Voting paradox
Encyclopedia : V : VO : VOT : Voting paradox
The voting paradox (also known as Condorcet's paradox or the paradox of voting) is a situation noted by the Marquis de Condorcet in the late 18th century, in which collective preferences can be cyclic (i.e. not transitive), even if the preferences of individual voters are not. This is paradoxical, because it means that majority wishes can be in conflict with each other. When this occurs, it is because the conflicting majorities are each made up of different groups of individuals. For example, suppose we have three candidates, A, B and C, and that there are three voters with preferences as follows (candidates being listed in decreasing order of preference):
- Voter 1: A B C
- Voter 2: B C A
- Voter 3: C A B
When a Condorcet method is used to determine an election, a voting paradox among the ballots can mean that the election has no Condorcet winner. The several variants of the Condorcet method differ chiefly on how they resolve such ambiguities when they arise to determine a winner. Note that there is no fair and deterministic resolution to this trivial example because each candidate is in an exactly symmetrical situation.
See also
- Kenneth Arrow, Section 1 with an example of a distributional difficulty of intransitivity + majority rule
- Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Smith set
- Social Choice and Individual Values
- voting system
- [Paradox of Majority Rule], a Madisonian rendering
From Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Original article here. Support Wikipedia by contributing or donating.
All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License See Wikipedia Copyrights for details.
