief that the government is acting outside of its legal authority when imposing such taxes. (See also: Tax protester)

Denial of tax liability in the United States

Arguments made by tax protesters generally deal with the U.S. Federal income tax and not with other taxes such as the gift tax, estate tax, sales tax, and property tax (although some tax protesters have attacked the last category under allodial title claims). Arguments against the income tax generally fall into several categories:

*that the Sixteenth Amendment was never properly ratified and is therefore not really part of the U.S. Constitution;
*that the Sixteenth Amendment was properly ratified but does not permit the taxation of individual income, or particular forms of individual income;
*that the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant to its constitutional taxing power are defective or invalid;
*that the statutes are misapplied by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the courts, lawyers, certified public accountants, law professors, and legal experts generally, and that the tax "protesters" are not liable for tax under the law; and
*that since the year 1913 (the year of the inception of the modern Federal income tax) several generations of IRS employees, Department of Justice employees, the United States Congress, Federal court judges, lawyers, certified public accountants, and other experts have engaged in various continuing conspiracies to conceal the above deficiencies.
These arguments generally contain logical fallacies and selective interpretation of perceived syntactic ambiguity in statutes and cases, and are often based on general misconceptions about (1) fundamental U.S. legal concepts (especially the fundamentals common to all U.S. laws not separately "spelled out" in "tax law" materials), (2) how to perform formal analysis of legal texts in general (especially, how to analyze statutes and case law), (3) the structure of the U.S. legal system, and (4) the operations of the government.

Arguments that the Sixteenth Amendment was never ratified

One argument that has been raised several times (and always ruled meritless) suggests that the Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified. This argument is based on the contention that the legislatures of various states passed bills of ratification with different capitalization, spelling of words, or punctuation marks (e.g. semi-colons instead of commas). The earliest reported court case where this argument was raised appears to be United States v. House, 617 F. Supp. 237, 87-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9562 (W.D. Mich. 1985), about seventy-two years after the ratification. The best-known proponent of the non-ratification claim is William J. Benson, co-author of the book The Law That Never Was (1985), who testified in the House case to no avail. The Benson contention was comprehensively addressed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. den. 107 S.Ct. 187 (1986):

:Thomas is a tax protester, and one of his arguments is that he did not need to file tax returns because the sixteenth amendment is not part of the constitution. It was not properly ratified, Thomas insists, repeating the argument of W. Benson & M. Beckman, The Law That Never Was (1985). Benson and Beckman review the documents concerning the states' ratification of the sixteenth amendment and conclude that only four states ratified the sixteenth amendment; they insist that the official promulgation of that amendment by Secretary of State Knox in 1913 is therefore void.
:Benson and Beckman did not discover anything; they rediscovered something that Secretary Knox considered in 1913. Thirty-eight states ratified the sixteenth amendment, and thirty-seven sent formal instruments of ratification to the Secretary of State. (Minnesota notified the Secretary orally, and additional states ratified later; we consider only those Secretary Knox considered.) Only four instruments repeat the language of the sixteenth amendment exactly as Congress approved it. The others contain errors of diction, capitalization, punctuation, and spelling. The text Congress transmitted to the states was: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." Many of the instruments neglected to capitalize "States," and some capitalized other words instead. The instrument from Illinois had "remuneration" in place of "enumeration"; the instrument from Missouri substituted "levy" for "lay"; the instrument from Washington had "income" not "incomes"; others made similar blunders.
:Thomas insists that because the states did not approve exactly the same text, the amendment did not go into effect. Secretary Knox considered this argument. The Solicitor of the Department of State drew up a list of the errors in the instruments and — taking into account both the triviality of the deviations and the treatment of earlier amendments that had experienced more substantial problems — advised the Secretary that he was authorized to declare the amendment adopted. The Secretary did so.
:Although Thomas urges us to take the view of several state courts that only agreement on the literal text may make a legal document effective, the Supreme Court follows the "enrolled bill rule." If a legislative document is authenticated in regular form by the appropriate officials, the court treats that document as properly adopted. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 36 L.Ed. 294, 12 S.Ct. 495 (1892). The principle is equally applicable to constitutional amendments. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 66 L.Ed. 505, 42 S.Ct. 217 (1922), which treats as conclusive the declaration of the Secretary of State that the nineteenth amendment had been adopted. In United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d. 457, 462-463, n.6 (7th Cir. 1986), we relied on Leser, as well as the inconsequential nature of the objections in the face of the 73-year acceptance of the effectiveness of the sixteenth amendment, to reject a claim similar to Thomas's. See also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 83 L. Ed. 1385, 59 S. Ct. 972 (1939) (questions about ratification of amendments may be nonjusticiable). Secretary Knox declared that enough states had ratified the sixteenth amendment. The Secretary's decision is not transparently defective. We need not decide when, if ever, such a decision may be reviewed in order to know that Secretary Knox's decision is now beyond review.
This decision did not satisfy tax protesters, who contended that the Courts, in order to set a precedent supporting ratification, deliberately chose to hear cases in which the litigants presented no "evidence." However, appeals courts (including the Supreme Court) decide questions of law, not questions of fact. Under the U.S. legal system, "evidence" cannot be "admitted" at the appeals court level, as all evidence must be presented at the trial court, where factual (evidentiary) issues are determined. In other words, the appellate court could determine whether a particular item of evidence should or should not have been admitted at the trial court level, and could refer to evidence that was admitted (or refused) by the trial court to determine whether the trial court's decision was correct, but the appellate court does not itself hear "testimony" or other "evidence." Further, the question of whether a particular amendment is a valid part of the Constitution would be a question of law, not a question of "evidence" or "fact."

