United States v. Lopez

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United States v. Lopez, [514 U.S. 549] (1995) was the first United States Supreme Court case since the Great Depression to set limits to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

Background

Alfonso Lopez, Jr carried a handgun and cartridges into his high school, Edison High, San Antonio, Texas. He was charged with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act (of 1990), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).

The government argued that possession of a firearm in a school zone can be expected to lead to violent crime, which can be expected to affect economy and traveling in the area, as well as to produce a citizenry with less of an education due to the distraction of the violent crime and in the long-term, a weaker economy. Thus, possession of a firearm at a school falls under jurisdiction of the Commerce Clause.

Supreme Court decision

The Supreme Court held that while Congress had broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, it was not unlimited, and did not apply to something as far from commerce as carrying handguns, especially when there was no evidence that carrying them affected the economy on a massive scale. (A later case, United States v. Morrison (2000), ruled that Congress could not make such laws even when there was evidence of aggregate affect.)

Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the court, wrote that Congress had the power to regulate only:

the channels of commerce,
the instrumentalities of commerce, and
action that substantially affects interstate commerce.

He dismissed the government's argument, reasoning that if Congress could regulate something so far removed from commerce, then it could regulate anything, and since the Constitution clearly creates Congress as a body with enumerated powers, this could not be so. He concludes:

To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do.

It is important to note that although the ruling stopped a decades-long trend of inclusiveness under the commerce clause, it did not reverse any past ruling about the meaning of the clause.

The Court specifically looked to four factors in their determination.

Whether the activity was non-economic as opposed to economic activity; previous cases involved economic activity.
Jurisdictional element: whether the gun had moved in interstate commerce.
Whether there had been Congressional findings of an economic link between guns and education.
How attenuated the link was between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.

External links

[Full text at Cornell.edu]

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