Similar "Sixteenth Amendment arguments" have been uniformly rejected by the courts in other cases including Ficalora v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 85, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9103 (2d Cir. 1984); Sisk v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 58, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9433 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43, 88-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827 (1988); and United States v. Stahl, 792 F.2d 1438, 86-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9518 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 888 (1987). The non-ratification argument has been specifically deemed legally frivolous in Brown v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 94, T.C. Memo 1987-78, CCH Dec. 43,696(M) (1987); Lysiak v. Commissioner, 816 F.2d 311, 87-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9296 (7th Cir. 1987); and Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 89-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9184 (7th Cir. 1989).

William J. Benson, the co-author of the book mentioned in the Thomas case above, was unsuccessful with his Sixteenth Amendment argument when he had his own legal problems. He was prosecuted for tax evasion and willful failure to file tax returns. The court rejected his Sixteenth Amendment "non-ratification" argument in United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,437 (7th Cir. 1991). Benson was convicted of tax evasion and willful failure to file tax returns in connection with over $100,000 of unreported income, and his conviction was upheld on appeal. He was sentenced to four years in prison and five years of probation. See United States v. Benson, 67 F.3d 641, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,540 (7th Cir. 1995).

Another argument made by some tax protesters is that because Congress did not pass an official proclamation recognizing Ohio's year 1803 admission to statehood until 1953 (see Ohio Constitution), Ohio was not a state until 1953 and therefore the Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified. The earliest reported court case where this argument was raised appears to be Ivey v. United States, 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9682 (E.D. Wisc. 1976), some sixty-three years after the ratification. This argument also has been uniformly rejected by the courts. See, for example, Knoblauch v. Commissioner, 749 F.2d 200, 85-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9109 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985).

Arguments that the Sixteenth Amendment does not permit taxation of income

Some protesters have argued that because the Sixteenth Amendment does not contain the words "repeal" or "repealed," the Amendment is ineffective to change the law forming the basis of cases decided prior to the ratification of the amendment. This argument has never succeeded in the courts, in part for the simple reason that under the American legal system there is no requirement that an amendment include the words "repeal" or "repealed" to be Constitutionally valid. Instead, U.S. constitutional law with respect to constitutional amendments includes a form of the legal doctrine known as the "doctrine of implied repeal". See also Constitutional amendment. Indeed, the vast majority of U.S. Constitutional amendments do not contain the words "repeal" or "repealed." Section One of the Twenty-first Amendment contains a notable exception.

Another argument made by tax protesters is that the word "income" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment cannot be interpreted as applying to wages, or that the government cannot tax "labor." Others have claimed that wages are not income because labor is exchanged for them.

All courts that have considered these positions have rejected them, and have imposed sanctions on persons who raise these arguments.

Arguments relating to citizenship or the Fourteenth Amendment

Some tax protesters argue that all Americans are citizens of individual states as opposed to citizens of the "United States," and the United States therefore has no power to tax citizens outside of Washington D.C. However, the Fourteenth Amendment states, in part, All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.

Notably, some tax protesters contend that the Fourteenth Amendment itself was never properly ratified, under the theory that the governments of southern states that supported the post-Civil War amendments were not representative of the people.

Other Constitutional arguments

Some protesters argue that imposition of income taxes violates the First Amendment freedom of speech because it requires the subject of the tax to write information on a tax return; or violates freedom of religion if the subject of the tax claims some religious objection to the payment of taxes, particularly if the subject styles himself or herself as a Reverend, Minister, or other religious office-holder. However, while the Internal Revenue Code makes an exemption for churches and other religious institutions, it makes no such exception for religious professionals. The United States Supreme Court long ago held in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), that a religious belief, however strongly held, does not exempt the believer from adhering to general laws.

Other protesters argue that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination allows an individual to refuse to file an income tax return calling for information that could lead to a convicton for criminal acts from which the income was derived, or for the crime of not paying the tax itself. In response, the courts generally refer to the case of United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1927), where Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:

If the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all.... It would be an extreme if not an extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in crime. But if the defendant desired to test that or any other point he should have tested it in the return so that it could be passed upon. He could not draw a conjurer's circle around the whole matter by his own declaration that to write any word upon the government blank would bring him into danger of the law.

Some protesters have argued that the income tax is a prohibited "taking" under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, and can not be imposed unless the taxpayer receives adequate compensation. The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad.

Another tax protester argument is that a 'missing' Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution known as the Titles of Nobility amendment precedes the current Thirteenth Amendment; the missing amendment purportedly would have divested the citizenship of any person receiving a title of nobility. Therefore, actions taken by lawyers and judges, who use the title 'Esquire' (which is claimed to be a title of nobility), are monarchial, and therefore unconstitutional. This contention, rarely raised before courts, was most recently addressed in Campion v. Towns, No.CV-04-1516PHX-ROS, *2 n.1 (D. Ariz. 2005) as a defense to a charge of tax evasion. The court replied:

Additionally, the Court will correct any misunderstanding Plaintiff has concerning the text of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In his Complaint, Plaintiff includes a certified copy of the Thirteenth Amendment from the Colorado State Archives which was published in 1861. As included in that compilation, the Thirteenth Amendment would strip an individual of United States citizenship if they accept any title of nobility or honor. However, this is not the Thirteenth Amendment. The correct Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery. Although some people claim that state publication of the erroneous Thirteenth Amendment makes it valid, Article V of the Constitution does not so provide.

Conspiracy arguments, in general

Tax protester Irwin Schiff, following his criminal conviction for tax fraud that resulted in the imposition of a 13-year prison sentence, released a statement asserting in part that "the entire federal judiciary is involved in a monumental, criminal conspiracy to collect income taxes in violation of law". In explaining its numerous court defeats, the tax protester movement relies on a claim of the existence of such a conspiracy involving all federal judges, members of Congress, and executive branch officers from both parties up to the President of the United States. Among the claims made in line with this belief:

Arguments about money

Some protesters have argued that Federal Reserve notes (better known as dollar bills) are not actually money, because the Constitution only permits the government to "coin" money, and requires that such money be exchangeable for gold or silver; therefore, printed bills are instead symbols for use in bartering, and being paid in dollars is not the receipt of taxable income. This argument was brought before a court in Wilson v. U.S., 1998 WL 937356 (D.Col. 1998). The court responded:

"The contention that paper money is illegal has been consistently rejected. … Congress has exercised this power by delegation to the federal reserve system. 12 U.S.C. section 411. Federal reserve notes are legal tender for all debts, including taxes. 31 U.S.C. section 392 [now #redirect ] Milam v. U.S. 524 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1974). The United States Constitution, art. 1, section 10, 'prohibits the states from declaring legal tender anything other than gold or silver, but does not limit Congress' power to declare what shall be legal tender for all debts.' U.S. v. Rifen, 577 F.2d 1111, 1112 (8th Cir. 1978). Since Congress has done so, there can be no valid challenge to the legality of federal reserve notes. United States v. Anderson, 584 F.2d 369, 374 (10th Cir. 1978)."

The argument about whether Federal reserve notes are "money" also ignores the essence of the income tax, which is imposed on "income from whatever source derived," not merely on the receipt of "money."

Other occasionally encountered arguments from tax protesters include the notion that U.S. currency is valueless or unauthorized by the Constitution because the currency is fiat money untied to the gold standard. No court has upheld the validity of that argument.

Arguments about tax administration and process

Some tax protesters argue that there is no law imposing a Federal income tax or requiring a payment of tax. Internal Revenue Code sections 1 (#redirect ) (relating to individuals, estates and trusts) and 11 (#redirect ) (relating to corporations) are examples of statutes that impose an income tax on "taxable income," which in turn is defined in section 63 (#redirect ) with reference to "gross income" which in turn is defined in #redirect . The requirement to file Federal income tax returns is imposed at #redirect (see also #redirect ). For the duty to pay the tax at the time prescribed for filing the related tax return, see #redirect . Civil (monetary) penalties for failure to timely file tax returns are imposed at #redirect . For civil penalties for failure to timely pay taxes, see #redirect . Criminal penalties for willful failure to timely file tax returns or pay taxes are prescribed at #redirect . Criminal penalties for willfully filing false tax returns are imposed under #redirect , #redirect and #redirect . The general Federal tax evasion statute is #redirect .

Some tax protesters claim the following language from a court decision in Schulz v. Internal Revenue Service, 395 F.3d 463, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,165 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam), means that a taxpayer has a due process right to demand a response from the IRS as to why he or she is subject to taxation:

. . .absent an effort to seek enforcement through a federal court, IRS summonses apply no force to taxpayers, and no consequence whatever can befall a taxpayer who refuses, ignores, or otherwise does not comply with an IRS summons until that summons is backed by a federal court order. . . . any individual subject to [such a court order] must be given a reasonable opportunity to comply and cannot be held in contempt, arrested, detained, or otherwise punished for refusing to comply with the original IRS summons, no matter the taxpayer's reasons, or lack of reasons for so refusing. [link]

However, the court in Schulz did not rule that a taxpayer has a right to have the IRS explain why he or she is subject to taxation, and that issue was not even presented to the court. The taxpayer in the case had filed motions in a federal court to quash administrative summonses issued by the IRS seeking testimony and documents in connection with an IRS investigation. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the taxpayer's motions for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no actual case or controversy as required by Article III of the Constitution. The summonses posed no threat of injury to the taxpayer, as the IRS had not yet initiated enforcement proceedings against him. In other words, the taxpayer was not entitled to a court order to quash the summonses until the IRS went to court to demand that he comply with the summons or otherwise face sanctions -- which the IRS had not yet done. Once the IRS took that action, the taxpayer would then have ample opportunity to challenge the validity of the summonses.

The confusion results when a quotation is taken out of context. The court was emphasizing that the law requires the IRS to use the judicial process to punish lack of compliance with an administrative summons; the summons is not self-enforcing. This is true of any government request where the citizen is free to ignore the request until the government brings enforcement action. Courts adjudicate only actual controversies. In the Schulz case the court wanted to leave room for the possibility that the IRS might decide to drop the investigation and never enforce the summonses or that the plaintiff might voluntarily comply with the request. Until the IRS took the taxpayer to court, the injury was merely "hypothetical."

While there is disagreement over exactly how "imminent" an injury has to be before a taxpayer can obtain relief from a court, this has nothing to do with the obligation to timely file a tax return (which is imposed by statute). The Schulz court did not rule that the IRS was required to "explain" to the taxpayer why he had to pay taxes, but rather that the taxpayer could not obtain a court order to quash the summonses until the IRS first went to court against him. Additionally, the taxpayer was challenging requests for documents and testimony for an investigation (similar to challenging a subpoena or warrant), not demanding that the IRS explain to him why he was subject to taxation. The court did not rule that a taxpayer has no obligation to respond to a summons until the IRS undertakes proceedings against the taxpayer. The court essentially ruled that the taxpayer cannot be punished for failing to comply until the taxpayer has violated a court order mandating compliance.

Arguments about authority of IRS employees

Some tax protesters believe the IRS does not have the authority to assert penalties -- basing the argument on Internal Revenue Code section 6020(b)(1) which states "Authority of Secretary to execute return. If any person fails to make any return required by any internal revenue law or regulation made thereunder at the time prescribed therefor, or makes, willfully or otherwise, a false or fraudulent return, the Secretary shall make such return from his own knowledge and from such information as he can obtain through testimony or otherwise." Some protesters contend that this provision somehow shows that IRS agents have no authority to impose penalties unless they have a delegation from the Secretary, although the logic of the argument is unclear given that the function of imposing penalties is a separate function from that of preparing section 6020(b) returns.

Tax protesters sometimes assert that court decisions that IRS agents have delegated powers from the Secretary of the Treasury constitute a blatant disregard for the law, which tax protesters cite as proof that the finding of the court is somehow opposite of what the law says. At any rate, under #redirect , #redirect , and #redirect and the Treasury regulation at 26 C.F.R. section 301.6020-1(a)(1), IRS agents do indeed have the delegated power to prepare section 6020(b) returns (see Craig v. Lowe, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,416 (N.D. Calif. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,316 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also Delegation Order 182 (Rev. 7), at IRM 1.2.44.5 (5 May 1997), which specifically delegates this authority to Internal Revenue Agents, Tax Auditors, and Revenue Officers of grade GS-9 and above, and to various other IRS personnel. In Craig, the taxpayer argued that only the Secretary of the Treasury himself or herself was authorized under section 6020 to prepare returns for taxpayers despite the plain language of section 6020 which uses the word "Secretary" (without the phrase "of the Treasury"). Under section 7701(a)(11)(B), where used in the Internal Revenue Code without the phrase "of the Treasury," the term "Secretary" means the "Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate" (emphasis added). The phrase "or his delegate" is defined in part as "any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department duly authorized [ . . . ] to perform the function mentioned or described [ . . . ]" (see section 7701(a)(12)(A)(i)). The Court rejected the taxpayer's argument, and ruled that an IRS Revenue Agent "plainly falls" within the cited Treasury regulation.

Another group of protesters claims the existing law demands income tax only from federal employees and residents of US territories. Their argument does not rely on nonpassage of the 16th Amendment, but does suggest it.[link] They have asked the IRS and other authorities to cite the laws requiring others to pay income tax. This group claims never to have received an answer.

Arguments about the legal status of the Internal Revenue Service

A somewhat incidental claim of tax protesters is that because the IRS itself was not created by statute or because the IRS has no legal capacity to "sue or be sued," the IRS must somehow not really be a federal government agency. Some claim it is a Puerto Rican trust [link]. The courts have uniformly rejected such arguments. As explained below, the "Internal Revenue Service" is specifically referred to in statutes and regulations as both an "agency" and a "bureau." Although the IRS, as a bureau within the Treasury Department, was not created by statute (and no law requires that the IRS, as a bureau within an executive department, be "created" by statute), the United States Supreme Court, in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), specifically referred to the Revenue Act of 1862, the "Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, the statute to which the present Internal Revenue Service can be traced" (emphasis added). (The 1862 Act created the office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue.) Due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the IRS itself (along with many other Federal agencies) does not, as a general rule, have the capacity to "sue and be sued" -- a concept separate from that of whether the IRS is a U.S. "government agency." See, for example, Thompson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service and United States of America, 2006-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,392 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (hereinafter Thompson) where the court stated that the "Department of the Treasury" and "Internal Revenue Service" are "federal agencies within the United States Government. Federal agencies may not be sued in their own name except to the extent Congress may specifically allow such suits" (bolding added). Also, "Congress has made no provisions for suits against either the IRS or the Treasury Department, so these agencies are not proper entities for suit. Where taxpayers are authorized to sue on matters arising out of IRS actions, the United States is the proper party defendant" (from Devries v. Internal Revenue Service, 359 F. Supp. 2d 988 (E.D. Calif. 2005), as quoted in Thompson).

Some tax protesters even claim that the Internal Revenue Service is not mentioned in the statutes, despite the fact that the Internal Revenue Code contains over ninety references to "Internal Revenue Service". Many Internal Revenue Code sections contain multiple references to "Internal Revenue Service" (for example, see section 6103: #redirect ; #redirect ; #redirect ; #redirect ; #redirect ; #redirect ; #redirect ; #redirect ; #redirect ). At least nineteen references to "Internal Revenue Service" are found in titles 2, 5, 12, 23, 31, and 42 of the United States Code. For example, #redirect refers to the "Internal Revenue Service" as an "agency" of the Treasury Department. According to the official web site of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service is a bureau located within the Department [link].

The official U.S. Treasury regulations provide (in part):

::The Internal Revenue Service is a bureau of the Department of the Treasury under the immediate direction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Commissioner has general superintendence of the assessment and collection of all taxes imposed by any law providing internal revenue. The Internal Revenue Service is the agency by which these functions are performed.
26 C.F.R. section 601.101(a) (emphasis added).

The "Internal Revenue Service" is also listed as a "component" and "agency" of the U.S. Department of the Treasury in the official government regulations for "Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Department of the Treasury" at 5 C.F.R. section 3101.102(f). The House Committee Report accompanying the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (July 22, 1998), specifically refers to the IRS as being one of the "agencies within the Treasury." See H.R. Rep. No. 105-364, pt. 1.)

Other arguments

Some tax protesters have argued that none of the fifty U.S. states are "states" under the tax code. No court has upheld this argument.

The position of the Internal Revenue Service

The position of the Internal Revenue Service based upon the statutes and upon the related legal precedents in case law, is that these and similar tax protest arguments are frivolous and, if adopted by taxpayers as a basis for failure to timely file tax returns or pay taxes, may subject such taxpayers to penalties. As stated in the Arkansas District Court case of United States v. Rempel 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8518, *; 87 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1810 "It is apparent ...that the defendants have at least had access to some of the publications of tax protester organizations. The publications of these organizations have a bad habit of giving lots of advice without explaining the consequences which can flow from the assertion of totally discredited legal positions and/or meritless factual positions."

External links

 


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